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ABSTRACT
The present thesis is a po litica l study of the reign of al-Hakim 
Bi Amr Allah the sixth Fatimid Imam-Caliph who ruled between 386-411/ 
996-1021. It consists of a note on the sources and seven chapters. The first 
chapter is a biographical review of al-Hakim's person. I t  introduces a 
history of his b irth , childhood, succession to the Caliphate, his education 
and private life  and it  examines the contradiction in the sources concerning 
his character.
Chapter II discusses the problems which al-Hakim inherited from 
the previous rule and examines their impact on the po litica l life  of his State.
Chapter III introduces the administration of the internal affairs of 
the State. It examines the struggle for power between the Imgm-Caliph and 
his Wasita and its results on the internal policies of the Imam-Caliph. If also 
discusses the economic, social, legal and architectural reforms which he 
introduced throughout his reign. The progress of the Ismaili Da*wa and the 
problem of Ahl af-Dhimma are also examined in this chapter.
Chapter IV is devoted to the external policy of a l-Hakim . It studies 
his policies concerning the maintenance of his suzerainty over the provinces 
of Damascus, H ijaz and Tripoli and his endeavour to extend i t  over Aleppo 
and other parts of the Muslim world. His policy towards the Byzantine and 
Abbasid Empires is also discussed in this chapter.
Chapter V examines the rebellions and uprisings which al-Hakim 
faced and discusses his methods in dealing with them.
Chapter VI introduces the split in the Ismaili Da*wa which resulted 
in the creation of the Druz Sect. It also examines the causes behind such 
an important event.
Chapter VII is concerned with the death or "disappearance" of 
al-Hakim and discusses the stories and myths surrounding i t ,
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NOTE ON THE SOURCES
A satisfactory account of Fatimid history is a most d iff icu lt task.
The major problem is, of course, the lack of coherent information. By 
comparison with the profusion of words the sources contain concerning the 
Umayyad or the Abbasid dynasties, the actual information relevant to the 
Fatimids is very small. More has been written about the Umayyad Caliph 
f Abd a I-M a lik  or a l-M a ’ mun of the Abbasids than the whole dynasty of the 
Fatimid Caliphs. Contrary to those periods, accounts on Fatimid history 
are very brief and seldom give different versions of important events. In 
addition to that there is the biased view of chroniclers. Most of them were, 
d irectly or indirectly, influenced by bigoted religious beliefs and political 
hostility . They have labelled the Fatimid Caliphs as "imposters, irreligious'1 
etc. and thus their accounts can hardly do justice to the Fatimid cause.
Unfortunately, the greater amount of the surviving Ismaili literature, 
which would be expected to put the pro-Fatimid view, is concerned with 
theological polemics. It is of great value for religious studies but contains 
lit t le  information on history and thus the other side of the picture remains 
unclear.
Sources of Fatimid history have been surveyed by a considerable
12.
number of modern scholars J  Most of them of course are relevant to the 
reign of al-Hakim Bi Amr A llah , the topic of this thesis. This note, 
however, is an endeavour to examine the importance and re lia b ility  of 
the information concerning this period.
Chroniclers may be divided into two groups: contemporary and late.
The Contemporary Chroniclers
al-Musabbihi (Muhammad Ibn A b i Qasim died in 420/1029). 
According to the authority of Ibn Khallikan, al-MusabbihPs works appear 
to have been the most important source of information on Fatimid history.
He wrote more than th irty books on various subjects. One of them was 
his greatest work Akhbar Misr wa Fada* iluha which comprised twenty-six 
thousand pages.^
Unfortunately nothing of his actual works has survived, except 
volume forty of his large Tarikh in which he deals with the events o f a part 
of the year 414 A .H  . and the whole of 415 A ,H . There are in addition a 
number of Quotations made by some later chroniclers. If must be remembered,
1. See B. Lewis, The Origins of Ismail ism, Cambridge, 1940, Chapter I 
and ,lThe Sources for the History of the Syrian Assassins", Speculum,
X XV il (1952), 475-489; M . Canard, La Dynastie des H*aman?des,
Paris, 1953, Chapter I; C . Cahen, "Gueiques chroniques anciennes 
relatives aux derniers Fatimides", B.l ,F,A .O 37 (1937-38), 1-27;;
P ,J . Vafik io tis, The Fatimid theory of State, Lahor, 1957, 180-204;
W. Ivanow, Ismaili Literature, Tehran, 1963. See also surveys of the 
sources by H ,M , Rab7<, The Financial System of Egypt (i) 564-741/1169-1341, 
Ph,D . thesis, S.O ,A ,S ., 1968; S. Zakar, The Emirate of Aleppo 392-487/ 
1094, Ph.D. thesis, S .O .A .S ., 1969; B .l,Bashir, The Fatimid Caliphate, 
386-407/996-1094, Ph.D. thesis, S .O .A .S ., 1970; H .A . Ladak, The Fatimid 
Caliphate and the Ismaili Da* wa from the appointment of al-Musta* l i to the
Suppression of theipynasty, Ph.D. thesis, S .O .A .S ., 1971.
2 . Ibn Khallikan, III,  88.
however, that these Quotations are not the actual words of al-M usabbihi.
They are more like ly  to have been inspired by the information he gave and 
re-phrased by later chroniclers. A comparative study of the style of 
writing in his actual work and that in these Quotations would prove this point. 
From that part of his Tarikh which remains, i t  seems clear that if  
was the fullest account which was ever written on the history of the Fafimids.
The volume consists of 156 folios dealing with the events of less than two 
years. It is a da ily account of events and a brief biography of the famous 
people who died during that time. The value of al-Musabbihi's information
stems from the fact that he was a high o ffic ia l in the service of the Fafimids,
-  -  . 3and a personal friend of both Caliphs al-Hakim and a l-Z a h ir . In addition,
he was a regular attendant at the Caliph's court and,judging from his records,
appears to have gained the imam's confidence. Such prestige undoubtedly
adds weight to his work, although it  does not guarantee its re lia b ility . No
doubt his position would bias his judgement and incline him to take a pro-Fatimid
view. In fact, there are strong indications which suggest that he was himself
an Ism aili. Whenever he mentions the name of the reigning Im3m-Caliph
a l-Z a h ir he says, "al-lmam a l-Za liin  Salawat A l^ h  <Alayhi wa (A la 
„  -  4
Aba? ihi" . Whenever he mentions the name of a previous Fatimid Caliph he
5says, 'Qaddasa al-tphu Ruhahu". Such comments are pure Ismaili and only
3. B . l,  Bashir, The Fatimid Caliphate: 386-487/996-1094, 13 f f .
4 . al-Musabbihi, Akhbar Misr, fo l, 134 f f ,
5 . al-Musabbihi, Akhbar Mi§r, fois. 243B, 247B, 262B, 276B, 278A, 281A.
14.
Ismaili writers apply the phrase nSalawat - A l lah ‘ A layh i" to the Fatimid 
tmam-Caliph, While others, who are not, apply it  only when the name of 
the Prophet is repeated.
a l-Antaki (Yahya (bn Sand, died in 458/1065). This writer, whose 
work is known as Tarikh Yahya ibn Sa* Sd al-Antaki supplies the only con­
temporary account which has survived complete. He gives an annual record­
ing of important events which occurred in the Fatimid, Abbasid and Byzantine 
Empires during the period 326/422/937-1030. Although Antaki offers more 
information about al-Hakim than of any other Caliph or Emperor, his account 
of al-Hakim's reign is brief and lacks detailed explanation of many important 
questions. His Tarikh, on the whole, is merely the brief narration that he 
mentions in the introduction. He says that his book is a continuation of the 
Tarikh which was written by Sa‘ id Ibn al-Batriq (the patriarch of Alexandria 
who died in 328/939) and that he intended to follow the same method adopted 
by the earlier writer and avoid detailed explanations.^
The value of Antaki's work comes from the fact that he was a 
Christian liv ing in Antioch which was a part of Byzantium. For this reason 
his records are hardly influenced by the re lig io -po litica l quarrel between the 
Abbasids and the Fatimids at that time. His account is a comparatively 
reliable assessment and recounts,in the main, the good as well as the bad 
behaviour of al-Hakim . Nevertheless, his own interpretation of historical
6. Antaki, 91 .
events and his treatment of al-Hakim's attitude towards Ahl al-Dhimma 
should be examined with care. a l-A ntak i, as a number of his records show,
was a pious Christian. Even the writing of his Tarikh may have been the
7
outcome of a request by some high Christian a u th o rity / al-Hakim was a 
Muslim ruler who had persecuted Christians throughout his empire and des­
troyed the holiest shrine of Christendom (the Church of the Holy Sepulchre 
in Jerusalem). To this end, Antaki can hardly be expected to give a completely 
unbiased judgement.
His interpretation of current events sometimes conflicts with his 
own records. He appears to be a lit t le  anxious to explain the deeds of a l-  
Hdkim by applying insanity to them. He says that al-Hakim's mental illness 
was easily recognised by those who saw or spoke to him. Simultaneously, 
he speaks of high officia ls who had served al-Hakim for a long time and after a 
dispute with him fled from Egypt. None of them is reported to have accused 
al-Hakim of insanity. Such interpretation of Antaki is, however, considered 
as the mark of great ignorance (Jahl *Azim) by the Muslim chronicler 
a l- f Azim i ?
Ibn aI-Sabi7(H ila l, died in 448/1056). His work, which was known 
as Tarikh H ila l Ibn a l-S ab i\ has unfortunately not survived as a whole. Later
7. Antaki, 92.
8. Antaki, 218.
9. *A;zimi, anno, 410.
16.
chroniclers such as al-Rudhrawari, Ibn a l-Q alanisi, Sibt Ibn a l-Jaw zi,
Ibn Taghri Birdi and many others have preserved a considerable amount 
of i t  from which i t  is possible to obtain a clearer idea concerning his 
treatment of al-Hakim's reign.
MP
To understand the value of Ibn al-Sabi?,s information, it  is necessary 
to mention the circumstances under which he wrote his account. He lived in 
Baghdad, the centre of the Abbasid Caliphate, during a period when the 
propaganda war between the Abbasids and the Fatimids was at its peak. The 
Abbasid Caliph, in person, supervised an anti-Fatimid campaign and com­
manded a ll learned men of his court to sign a manifesto condemning the 
Fatimids and accusing them of atrocities and irreligious deeds. He also paid 
sums of money to theologians and writers to write books emphasising the 
same purpose. Ibn al-SabPhimself was a learned man newly converted to 
Islam and o ffic ia lly  employed in the service of the Abbasid C a lip h .^
From what has survived of his work, i t  would appear that he was 
hostile to al-Hakim and treated the history of his rule in accordance with 
the offic ia l view of the Abbasid court. He presents the events of the time 
in a manner which would support the allegations of the Abbasid Caliph. For 
example, the Baghdad manifesto accused the Fatimids of assuming d iv in ity 
and committing irreligious acts. Ibn al-Sabi’ says, “Then al-Hakim desired to 
be proclaimed d iv ine. For this end, he encouraged and supported a man
10. Ibn Khallikan, 111, 628-32,
17.
known as al-Akhram and others of his like to declare him as such. One
day, al-Akhram and f if ty  of his men, on horse-back, entered the mosque
where the chief Qadi was delivering his judgment. They handed him a
sheet which bore the writing "By the Name of al-Hakim the a ll merciful
11(al-Rahman al-Rahim)". The obvious purpose of the Abbasid Caliph's 
campaign was to counter the Fatimid propaganda and halt the spread of 
their teaching amongst his subjects. This policy was carefully followed by 
Ibn al-Sabp as is clearly visible in his Tarikh . He emphatically declares
that Egyptians who were under the rule of the Fatimids suffered hardships
— 19and hated al-Hakim and his ancestors and desired their destruction. In
those of his accounts which have survived, there is no mention of any of a l-
Hakim's achievements while every one of his misdeeds is emphasised. The
building of Par a l-H ikm a, the many mosques erected by him, are completely
ignored, as are the social reforms and the standard of justice he endeavoured
to maintain. Even his policy towards Ahl al-Dhimma is presented in a way
which suggests that Jews and Christians who had adopted Islam were allowed
-  13
by al-Hakim to abandon it  and return to their previous relig ion.
al~Quda<i (Muhammad Ibn Salama died in 454/1062). The most 
interesting point about this chronicler is that he was a learned man (* AUama)
11, Ibn al-Sabi* quoted by S ibt Ibn a l-Jaw zi, M ir*a t al-Zaman, fo l,
207 B, and by Ibn Taghrl Birdl, Nujum, IV , 183.
12 . Ibn al-Sabi* quoted by Sibt, Mir* at, fo l. 206B, and by Ibn
Taghri Birdi, Nujum, IV, 1*80-1.
13. Ibn al-Sabi* quoted by Sibt, M ir*a t, fo l . 207B, and by Ibn
Taghri Birdi, Nujum, IV, 183.
18.
and a Sunni in the service of the Fatimids. He was a prominent QadT
 ] 4
and secretary of the Wazir al-Jarjara* i .  For this reason his information 
is probably more reliable than most of the other sources. According to 
his position, he would be well informed and the fact that he retained his 
religious fa ith , as a Sunni in the Fatimid court, indicates his honesty.
Unfortunately none of his actual works have survived, but 
Quotations from his Tarikh and the accounts of later chroniclers who were 
influenced by its information, tend to suggest that his account of the reign 
of al-Hakim was a fair presentation of historical events without the un­
necessary emphasis of either pro- or anti-Fatimid chroniclers.
The cla im that the manuscripts which are available in the British 
Museum, Oxford, and Paris libraries and recorded as the actual Tarikh of a l-  
Quda* i appears to be mistaken. The manuscript of the British Museum library 
no, add. 23,285 seems to be the work of a later, and unknown, chronicler 
who lived, probably, during the latter part of the 8/14th century. It is the first 
volume of a book called Nuzhat a l-A lbab, Jami* al-Twarikh wa A l-Adab 
written in the year 774/1384. The author explains why and how he wrote his 
book. He says, "I found the book known as Bulghat al-Zurafa fi Tarikh al-Khulafa
of Abu a I-Hasan ‘ A li Ibn Muhammad al-Ruhi to have been taken from the book .
of al-Quda* i .  He (al-Ruhi) copied i f  word by word (Naglan) but omitted from 
its beginning the part 'From Adam (may peace be upon him) to the H ijra 1 and
14. Ibn Khaliikan, II, 616-17.
19.
added extracts from the history of the Umayyads in Maghrib down to the
rise of Ibn Tumarf, He added at its end the history of the Fafimids down to
the time of al-Fa* iz . He also omitted fromQuda* i*s book the history of
the Walis and Qadis in Egypt. I have summarised both books and added to
each of them the part which is available in the other. So my book has come
15as a combination of the beauties of both books."
The manuscript of the Bodleian library, no. POC 270, is the work of
an unknown writer who may have been influenced by the actual Tarikh of a l-
Quda* i or may have merely summarised its information down to the reign of
a l-Zah ir (the Fatimid Imam - Caliph who succeeded al-Hakim ). The t it le  of
-  -  uJ
the book is Tarikh al-Quda* j Wa A'wal al-Manqul, which suggests that the 
writer may have intended to summarise or copy books of famous writers and 
began with Quda* i*s Tarikh . The book contains only two and a half lines of 
information about a l-Z a h ir and that could hardly be the actual work of 
Quda< i who was a live when that Caliph was born and witnessed not only his 
succession to the Caliphate but also his death. It is also very unlikely that 
Quda* i would write nothing about the reign of al-Mustansir whom he served 
for a long f im e .^  This is in addition to the fact that the writer of this 
manuscript had adopted the manner of a posthumous writer and not that of a 
contemporary. He also committed an error concerning the date of the 
destruction of Q iyama, He puts it  in 403 A .H  •, three years later than the
15. Nuzhat a l-A lbab, fols. 1-2.
16. B . l.  Bashir, The Fatimid Caliphate, 17.
20.
17actual time. It is doubtful whether such an Important event would be 
so obviously mistaken by a contemporary writer.
A comparison of this manuscript with the work of al-Ruhi, which is 
also available in the Bodleian Library under N o. Marsh, 46, adds a number 
of interesting points. al-Ruhi's account is actually a copy of this work but 
without the part from Adam to the H ijra . It also contains the history of the 
Fatimids down to al-Fa* iz while this work ends with the reign of a l-Z a h ir .
The question arises as to whether the author of Nuzohat al-A lbab really saw 
Tarikh a l-Q  uda* i or merely a copy of this work and assumed that i t  was the 
actual work of al~Quda*i. It is interesting to note that the first few 
sentences of Nuzhat ai-A lbab , which concern the history of Adam are identical 
with those used by the author of Awwal a l-M anqu l. I have referred to the 
Bodleian Library manuscript as Awwal al-Manqul .
The manuscript of the Paris Library no. 1490. This manuscript is 
clearly in two different parts when examined for handwriting and style. The 
first is a brief history beginning with Adam and ending with the reign of a l-  
Q a J im, the Abbasid Caliph (died in 467/1074). The second is a brief 
history of the Fatimids. The writer of the first part may have been influenced 
by the work of aI-Qudaf i ,  but for the second half i t  is very un like ly. The 
part that deals with the reign of al-Hakim shows that its writer was extremely
tv* .
hostile. For example, when he speaks of al-Hakim's succession to the
17. Awwal al-M anqul, fo l. 111A.
2 1 .
Caliphate he says, "Tasallafa" instead of "Tawalla" and when he 
mentions the duration of his reign he says "Ayyamu ^u lm ih i11 instead of 
"Ayyamu Hukm ih i", Such an attitude is not acceptable from a con­
temporary chronicler in the service of the Fatimid court. This is in 
addition to the fact that this writer's account concerning al-Hakim's death 
is borrowed from the version of Ibn al-Sabi* and not from that of a l-  
Qudatf!.
The most important fact about these contemporary chroniclers is that
Ibn a l-S ab i*, whose information is the least reliable, is the most quoted
and had the greatest influence among the later chroniclers. al-Rudhrawari,
Ibri a l-Qalam isi, Ibn a l-Z a fir , Ibn a l-A fh ir, Ibn a l-Jaw zi, Sibt ibn a l-
Jawzi, al-Dhahabi, Ibn Taghri Birdi and many others have been, directly
or indirectly, influenced by his account. This is, perhaps, the reason for
which the majority of sources are hostile in this treatment of the history of
the Fatimids. Almost a ll late chroniclers were Sunnis and influenced by
re lig io -po litica ! motives. They found in Ibn al-Sabi* 's Tarikh the view that
suited their own conviction and accepted it  without examination. An example
of that can be seen in the treatment of Sibt Ibn a I-Jawzi of the history of• 1
al-Hakim . Although Sibt states that he had read many books by Egyptian 
au tho rs ,^  he relies almost entirely on the information of Ibn al-Sabi* .
18, Sibt, fo l . 206A.
St was not until the time of Maqrizi (9 /l5 th  century) that a Sunni
writer attempted to write an extensive history of al-Hakim's reign
based on the information of other contemporary chroniclers and
criticised those who relied only on Ibn a l-S ab i\ He says, after quoting
Ibn Abi Tayy, who adopted the version of Ibn a l-$ab i?, "This contains
19extreme hostility which none of the Egyptian writers had ever shown."
The Late Chroniclers
Although late chroniclers have not added much to the information 
of the contemporary writers, their accounts are of considerable value.
In addition to preserving a great deal of the works of the early authors, 
which would otherwise have been lost, some of them throw a fresh light 
on certain issues. These are:
Ibn al-Muqaffa* . He offers a unique explanation concerning 
al-Hakim's confiscation of the revenue of Egyptian churches and , being 
a Bishop who lived in Egypt during the latter half of the 5 /1 1th century, 
makes his account of great value.
Ibn a i-Q a la n is i. His account concerning the Province of 
Damascus under al-Hakim's rule, although brief, is of great importance.
Itti^a^ , anno, 411 .
23.
The names of many Walls, duration of their appointments, and their 
deeds in Damascus would have been unknown without i t .
ibn al-< Adim . His work Zubdat al-hjalab f i Tarikh Halab is 
indispensable to the study of al-Hakim's policy concerning Aleppo. He 
preserved a unique document, signed by al-Hakim himself and addressed 
to the population of the province of Aleppo, which gives a clear idea of 
the I mam's plans to win the c ity .
Ibn a l-A fh ir . His account is similar to the many of those who 
followed the information of Ibn al-Sabi7 , but its importance lies in the fact 
that he gives the fullest details about the rebellion of Abu Rakwa.
n *  mi
a l-M aqriz i . Although he lived in a much later time, his account 
remains the most valuable concerning the reign of al-Hakim . He was the 
first chronicler who gave a fu ll and details account based on the informa­
tion of many earlier ch ron ic le rs .^
The writing of Contemporary Religious Groups
The Ismaili Da* is . The only surviving literature of the [sma( i l i  
Da* wa at that time are some works by the most distinguished Da* i,  a l-  
K irmani. Although they contain a lim ited amount of historical information, 
they are indispensable to the study of the progress of the Da* wa and its
20. See A .R * Guest, "AJist of Writers, Books and Other Authorities 
mentioned by M aqriz i", J .R .A .$ ., (1902), 103-125.
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infernal struggle culminating in the birth of the Druz, a 1-Riyadh and 
Rahat a l-*A q l are of extreme value concerning the philosophy of the 
Ismaili doctrine. Risaldtfal-Mabasim wa al-Bisharat and a I-Risala a l-  
Durriyya illustrate the infernal upheaval of the Du* at over the question 
of the Imam and his role in the Da* w a. a 1-Risala al -Wa* iza gives the 
o ffic ia l view of the Da< wa concerning the Druz claim of al-hjakim's 
d iv in ity .
The Druz writings. Like the literature of the Ismaili Da* wa,
the Druz writings were written to support and explain the theological
views of the Druz leaders. H istorically they contain very limited
information, but on some points they are valuable. If is, however,
noticeable that a ll chroniclers fa il to give a clear picture of al-Hakim's
attitude towards the Druz leaders after they declared that he was divine
in 408/1017. The Risala , known as al-Subfoa al-Ka* im a, written by Hamza
Ibn A li (the founder of the Druz Sect) gives unique information concerning
the o ffic ia l reaction of the authorities and their persecution of the followers
of Darzi. The Risala , known as al-Ta* n if wa a l-T a h jin , probably written
by al-Muqtana BahaJ a!-D in (Hamza's successor) illustrates the difficulties
which befell the followers of Hamza as a result of al-Hakim's commands. The. »
Druz writing gives an idea of the standard of Ismaili teaching in Par a l-  
Hikma and the progress of * 11m a 1-Batin (the allegorical interpretation
of Hie Holy Books) during the latter part of the 4/1 Oth century and the 
first half of the 5 /1 1th century. They also mention the areas where 
there was strong popular support for the Fatimid mission. This is, of 
course, in addition to their value concerning the infernal crisis among 
the Fatimid Du.* at and the causes of the first split of the imam's mission 
since if  had arrived in Egypt.
26.
CHAPTER 1
A OiB.IOGRAPHICAL REVIEW OF AL-HAKIM 'S PERSON
His Birth
He was born during Hie night of the twenty-third of Rabi* the
first 375/14th August 985 at the royal palace in Cairo,  ^ and thus was
the first Fatimid Imam-Callph bom on Egyptian s o il. He was named a l-  
,  X
Mansur (the Victorious) and was the son of a l-*A z iz , the fifth  Fatimid
Imam-Caliph. Very li t t le  is known of al-Hakim's mother, but her
religious beiiefis have been disputed by modern historians* Lane-
3Poole, V'atikiofis and Canard say that she was Christian, while 
* Inan and Majid affirm that she was Muslim.^ Early sources fa il to 
offer confirmation or denial of either suggestion; and Muslim sources, with 
the exception of the Druz manuscripts are completely silent on the subject. 
Some of the information is offered by the Christian chroniclers. Ibn al-Muqaffa*
1. A l-M usabbihi, quoted by Ibn a l-Z a fir , Tarikh al-Duwal ql~Munqati*a, 
fo l . 66B; Ibnjal-Sabi*, cjuoted^by Sibt Ibn a l-Jaw zi, Mir* a t, fol *"2Q6A 
Druz Ms. M ilad Mawlana al-Hakim , B .N . N o .1412, f o l . l ;  Ibn
--------------- -I II - H n iu f . !  n l t ^ r i  ~ - i -  *
Muyassar, 52; Ibn Khallikan, III,  449; A l-Safadi, f o l . 17; Ibn a l-  
Dawadari, V I, 256; ltti*a%, anno, 386, and K h ita t, II, 285;
De Sacy, Exposfe, I, 280.
2 . Contrary to a ll other sources, the Druz Ms. reports his name as 
Muhammad,. See M ilad, f o l . l .
3 . S. Lane-Poole, History of Egypt in the Middle Ages, 124;
P .J . V a tik io tis j The Fatimid Theory of State, 151; M , Canard, 
a rtic le , “A l-Hakim  Bi Am riifah” , E . j ^
4 . * inan, al-Hakim  B? Amr A llah , Cairo 1932, 42-44; M ajid,
al-Hakim  Bi Anir A llah  a i-Khafifa  al-M uftara ‘ alayh, Cairo 
1959, 25 .
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says that* al-Hakim's mother was a Christian slave g ir l,  and was a
sister of the Arsenius who was appointed by a l-*A z iz  as the Patriarch
5 ___
of the Melkite Church in Egypt. Antaki states that a l-*A z iz  had a 
Christian w ife , but does not clearly state that she was the mother of 
a l-Hakim . This is somewhat strangG in consideration of the reference to 
Arsenius and Aristos to whom he alludes as "the uncles of Sit a l-M u ik , 
a l- 'A z iz ^  daughter"^ but gives no hint of relationship between them and 
al-Hakim . Had they been the maternal uncles of al-Hakim , Antaki would 
scarcely have ignored such close ties to the imam - Caliph and emphasised 
the lesser importance of relationship with Sit a l-M u lk . Ibn a l-*Am id 
states that "AI~*Aziz had married a Christian woman by whom he 
had a daughter".^ It would seem more like ly  that this Christian concubine 
or wife of a l-* Aziz was not al-Hakim's mother. The Druz manuscript
states that a l-H akim ‘s mother was a member of the Fatimid fam ily and
- 8 says, "She was the daughter of Prince Abd A llah , a l-*A z iz 's  uncle ."
Therefore i t  is probable that a I-* Aziz had more than one w ife , one of
them being the Christian of whom Ibn a l-M u*qaffatf, Antaki and
Ibn a I - * Amid speak and also perhaps another who was a Muslim and the
5. Ibn al-Muqaffa*, II, 113.
6. Antaki, 164.• ' #
7. |bn al~*Amid, Tarikh al-M uslim in, anno, 375.
8. The Druz Ms., M ilad, fol .1 . This Prince Abd A llah  may have been
Abu *Abdailah, al-Husayn, son of al-Mansur, the third Fatimid 
Imam-Caliph or<AbdAllah son of Ja* far son of a l-Q a’ im, the 
second Imam-Caliph. See ltfi*a z , 127 and 133.
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mother of a l-Hakim . The fact that al-Hakim became Caliph while he
was s till a child and his relations with his mother were reported to be very 
9
good, would more like ly  account for the severity of his attitude towards 
his Christian subjects. Had his mother herself been, as has been 
suggested, Christian, surely a more lenient policy towards them would 
have been followed.
Al-Mansur as heir (Wali <Ahd)
It was during Sha*ban 383/October 993, at the age of eight, 
and after the death of his elder brother Muhammad, who had already been 
nominated as heir (Wali f Ahd) that al-Mansur was declared to be the 
successor of his father to the jo in t I mama and C a lip h a te .^
The sources give no clear picture of al-Hakim's childhood and 
early education and except for some reports by Maqrizi and Da* j IcTris, 
nothing is mentioned about him before he succeeded to the Caliphate.
Maqrizl says that from the time of his appointment as W all *Ahd, a l-  
Hakim began to make public appearances. He was allowed to preside over 
o ffic ia l ceremonies, meet Walis and Commanders of the army and exchange 
presents with them. Sometimes he even fu lfilled  the Caliph's functions of
9 . Ibn al~Sabi? quoted by Ibn Taghri Birdi, Nujum, IV , 185-190, and 
Ibn Abl Tayy quoted by M aqrizi, Itti*a;£, anno, 411.
10. Ibn al-Sabi?, quoted by Sibt, Mtr^at, fol_. 206A; the Druz Ms. M ila d , 
f o l . l ;  Ibn Khali ikon. III ,  449; al-Safadi, fo l .17 a ll mention his 
nomination but not his brother. Ibn a l-Z a fir , fol .56A; Nuwayri, 
XXV I, 50 report the death of the heir Muhammad and the appointment 
of a I-Mansur.
f
11 “  leading the Friday prayer. This indicates that a i-*A z iz  was preparing
his son for his important future by making him fam iliar with the offic ia l
functions of the Imam - C aliph. O f his early education lit t le  is known,
12nor is there any indication by whom he was taught or what kind of
education he received nor how he responded to learning. O nly Dag ?
Idris reports that al~* Aziz educated his son al-Hakim and tutored him
*
13 -well for his future important ro le . Maqrizi says that a l«(Aziz
14imparted secrets and knowledge to al-Hakim . This may, of course,
mean the in itia tion  of the boy info Ismaili doctrine which is described
by Da* i Idris as * Elm a l- ?A y imma (the knowledge of the Imams) and adds
that God revealed it  to al-Hakim .
*
1 1 .
12.
13.
14,
|t t i*a z , anno, 383, 384, 385.
Lane-Poole, 125 and De Lacy O'Leary, 123 mentioned that 
Barjawan was al-Hakim's tutor which might be understood to 
mean that he was responsible for al-IHakim's education. Here 
it  should be noted that Barjawan was a slave working as super­
intendent of the Royal Palace. His relationship with the young 
Prince could be called "guardianship" or "mentor" in the sense 
that Barjawan would superintend al-Mansur's affairs such as 
clothing, guarding his play and accompanying him outside the 
Palace. Barjawan is not known to have been a man of learning, 
therefore he could not have been a tutor in the sense of 
teaching. For information on Barjawan see B. Lewis, a r t., 
"Bardjawan", E .1.2
1 had no access to * Uyun a I-Akhbar of Da* i Idris and this 
Information is based on quotations by A . Majed, A l-H akim , 25.
Khitaf, I, 434.
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Al-Mangur's Succession to the Caliphate
In Ramadan 386/t)ecember 996, while in the town of
16a l-*A z iz  met sudden death, through a stone in the kidney. He was
leading an army towards Syria to support his troops there against the
17 — 1 g
Byzantines. Al-Mansur, who accompanied him, was immediately
1 °proclaimed Caliph, '
Al-Musabbihi, later quoted by other sources, relates the incident
of succession as told by al-Hakim himself: "My father called me before
15. For information about Bilbis see Yaqut, Mu* jam al-Buldan, ed. 
F. Wlfstenfeld, Leipzig, 1866, 1, 712 and Khitat, I, 183.
16* Antaki, 180, says: "al-Haga was a l-Q u la n g ". Ibn a l-A th lr,
IX , 48 adds, "al -N iq r is " . See also Ibn a l-Z a fir , fol .55A, 
Al-Safacfi, fo l.  17; itt i*a z , anno, 386 and Khi|pt, Ifl, 284.
17. Antaki, 179.
18. It is d ifficu lt to ascertain why al-Mansur was in his father's
company at that time and whether a I ~* Aziz had intended to
bring his heir to the battlefie ld to experience an actual war
or al-Mansur was only going as far as Bilb^sto say farewell 
to his father, is not certain.
19. ibn a l-G a la n is i, 44, says that after the death of a l-*A z iz  
his daughter Sit a l-M u lk  tried todepose her brother and 
declare her cousin *Abd &L;Lah as Caliph. But since an 
incident of such importance is not reported by any other 
chronicler, i t  seems very un like ly.
31*
his death* His body was naked except for bandages and pieces of clo th.
He hugged me end kissed me and said, !S am grieved about you, O my
heart's love '. His eyes were fu ll of tears, then he said, 'Go dear and
play, I am a ll r ig h t . ’ I went out and occupied myself as children do
when they play until God transferred a l-*A z iz  to him, Barjawan came to
me while I was at the fop of a sycamore free which was in the yard of the
house. He said, ’Descend, may God be with you. 1 S descended; he put
the diamond turban on my head, kissed the ground before me and said,
'May peace be upon you Amir gUMu*minin, God's mercy and blessings,'
He took me out to the people and they a ll kissed the ground before
20me and greeted me as C a liph ,” Al-Mansur was eleven years, five
21months and six days old.
On the following day al-Mansur, together with the officia ls of
his court, rode to Cairo. The body of his father was carried in a coffin on
the back of a camel. They reached Cairo before sunset and immediately
al~*Aziz was buried with ceremony. "On the following morning the dignitaries
20. Ibn Muyassar, 51; Ibn Khali ikon, III, 525; A l-Safadi, f o l . 19;
lfti*a%, anno, 386.
21 . In spite of the sources'agreement on both dates, al-Mansur's birth­
day and the day on which he became Caliph, they differ concerning 
how old he was when he succeeded to the Caliphate. Antaki, 180, 
says, "Eleven years and five months". Ibn a l-Q a la n is i,4 4 , says, 
"Ten years and six months". Ibn a l-A fh ir, IX, 48, says, "Eleven 
and a half years". Ibn al-Dawddari, V I, 256, says, “ Eleven 
years". Other chroniclers repeat Ibn al-QalanisTs or Ibn a l-  
A thlr's report. Only Ibn Muyassar, 51, and ‘ M aqrlzi, I t t i* a z / 
anno, 386, and Khiiat, II, 285, give the correct age.
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assembled in the Grand Hal! to await the new Caliph. Al-Mansur, wearing
the diamond turban, entered the Hall and walked to the golden throne,
the assembly bowing to the ground meanwhile. They greeted him with
the Bay*a as Imam and the tit le  al-Hakim Bi Amr^llah (the ruler by
22God's command) by which he was thereafter known.” During the
ceremony, a number of Kutami chiefs demanded the dismissal of * Isa
Ibn Nasturus from the position of Wasafct and the appointment of their
chief Ibn *Ammar in his place. They claimed to have been ill-treated by 
-23* Isa which was highly unlikely, but such a demand, as w ill be discussed 
later, was an excuse to reach power by taking advantage of the in­
experienced young imam-C aliph. A l-Hakim  was obliged to meet their 
demand and actually the appointment of ibn * Ammar was his first exercise 
of power as C a lip h .^
A t the conclusion of the ceremony, Qadi Muhammad Ibn al-N3u*man 
went to the Mosque, led the prayer and delivered the Khutba in the name of 
al-Hakim .
m
22. i t t i* a z , anno, 386, Khita f, II, 285.
23. See Ib id .
24. Antaki, 180; Ibn a l-Q a lan is i, 44; Ibn al-Ath?r, IX , 48; Ibn
a l-Z a fir , fo l.  56B; lt t i*a ^ , anno, 386; Khitaf, II, 285.
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The Portrait of ai-Hakim
—  ...  , * i  -
According to the chroniclers, al-Hakim was an impressive 
-  25figure ( *Azim al-Hayba) -  fa ll, broad-shouldered with a powerful
voice. His eyes were big, coloured dark blue,flecked with deep reddish- 
26gold. (Shuhl).
The picture of him thus reached may have been the result of 
unctuous adulations, enhanced by legends which gathered about him.
His cruelty and rufhlessness as ruler, which resulted in the death of many 
of his subjects, has undoubtedly influenced the imagination of many
27chroniclers. One of them describes him as a lion searching for prey. 
Another says that many people who endeavoured to attract his attention in 
the public streets would fall to the ground and become speechless in his
presence .28 A further description states that he once shouted at a man
o owho immediately died of frigh t.
Al-Hakim 's Education
The fact that al-Hakim became Caliph when he was s till a child 
and assumed fu ll power as ruler at the age of fourteen, does not seem to 
have effected his education. A t an early age he appears to have had a
25. Ibn Abi Tayy, quoted by Maqrizt, lft?*a;z, anno, 411.
26. Ibn a l-M uqaffa*, IS, 123,
27. Ibn a l-M uqaffa", I!, 121.
28. Antaki, 221,
29. A l-Rudhabafi, quoted my Maqrizi, IftH az, anno, 411 .
good command of the Arabic tongue and a good knowledge of poetry. 
Maqrizi says, “A l-Hakim  had skilfulness in the knowledge of poetry 
which no other man had. A t his court, poets and those who have know­
ledge of poetry would gather and the poets would recite their poetry 
while he would listen carefully and ask the repetition of every verse
which held exceptional meaning or style, Each of them would receive
30gifts of money in accordance with the quality of his works." He was a
mere twelve years of age when he gained this reputation. Ibn al-Sayrafi,
*
who is quoted by Maqrizi tells a story which emphasises al-Hakim's
superiority in the knowledge of Arabic over a number of learned men who
31were present in his court. In spite of such eulogy, which may have
been prompted by policy, there are some verses and writings which are
attributed to his personal composition, the quality and style of which
32gives an impression of poetic a b ility  and penmanship.
Astronomy also appears to have been included in his studies as 
agreed by a ll his chroniclers. For this purpose he bu ilt and equipped an 
observatory on Mount Miuqattam near Cairo where he studied and personally 
supervised the curriculum. He gave encouragement to a scientific approach 
to astronomy by financia lly helping and showing respect and admiration to
30* ltti*<3%, anno, 387.
31 , Ib id ., anno, 411.
32. Ib id ., anno, 390-411.
35.
astronomers such as M alik ibn SaMd and Ibn *Abd a i-A * la  who wrote
33books on astronomy.
Beside his interest in these fields, he appears to have extended 
his attention to other fields of science. He bu ilt Dar al-Hikma which
■■   t ........................
he equipped with a large number of books comprising a ll fields of study 
and gave freedom to a ll who wished to attend its lectures or read and 
copy its books. He would visit i t  from time to time, listening to
debates among its learned men and granting them generous gifts to
34encourage research in their professions. * The scientists and learned
35men of his State were, as ma^ry reports say, "favoured and loved by h im ".
«u»
Antaki praises al-Hakim's relationship with his private physicians and 
suggests that Ibn al-Muqashshar and Ibn Nastas were personal friends of 
the Caliph, able, at times, even to influence his policy and his personal 
b e h a v i o u r  j n addition, some reports indicate his considerate treatment
33. On M alik Ibn Sa*id see |tti*az  , anno, 403. On Ibn *Abd a l-A *la  
s e e G ifti,  230-31 and iSrTKStlfir, X I, 341 .
34. A l-Musabbihl, quoted by Maqrizi, Khitat, I, 459.
35. Ibn Abt Tayy, quoted by M aqriz i, I t tP a z ,. anno, 411; A l-Safadi, 
fo l.  19; Ibn Ayas, I, 53. See also Ibn Abl Usaybi*a, II, 86—101.
36. Antaki, 186, 192. On Ibn Muqashshar see also G iiftf, 438. 
and Ibn Abi UsaybHa, II,  86, 90.
of, and the respect in which he held, the engineer al-Hasan Ibn a l-  
Haytham, This man le ft Iraq and entered the service of al-Hakim  for 
the purpose of in itia ting a system to accelerate agricultural progress in 
Egypt. A l-Hakim  is said to have personally welcomed al-Hasan when
37he arrived in Cairo. The surviving reports of al-Musabbihi testify that 
this historian was a personal friend of the Imam-Caliph, respected by
*Sn
him and generously treated in his cou rt/' '
On the other hand, there are some reports which suggest that
he was at times very cruel towards the *Ulaina* and k illed  many of
them. These records, however, give no specific examples of such
cruelty; the only recorded incident being the execution of two Sunn?
theologians whom al-Hakim had previously employed to instruct in
Sunn? law in Par al-Hikma . Maqrizi, who relates the incidents states
that the men had flagrantly disobeyed al-Hakim's commands. He closed
Par a i-H ikm a, expfessly forbidding meetings to be held there and when
he learned of their disobedience in this respect, he angrily condemned 
39them. A more consistently tolerant ruler would probably have taken
their personal reasons into account and have acted in a less perfunctory 
manner.
37. Bar Hebreaus, 189; Q if t i ,  166-7; Ibn Abi Usaybi*a,
11,90-101.
38. A l-Safadi, IV , 7; Sibt, fo l.2 0 6 B ; A l-Dhahabi, *ibar, 111, 72. 
ltt?*az, anno, 399.
Al-fjak im 's Private l i f e
L ittle  is known concerning the private or marital life  of a l-
Hakim. It is not known when he married or how many wives he had, but
from Maqrizi's reports if  appears that he had two wives who were legally
recognised. One was named Amina, the daughter of Prince *Abd A llah
40son of Mu* iz , the other a slave girl whose identity is not reported.
M l
He had two sons, al-Harith born in the month of Rabi* I 395/
41
October 1004, and *A li born in Ramadan of the same year. A l-H arith♦ .
42died during his father's lifetim e, approximately in 400/1009 while 
*A li lived and succeeded his father to the Caliphate and afterwards 
became known as a l-Z a h ir. From the name of *A li al-Hakim's Kinya was 
originated by which he was sometimes called Abu *A !i (the father of  ^A l i ) .
He also had a daughter who was nick-named Sit Misr. She died 
in 455/1063
Al-Hakim 's Character
Certainly, according to the information which has been recorded, 
he was of a complicated and contradictory nature.jSt times * ruthless and
\
lf t i*5 z , anno, 411.
41 . Ib id ., anno, 395.
42. Ib id ., anno, 403. See also Ibn a i-Z a fir , fo l.  66.
43. Al-Dhakha* j r  wa al-Tuhaf, Kuwait, 1959, 240.
38.
exceedingly c ru c l^  and at others tolerant to a surprising d e g re e .^  By 
a ll chroniclers he is described as generous and brave, yet Sibt says, "He
46was cowardly and miserly". The term "cowardice" does not seem to 
agree with other observations recorded. The al-Hakim who killed  many 
who were of high prestige and importance in the State and who would 
frequently adventure impervious to the dangers to his person, by day or 
night, unguarded except for a slave to lead his horse or ass, could hardly 
be described as "cow ard ly". The confiscation of the properties of those 
he k illed , which might have been the basis of Sibf's statement, can
scarcely be termed "miserly" and peculiar to al-Hakim . Some designate
4 7
him as a tyrant and there is no doubt that he was more than usually
44. See ibn a l-Q a lan is i, 80; Ibn a l-Z a fir , f o l . 57A; Ibn a l-A th ir, [X, 
131; Ibn AbiJTayy, quoted by Maqrizi, ltt i*a z , anno, 411; a l-  
Dhahabi, Tarikh al-Sslam, anno, 411 also quoted by Ibn Taghri Birdi, 
Nufum, IV , 178; K h ita t, II, 289. A l! describe al-Hakim as
( 3  <2J U lZZTIZ) .  Ibn a l-M uqaffa*, II, 121 says
( >1^) <2J-Z— See also instances of his cruelty in 
Antaki, 185-230; ltt? *az , annos, 390-405; K h ija f, II,  285-9.
45. See al-Musabbih! quoted by Maqrizi, ltt?*a%, anno, 398, who indi­
cates that al-Hakim was intending to pardon Abu Rakwa who rebelled 
against him, after he was captured and brought to Egypt. His 
treatment of Abu al-Futuh, the Sharif of Mecca, who rebelled and 
deposed him is described'in Chapter V of this thesis; Al-Hakim 's 
pardon of *AI7 Ibn Muhammad al-Tihami after his rebellion, Sibt,
Mi Mat, f o l . 411;, his Aman of pardon to Ibn ai-M aghrib i who caused 
the rebellion of Abu al-Futuh 7 ibn a!-*Adim , Bughyat a l-Ta lab , IV, 
fo l . 23. See also al-Dhahab*!, quoted by Ibn Taghri Bird!, Najum,
IV , 178, who described al-Hakim as "Samihan",* * • .—.-.t ...
46. Sibt, fo l . 206B.
«  9
47. Ibn al~G;alanisi, 79; A l-Suyuti, 11, 17; Ibn Kathir, X II, 9;
Ibn Ayas, I, 52-53,
insistent that his commands should be lite ra lly  and immediately obeyed.
48Yet many chroniclers say "he championed justice" and Antaki adds that
49he provided justice to a degree his subjects had never known before. ‘
He is further described as being of "extreme arrogance" (Shadid al-Ta*ajruf)
Yet another part of the man, the significance of which seems to have
escaped the notice of chroniclers, was the almost monastic s im plic ity.
They are in complete agreement that his clothes were simple and made
chiefly of wool, and that he chose an ass rather than a horse to ride.
Maqrizi adds that he would discard the diamond turban and wear a plain
51 __
white scarf in its place. Antaki says that despite the prosperity of his
State, he disliked ceremonies and feasts and they were banned in his
52 __
palace. His food was simple and cooked by his own mother. AnfakI
and Maqrizi agree that he would frequently pause in the streets of his
5 3
capital to exchange greetings or questions with his poorer subjects.
Unlike the majority of Muslim Caliphs he did not indulge in a Harim
5 4
and seems to have freed al! his female slaves. The life  of fr ivo lity
48. Ibn al-M uqaffa^, II, 125; A l-Safadi, fo l.  19; Ibn Ayas, I, 52-53 
Ibn al-Dawd‘d a ri, quoting a contemporary poet, al-Durra, V I, 592
49. Antaki, 205-6.
50. Ibn a l-Q a lan is i, 80.
51. I t t i f az, anno, 403-405.
52. A n jak i, 200.
53. A n jak i, 222; ! t t i* a ^ ,  anno, 395-405.
54. Antaki, 206; Ibn Taghri Birdi, Nujum, IV, 235.
seems to have been against his principles and one of his idiosyncrasies
was that singers and dancers were not welcomed in his palace and once
55were banned from their profession throughout Egypt.
He is further described as "moody" ( Kathir a l-ls tiha la t or 
Kathir al-Taluwon) . His dealings with the many ministerial appoint­
ments and some orders he gave and suddenly withdrew may perhaps be 
the basis of such a description. On the other hand many of his edicts
were strictly observed throughout his reign and some of his high officials
57are known to have kept their positions until ths end of his ru le .
By some he is considered to have suffered from an exalted religious mania
58to the point of insanity, with ideas which were devilish; or which others
59considered as the manifestation of God upon earth. / To some he was of 
"wicked beliefs" (Radi* a l-H tiqad)^® but his infernal policy and personal 
behaviour indicate that he was deeply religious and this is apparent in his 
determination to observe Muslim law, in his enthusiasm to build mosques 
and in his encouragement to his subjects to practice the duties of Islam,
55. Antaki, 202; Itti*a z , anno, 402-411.
56. Ibn Khallikan, HI, 449; A l-Safadi, fo l.  19; Ibn Taghri Birdi, 
Nujum, IV, 179-180; Suyufi, |f ,  17.
57. See below the Infernal Policy, Chapter HI of this thesis.
58. Antaki, 217-222; Ibn a l-M uqaffa*, II, 124.
59. See below, Chapter V I, The Movement of the Druz.
60. AI-Dhahabi, Tarikbh al-lslam , Anno, 411, and quoted by Ibn
Taghri Bircfi, Nujum, IV , 178.
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added to many reports about his personal behaviour concerning his
duties as a M us lim ,^
He is further described as of "coarse manners" (G haliz
a l-Tab*), Yet in Maqrizi and Antaki's records he appears as a pleasant
man with a sense of humour. He often exchanged jokes with those to
whom he spoke in the s tre e ts ,^  and the many anecdotes which display
his sense of humour and appreciation of humorous stories indicate people's
impressions about this aspect of hts cha rac te r.^
Some chroniclers go much Further to a point which makes their
statements very d iff ic u lt to accept. They say that al-Hakim remained
*
seven years unwashed and he lived in the a rtific ia l light of candles
both day and night for three years -  suddenly changing at its end to no
65light during night-tim e. The question now is: how accurate can these 
reports be and were they a fa ir description of al-Hakim's character?
Many of his chroniclers were not contemporaries and few records appear 
to be in existance penned by those who knew al-Hakim personally and 
lived in Egypt during his ru le .
61. See below, the Inter nal Policy, Chapter I I I .
62. Ibn a l-Q a lan is i, 80.
63. Antaki, 205-217; |tti*a z  , anno, 404.
64. Iff?<az, anno, 402-411; Ibn Ayas, I, 52-53.
65. Sibt, fol;. 206B; ibn AbT Dahiyya, quoted by Ibn al-Dawadari, 
V i / 298.
42.
The surviving reports which are those of al-Musabbihi
and al-Quda* ?, who both knew al-Hakim a:nd lived in Egypt during
his reign, fa il to give any satisfactory explanation. Antaki and Ibn a l-
Sabi* 's records should be treated with a degree of caution since both
chroniclers were hostile to allHakim and lived in countries far away from
Egypt. The many apparent contradictions concerning his character may,
therefore, be the result of the aspects of his policy as they presented
66themselves to the historians. A fter such a long time-lapse i f  is d if­
f icu lt to arrive at a definite clarification of the man and his time. His 
ruthlessness and cruelty, for instance, may rather have been the result of 
circumstances rather than operated by a sadistic mind or were perhaps 
exaggerated according to the views of those who wrote concerning him.
He ascended the throne when he was s till a child and witnessed a fierce 
struggle and riva lry  for power among the high officia ls of his State. This 
fact may have created a sense of insecurity which made him resort to 
cruelty as a method of protecting his power. Ibn a l-Fu ti, who is quoted by
66. Antaki, 218, explains the contradictions of al-Hakim's policy 
to fiave bee^ n caused by his menial health. Ibn a l-G alanisi adds 
to his description of al-Hakim 's character the term "His policy 
was blameworthy ( ^ I b n  a l-A th ir, IX, 131, 
says, "His policy was astonishing ( - Sibt
M i raj-, fo l.  206A, says, "His rule was contradictive ( o j <>■£>_,
Suyuff, IS, 17, says, "His worpls and deeds were changeable 
( o i \£. ) 11. M aqrizi, Khifat, II, 289, says
"his deeds were unexplainable 12J) Ibn Ayas, I, 52-53,
says, "He loved good doing and followed i f  with some evil doing. He 
loved justice and followed it  with tyranny ( \L?
c lc e J  '  y t ) " -See also the interpretation »
43.
Maqrizi suggests that al-Hakim's cruelty was a part of his policy to 
abolish corruption resulting from the great tolerance of his father a M  Aziz
67and vengeance against those who showed opposition to the law of the State. 
This is supported by the fact that most of al-Hakim's victims were high 
o ffic ia ls .
Sim ilarly, the acts of tolerance, generosity, hum ility and
justice may have been an endeavour to achieve popularity and to disguise
the tyranny from which many people suffered. Antaki gives an important
account on this po in t. He says, "A l-Hakim  endeavoured to achieve what
he himself desired by religious devotion (al-Zuhd wa a l-w ara*), refusal of
the physical pleasures, by eating and drinking simple food, wearing ordinary
clothes and riding asses with cheap iron saddles, and by mixing with his
poorer subjects (AM Am m o) .11 By justice, tax exemption and generous
68gifts he attracted many people to his loyalty.
In the light of the available records, however, the riddle of 
al-Hakim's character w ill probably remain an enigma for ever. So 
many records have portrayed him as being entirely cruel, tyrannical 
and intolerant, with the mentality of a fiend. Others eulogised him to 
a superhuman degree.
= of the Druz writing of al-Hakim's policy which suggests
that if  was a sign of d iv in ity  and miraculous power. (Chapter VI 
of this thesis).
anno, 411.
68. Antaki, 222.
This portrait of the man has been intended to illustrate 
that as a human being al-Hakim showed both virtue and vice in a 
character not, perhaps, of any specific type, with opposing forces in 
his nature which made him appear both unusually great and exceedingly 
small,
CHAPTER IS 
THE LEGACY OF THE PREVIOUS YEARS
On the sudden death of his father, al-Hakim , the eleven years 
old prince inherited the throne of the Fatimid Empire and became the 
Imam-Caliph of the richest and largest portion of the Muslim world at 
that time* Most of North A frica , Egypt, Hijaz and a large proportion of 
Syria, together with a number of important islands in the Mediterranean, 
were part of his empire. The young prince also inherited a number of 
unsolved problems. Most o f his reign appears to have been spent in the 
endeavour to find a solution to them. The Ismaili Da* is had made many 
unfulfilled promises to the people, both before and after the establishment 
of the Fatimid State. The influence of the non-Muslim personnel in the 
offices had grown, and most significant of a ll the struggle and riva lry 
between the two elements of the army -  al-Maghariba and al-Mashcinqa -  
had developed alarmingly.
The U nfulfilled Promises of the Da*wa
The Fatimids owe the establishment of their State mainly to the 
well organised machinery of the ismaili Da* wa and since the early years 
of its inception the Da< wa emphasised the theory of Mahdism and employed 
it  as one of the fundamental principles of its teaching. "Messianism as a
46.
rationalisation of unfulfilled prophecies and a consolation for dis­
satisfied Muslims became the rudimentary appeal of the Fatimid Da*wa."^ 
The Ismail is preached the rise of a saviour, a l-Mahdi (the divinely 
guided) personified by the imam of the Ismaiiis, who would destroy 
tyranny by the overthrow of existing po litica l authorities. He would f i l l  
the world with equality and justice contrary to the oppression and in­
justice rampant at that time. He would unite a ll mankind under one
spiritual head. Under the Mahdi's rule, life  would become better and a ll
2mankind would be true believers. “The Fatimids then viewed themselves 
as the avanguardia of active Islamic development and growth arising 
from the unification of a ll Muslim and non-Muslim peoples in one uni­
versal empire through an invigorated fa ith . Their universal empire was
to be governed by one divinely-guided ruler, enabling him to establish
3a state of social equality and permanent peace."
1. P *J , Vatik io tis, The Fatimid Theory of State, p i 10.
2 . See extracts from Sharb al-Akhbar of Qadi al-Nu*man -
traditions on al-Mahd! -  edited and translated by W . Ivanow,
Rise of the Fatimids, London, 1942, 98-125. Arabic text, 1 -  31. 
For more details and discussions of the Fatimid MahcR, see 
P . J . Vatik io tis, The Fatimid Theory of State, 107-119; B. Lewis, 
The Assassins, London, 1967, 23-26.
3. P.J . Vatik io tis, The Fatimid Theory of State, 115.
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The p o litica lly  and socially dissatisfied masses found refuge in 
the idea of the Messianic return of a hidden leader of metaphysical power 
and the Ismaili teaching gained momentum which resulted in the establish­
ment of the Fatimid State in 296/908. The Imam emerged from conceal-
m ti t *.d
meHf and was proclaimed ds imam-Caliph under the name of a l-M ahdi.
Ml
With the proclamation of a l-M ahdi, fhe Ismaili theory of 
Mahdism began to materialise. Its claim of universal empire and social 
equality, together with permanent peace under the rule of the dtvihely 
guided Imam, was, however, challenged by the insurmountable d ifficu lty  
of materialising such promises. The ninety years of rule during which 
five Fatimid imams sat on the throne of the Caliphate were, to say the 
least, a disappointment of such hopes. The promises of the Da*is remained 
unfulfilled and the dream of the Messianic rule drifted farther from rea lity . 
The *Abbasids, the "oppressors of the believers and the usurpers of the Imam's 
right",were s till ruling over a very large portion of the Muslim world. The 
Byzantines, who were considered the enemies of Islam were stronger and 
more powerful than before. They not only defended their empire but 
made constant raids into Muslim territories. The "tyranny" exercised by 
the authorities of the * Abbasids and the Byzantines, was never abolished.
The society which was under the direct rule of the imam was composed of 
differing religious beliefs and the unification of a ll people into one
faith under the leadership of the Imam could never have been achieved. 
Equality and justice, the ideals which most appealed to the masses, were 
nebulous and eluded rea lity . Continuous uprisings and rebellions mocked 
the promise of a permanent peace in the Mahdi's realm. If must be 
admitted that, h istorically, such a Messianic state had never been achieved.
The Fatimid imams had, at first, been anxious to materialise some 
of those dreams, particularly the prophecies concerning the destruction 
of tyranny represented by the *Abbasid and the Byzantine authorities, but 
their hostile neighbours checked the expansion of their empire and limited 
its conquest. The Byzantine Empire, which had effective ly revived 
under a new and strong leader, the powerful Carmetians and their 
interests in Syria, the rulers of some Eastern provinces who preferred 
to retain independence under the name of the weak *Abbasid Caliph rather 
than accept the suzerainty of the new and powerful Fatimid Imam-Caliph, 
provided a solid front against the Fatimid conquest of the Eastern parts of the 
Muslim world.
This strong opposition was realised during a l-*A z iz 's  reign and 
gradually the idea of a quick conquest of the Eastern provinces of the 
Muslim world subsided into a desire to remain in the land they already ruled 
and to concentrate on its internal affairs. Even the declaration of aS-Mahdi's 
war against the enemies of Islam (the Byzantines) gradually subsided info 
negotiations for peace and friendly relations.
49,
This resulted in the prosperity of the Empire, although it was 
perhaps a disappointment to the Da*wa and a clear admission o f the 
impossibility of achieving its ideals. The Messianic kingdom of the 
Da* is became an ordinary State, in structure litt le  different from that 
of the ‘ Abbasid enemy. The people still looked for the Messianic rule 
and the idea of other "would be" Messiahs began to appear. During the 
third and most of the fourth century after Hijra it  is not recorded that an 
active Messianic movement other than that of the Fatimids was known in 
the Muslim world.
Towards the end of the fourth century, such movements began 
to appear. Abu Rakwa, who claimed Umayyad descent, declared that 
a l-M ahdi, the saviour of the Muslims, was an'Umayyad and not Fatimid, thus 
the tool by which the Fatimids established their State had now passed to 
their enemies. The success of Abu Rakwa which threatened the foundations 
of the Fatimid Empire in 396/1005 could be attributed mainly to the
failure of the Fatimid Imams in fu lf illin g  the impossible promises o f
4their Pa*wa .
"Both the *Abbasids and the Fatimids, in their hour of victory 
confronted the dilemma which sooner or later faces a ll successful rebels -  
the conflic t between the responsibilities of power and the expectations of
4 See below, The Rebellion of Abu Rakwa, Chapter V of this thesis.
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those who brought them to i t .  The ‘ Abbasids, after a brief attempt to
persuade the Muslims that their accession had really brought the promised
millennium, chose the path of stability and orthodoxy. The radical
doctrines were forgotten, the radical leaders murdered. The Messianic
epithet became regnal titles, . . . .  The same problem arose for the
victorious Fatimids, but in a more complex form, since their victory was
slower and incom plete.. . .  The Fatimid Caliphs, like the first <y^ bbasids,
found that the wishes of the missionaries did not always accord with the
needs of the S ta te .. . .  But the Fatimids, unlike the ‘ Abbasids, could not
afford to break completely with the mission, since there was s till important
5
work for the mission to do."
Subsequently the materialisation of the Messianic realm was 
postponed indefin ite ly under a convenient allegorical interpretation of the 
theory of a l-M a h d i. “The mission of al-Mahdi is enormous. I have con­
siderable share in if  and those who are coming after me shall also share i f . "  
(And, al-M u* iz  added), " I f  i t  should be the lot of one person only, how 
could anything from i f  come to me? " According to the Da* wa*s teaching, 
al-M ahdi became the key which opened the lock of divine bounty, mercy, 
blessing and happiness. "By him  God has opened a ll these to his slaves
5 . B. Lewis, "An Interpretation of Fatimid History", Cairo
Conference, 1969, 5 .
6 . Tradition No,28 edited and translated by W , Ivanow, Rise of 
the Fatimids, 102; Arabic text, 20.
51.
and this shall continue after him in his successors until the promise of
God which he made to them in his bounty, might and power, w ill be
7 -  ~ « -
fu lf il le d . Qadi al-Nu*man, who recorded the traditions of Imam-
Caliph al-Mu* iz says that the question, "Art thou the expected Mahdi
under whose authority God shall gather his slaves, making him the King
of the whole earth, and shall the religions of the world become one
under thee? " was put to him by a certain important man (Ba*d Shuyukh a l-
'JT1" , . 11' ■ - ■ m i  .
^ w l i a *) This clearly indicates that by the time of al-M u* iz , people 
began to feel that they had waited too long for the real Mahdi. By the time of 
al-Hakim their patience had run short and desperation began to mount, 
threatening the Da*wa with serious troubles.
Such desperation could clearly be seen in the appearance of the 
Druz movement. Now more than forty years had passed since the power of 
the Fatimids was established in Egypt, and a new generation, even amongst the
Du*at, was no doubt tired of waiting until after Baghdad and Constantinople
9
should be taken, before fu ll justice and universal plenty should prevail.
It could also be seen in the actions of the men in charge of the 
Da* wa who seemed to have realised that they could no longer postpone 
the appearance of al-M ahdi and to this end they declared that the rules of
7 . Tradition No.28 edited and translated by W . ivanow, Rise of 
the Fatimids, 102; Arabic text, 20.
8 . ib id .
9 . C f. M .G .S . Hodson, "A l-Darazi and Hamza in the O rigin of the 
Druze Relig ion", J .A .Q .S . ,  82 (1962), 17.
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the previous Imams were a period of preparation for the appearance of 
the real saviour, a i-M ahd i. Kirmani forecasts that the saviour by whom
«  mm
God's cause would triumph would be al "Hakim, the Bmam-Caliph con­
cerning whom a ll signs were propitious for the defeat of the enemies of the 
true cause. He would create justice, equality and peace, thus, at last 
fu lf il lin g  the promises of the D u*a t.^
Thus al-Hakim did not only inherit a complicated insoluble problem, 
he was made to bear the responsibility of solving i t .
The Influence of Ahl al-Phimma
The insecurity of the conditions under which the minorities of 
Ahl al-Dhimma (Jews and Christians) lived in the Muslim world forced them 
to seek some means of specialisation or qualification by which they would be 
considered an asset to the progress of the State and provide themselves with 
some security in their po litica l and social lives* Medicine, banking and 
financial administration, in which they became most skilfu l and e ffic ient, 
were their fields of specialisation.
When the Fatimids arrived in Egypt, the need for a stable and 
progressive financial administration provided an opportunity for many Jews 
and Christians to find employment in the offices of the State. Ahl al-Phimma, '
by their long experience in such matters, provided the Fatimids with the means
10. Kirmani, Risalat al-Mabasim wa al-Bisharat, edited by 
M . K . Husayn in, Ta* ifa t al-D ruz, C a iro T "^ ^ ,  55.
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of steady progress in the State economy. In return, the Caliph's
policy towards them was one of great tolerance. As time passed their
influence rapidly grew, and the high officials of financial administration,
their deputies and staff were chiefly non-Muslims. It is d iff ic u lt to
assess the influence of Ahl ci-Dhimma on the offices of the State
administration or the impact of their influence on the internal policy of
the Imam . Some of the events which have been recorded suggest that
it  was indeed significant. The chroniclers narrate that when a l-*A z iz
1]
dismissed and arrested his Wazir Ya*qub ibn K illis  in 372/982, the
functions of the administration came almost to a stand-still, This com-
12
pelted a l- tfA z iz  to free Yatfqub and re-appoint him. The dismissal
  13
of { Isa Ibn Nasturus in 385/995 followed a similar pattern. If may 
have been that the non-Muslim staff preferred the administration of 
Yaequb and < Isa and purposely crippled the work of the administration 
thus demonstrating to the Imam the incapacity of their appointed
11. The famous administrator of the Fatimid State during its early 
period in Egypt. He was of Jewish origin, but was converted 
to Islam. He is said to have sympathised with Ahl al-Phimma 
and encouraged their appointment^to offices of the State,
For his life  career see Ibn Khaliikan, IV , 359; Maqrizi,
Khita t, IS, 5; W J .  Fischel, Jews in the Economic and 
Political Life of Mediaeval Islam, London, 1937, 45 f f .
See also "Yacqub Ibn K illis11, E .1,
12. !bn a l-Q a lan is i, 21; Ibn a l-A th ir, V II!, 262 ,
13. A Christian from Egypt. He was appointed as Financial 
Administrator of the Fatimid Empire in 384/994.
successors. The Fact that the Imam re-appointed the dismissed adminis­
trators confirms the Dhimrr.ls great influence on the administration..
Their success in commerce, banking and business had led them to pros­
perity and affluence. A number of in fluentia l Dhimmis had their own 
courts where learned men and poets gathered to discuss current affairs,
praised their patrons and received their gifts after the manner of Eastern
14 15trad ition. Their schools of learning and religious education flourished
16and even the Imam-Caliph contributed to their finances.
The growing influence of Ahl al-Phimma roused indignation 
among the Muslim population. From their point of view, non-Muslims 
were not to be equally privileged nor should they be allowed to dominate 
the administration of finance. Added to this, it  was an affront to find them 
so rich and prosperous in a Muslim State. The nature of their positions as 
tax inspectors and collectors, together with the precedence in employment 
which non-Musltm high officia ls gave to their co-religionists, increased 
the anger of Muslims. Bitter criticisms, as shown in the follow ing translation, 
were hurled against the Imam-Caliph and those high offic ia ls who supported
14. For more information see J . Mann, The Jews in Egypt and Palestine 
under the Fatimid Caliphs, Oxford, 1920-2, 1, 5 -35 .
15. Ibn al~Muqaffa‘ , SI, 109; J . Mann, 1, 5-35.
16. J ,  Mann, 1, 38 -?states, “We thus gather the important information 
that Elhanan (a principle of the Jewish School of Fustatp) was some­
times the recipient of the sovereign bounty. This quite in 
accordance with the favourable position o f the Jews in Egypt
prior to ai-Hakim's persecution. Elhanan very like ly  received a grant 
from the government. Likewise, Joshich, the contemporary Gaon 
from Palestine, was maintained by the State."
the employment of Ahl al-Dhimma.
"Be Christian. Today is the time of Christianity.
Believe in nothing, but in the Holy Trin ity,
Ya<qub is the father, ‘ Aziz is the son
And for the Holy Ghost, F a d l^  is the o n e . " ^
When the Fatimids settled in Egypt and large numbers of their 
troops remained unoccupied at home, the problem became more acute.
The chiefs of al-Maghariba, the Berber element in the army, who had 
established the Fatimid State in Maghrib and had conquered Egypt for 
the Fatimids, clashed with the administrators. It would seem that they 
themselves desired to be employed in the State's administration; but 
since they were mainly tribesmen and had no experience in such matters 
the coveted posts were not suitable for them. Disagreement mounted 
between them and the Wazir Ibn K illis . The ensuing enmity caused 
an attempt to be made on his life
Towards the end of a l-<A z iz?s reign, the antagonism, which 
increased with the rapid growth of the Dhimmi's influence, had reached 
almost hysterical proportions among the Muslims. In a letter purported
17. AI-Fadl ibn Salih, one of the army commanders.
18. See the poetry of a I-Hasan Ibn Bishr al-Dimashqi, quoted 
by Ibn a l-A th ir, IX, 48-9.
19. Ibn al-Qalanisi, 28; Ibn a l-A th ir, IX, 13; Ibn Khaldun, IV, 53.
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to have been delivered to the Imam, the writer accused him by saying,
"By the Lord who honoured the Christians by i Isa ibn Nasturus and the
M 2q 2|
Jews by Manashsha ibn al-Qazaz and humiliated the Muslims by you ."
The situation became very tense and exploded in riots and disturbances.
al-Musabbihi who is quoted by Maqrizi says that during 386/995 five naval
ships, together with their equipment, were burnt. The Christians, who were
living in the neighbourhood of the port, were accused of deliberately
causing the fire . Muslim members of the public, together with a number
of sailors, attacked them. They killed one hundred and seven men, threw
their bodies into the streets, and looted a ll the houses of the Christians
in the area, ‘ Isa Ibn Nasturus, who was the representative of aM 'A z iz
during his absence, together with a police force came to the area,
inspected the incident and arrested many Muslims. He executed twenty
22men and crucified their bodies, and severely punished many others. The 
death to ll of this rio t indicates the large number of people involved.
Although the reason given was the fire  among the ships, the manner in
« 23
which the Muslims behaved (according to the description by al-Musabbihi)
4
confirms that hatred was at the root of the disturbance.
20. The financial administrator of Damascus -  a Jew and said to
have been appointed by Ibn K illis . For more information see 
J . Mann, I, 5-35.
21 . Ibn a l-Z a fir , fo l . 55B; Ibn a l-A th ir, IX, 81.
22, Khitafr, H , 195,
23. Ibid.
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A ( - ‘ Aziz's method of dealing with the problem was not conducive
to its solution. He neither planned a gradual take-over by Muslims in the
financial administration nor was he able to convince them of the value of
Ahl al-Phimma to the prosperity of the State. He merely replaced some of
the non-Muslim high officia ls by Musi inns when the hysteria of the Muslim
population reached alarming proportions. The records show his fo lly . Many
of the dismissed officia ls were reinstated and ‘ Isa Ibn Nasturus was re-
-  -  24appointed on condition that he would appoint only Muslims to his Dwawin.
The chiefs of al-Maghariba were silenced by the bestowal of
honorary places in the court of the Imam , together with generous gifts
and high salaries. The indignant Sunnis were treated with tolerance and
. 2 5patience. Critics, even the very bitter ones, were forgiven unconditionally. 
This policy, however, merely palliated the situation and pacified the parties 
concerned without reaching the roots of the problem.
L ittle  is recorded concerning the problems of the first four years 
of al-Hakim's reign. It may have been that the struggle between the 
elements of the army (al-Maghariba and al-Mashariqa), which reached 
its peak during that period, overshadowed other problems and made them 
appear less important in the eyes of the chroniclers.
The only reported incident in connection with Ahl al-Dhimma 
is the dismissal, and later the execution, of ‘Isa  Sbn Nasturus* It was9 |  “
24, Ibn a l-Z a fir , fo l . 56A .
25. Ibn a l-A th ir, IX, 48-9.
arranged by Ibn ‘ Ammar after his appointment as Wasita in 386/996.
Nuwayri, the only chronicler who explains the reason for ‘ Isa's
26execution, says, "Ibn ‘ Ammar accused him of collaboration with 
27M anjotg in." But since the death of ‘ Ssa occurred after the capture
*•*  * * * * = »  
and pardon of Manjotgin there were probably other reasons for ‘ Isa's
execution. It is perhaps more like ly  that It was an attempt by Ibn ‘ Ammar
to achieve popularity among the Muslims. It has already been mentioned
that less than a year previously ‘ Isa had executed twenty Muslims and
crucified their bodies in Cairo. Ibn ‘Ammar is highly praised by Nuwayri
for the execution of ‘ isa because: "Ibn Nasturus was wronging the Muslims.
Hatred between Muslims and non-Muslims seems to have become
so strong that to dismiss or execute a Phimmi high o ffic ia l was a passport
to popularity among the Muslim population. If was also expressed in the
riots which occurred in 392/1002 and resulted in the destruction of a church 
2o
in Cairo. * The continued riva lry between Muslim and non-Muslim 
30officials urged the Caliph to endeavour to find a solution.
26. For information on Manjotgin, see below, note 61 .
27. Nuwayri, f o l . 93.
28. Nuwayri, f o l . 93.
29. Khitaf, U, 293.
30. I b i d 31.
The internal Struggle of the Army
al-Hakim's legacy of the riva lry between the two main elements
3of his army, al-Maghariba and al-Mashariqa (Westerners and Easterners)
reached the point of open warfare which resulted in four years of internal
upheavals. Such a position, of course, proffered unique opportunity
for internal rebellions and attacks from outside enemies.
The roof cause of the upheaval was a problem created during
the last few years of al-Mu* iz*s reign. The discontent and unrest grew
stronger throughout the reigh of a l-*A z iz . Since the inception of the
Fatimid State, al-Maghariba were the chief element of its army. It was
31 . The term Maghariba in this context applies chiefly to the Berber 
troops of the Fatimid army after the conquest of Egypt, The 
majority of them were orig inally tribesmen from the tribes of 
Kufama, §inhaja and Zuwayla. (Khi[at, II, 4, 10, 21). It is 
d iff ic u lt to give any estimate of their members as a whole or 
by comparison with each other, but it  is quite clear in the 
records that the majority of them were Kutamis (members of the 
tribe of Kufama) who were, as Maqrizi says, "the backbone of 
the Fatimid army". (K h ija f, IS, 10). It is also recorded by Ibn 
Khaldun, V I, 148, that "when al “ Mu* iz moved to Egypt the 
whole tribe of Kutama came with him. It is also noticeable 
that the two terms, Maghtlriba and Kutama, are synonymously 
used by chroniclers. This in addition to the fact that a ll the 
famous Maghrib! personnel who glayed important roles in the 
Fatimid State in Egypt were Kutamis. Unfortunately there is 
not enough information to reveal the connection between a l- 
Maghariba and their previous homeland.
The term Mashariqa applied here chiefly to the Turkish and 
Daylamis troops in the Fatimid army. But it  is necessary to 
mention that a group of al-Maghariba under the leadership of 
Jaysh ibn al-Samsama supported al-Mashariqa in the struggle.
In addition to these two major elements, there was a group 
known as al-Saqaliba (see 1. Hrbek, "Die Slawen Im Dienste
al-Maghariba who established if ,  defended it  against its enemies, and
assured its suzerainty over Maghrib. By their power Egypt and H ijaz,
*
together with a large portion of Syria, were conquered and added to the 
Empire. But when al-M u* iz moved to Egypt, a change in his policy 
towards the army began to emerge. This change is emphasised during the 
reign of his successor a l-*A z iz , A new element other than Maghariba was 
created and although this was of considerable importance in the history of 
the Fatimids, none of the chroniclers or historians have given any satis­
factory reason for i f .  The only surviving information is that al~*Azlz 
encouraged the employment of Turks and Daylamis in his army and was 
the first Fatimid Caliph to employ Turks.
This important change appears to have been a calculated policy 
in an endeavour to achieve the fina l goals of the Fatimid ambitions. The 
infusion of a new element of strong and skilled fighters was the only means
of fu lfillin g  the Fatimid dream of quick conquest of the Eastern parts of the 
32Islamic world. The original and sole element of the army were the 
Maghariba but they had been fighting continuously for three generations and
z der Fafimiden", A ,Q  . , 21 (1953), 543-581) who,although they did not
form an independent group in the army, participated in the 
struggle. The §aqaliba were divided into two factions: a group 
led by al-Husayn ibn Jawhar, and Yamis who supported al-Maghariba. 
The other was under the leadership of Barjawan who also was the 
leader of al-Mashariqa. For a study of the elements of the Fatimid 
army see B . l . Bashir, The Fatimid Caliphate, Chapter I .
32 , De Lacy O /Leary in his Short History of the Fatimid Caliphate, London
1923, 120, suggests that the recruitment of al-MashSriqa was a plan 
to decrease the power of qI-Maghariba whom a l-*A z iz  mistrusted.
61.
had lost much of their early enthusiasm. Their defeats in Syria between
360-365/970-975 were ample evidence of their incapability of
33achieving their masters1 dreams.w
Turks seem to have been the race from whom al-M u* iz
desired to have the new recruits. Maqrizi reports a conversation
between al-Mu* iz and the commander-in-chief of his army, Jawhar,
after the latter had captured three hundred men and presented them to
his master. One of these captives was a Turk in whom al-M u* iz,
appeared to be more interested than in any of the others. Jawhar said,
nO Lord 1 notice that you have been more concerned with the Turkish
captive than the rest. 1 A l-M u* iz replied, "You w ill know, Jawhar,
that one of my children would employ a man of this race by whom God
34would grant him conquests which he had not granted to us." This 
suggests that a l-M u*iz  no longer hoped that the conquest of the Eastern 
parts of the Muslim world would be achieved by al-Maghariba. The rest of 
the report emphasises Jawhar*s strong belief in what his Imam had said and 
indicates that the idea of introducing an element of Turks into the army 
may have been exchanged amongst the higher offic ia ls of the Fatimid 
regime.
A lp tig in , the Turkish general, together with his Turkish and
33. Antaki, 155; Ibn a l-Q alan is i, 19; Ibn a l-A th ir, V llfl, 262;
Ibn Khaldun, IV, 49 !; Khitat, II, 9.
34. Khijaj>, I, 379*
6 2 .
Daylami troops arrived in Syria in the year 364/974. This offered the
Fatimids an opportunity to augment their army. A lp tig in  was a past-
master in the art of war and commanded equally skilled soldiers. He was
able to defeat Jawhar, the conquerer of Egypt and the best general of
the Fatimid army. Aided by his relatively small number of men (about
three hundred) he was able to control a large portion of Syria; both
in war and negotiations his prestige was equal, i f  not superior, to that
35
of the Fatimids or the Carmatians. In addition to these qualities, 
A lp tig in  had been a general in the *Abbasid army and his knowledge 
of the regime of Baghdad was an important factor. Perhaps the bitter 
experience of defeat in Iraq which forced him to leave may fired his 
ambition to lead a Fatimid army and by its aid to overthrow the ruling 
authorities there and achieve the final goal for the Fatimids. The deter- 
mination of al-M u* iz and later a l-*A z iz  to win the loyalty of A lp tig in  
and his soldiers Is clearly expressed in the way they dealt with the rising 
danger of A lp tig in  ls presence in Syria, A l-M u* Iz offered him the governor­
ship of Fatimid Syria in return for his loyalty to their cause,
A I-*  A ziz resumed his father's policy and during the many battles 
which A lp tig in  fought against the Fatimid forces, he noticeably repeated 
the same offer. Even in defeat and brought as a prisoner to a l-*A z iz ,
35. Antaki, 155; Ibn a l-Q alan is i, 19; Ibn a l-A th ir, V II! ,  262;
Ibn Khaldun, IV, 494; Khitat, IS, 9.
A lp tig in  was pardoned and was brought, together with a ll his men, to
36Egypt and treated as an honoured guest. It was not only, as the 
chroniclers state, “because of his own tolerance", that a l“ *Aziz treated 
A lp tig in  in that manner but also because A lp tig in  and his men 
represented the desirable element for which he and his father were 
searching. In Egypt A lp tig in 's  stay was more like a period of prepara­
tion for his appointment as the future commander of the Fatimid army.
In court his place was always beside the Imam , High offic ia ls of the 
State were commanded to show him every courtesy. A special bodyguard 
of his men was put under his command. Many of his friends and
supporters began to arrive in Egypt to join the Fatimid army. His position
3 7
became so powerful that jealous rivals plotted his death.
Alptigin*s men were co-o|!>ted to the army as professional soldiers
and were given special accommodation in Cairo which became known as fciaratal
38
Atrak (Q uartor of tho Turks) and Ijara f a I-Pay lam (Quarter of the Daylamis) and thus 
a now o!ament in the Fatimid fighting forces was creatod. This now element grew rapidly
36. Anfaki, 155; Ibn a l-Q a lan is i, 19; Ibn a l-A th ir, V III, 262; Ibn 
a l-Z a fir , fol.51B; Ibn Khaldun, IV, 52; Khitat, II, 10.
37. Ibn a l-G a lan is i, 19; Ibn a l-A th ir, V III, 262; Ibn a l-Z a fir , fo l.51B ;
Ibn Khaldun, IV, 53* Khitat,^ II, 10, suggest that Ibn K illis  was 
suspected of poisoning A lp tig in , but since A lp tig in  was only a m ilitary 
officer, there would have been no ncod for Ibn K illis  to fool jealous or
afraid that his post as Wazir might be given to A lp tig in . if  is possible
that the chiefs o f al-Maghariba, who hated Ibn K illis  and fe lt 
jealous of A lp tig in , arranged the plot and spread rumours accusing
Ibn K illis , so that they would be able to get rid of both A lp tig in  and 
Ibn K illis .
38. Khitgf, IS, 8 ,9 .
64.
sponsored by the Imam aHAziz and his Wazir Ya*qub Ibn K illis , and
before long its chiefs were appointed as commanders. In 381/991 the
entire command of the Fatimid army was given to one of them known
as Manjotgin with the tit le  Amir al-Juyush al-ft/lansura (Commander of
39the victorious armies) . His mission was to abolish the disturbances in
Syria, strike the Byzantines in the North, and put Aleppo under the
40direct rule of the Fatimids. If this could be accomplished, future 
expansion towards Baghdad would fo llow . Maqrizi's report on the 
o ffic ia l ceremony of Manjofgin*s appointment is an important piece of
J
information. It shows the importance al-Mashariqa had achieved by that
time and also the hope that a l-* A z iz  held that they would conquer the
Eastern parts of the Muslim Empire. This ceremony is interestingly
similar to that o f Jawhar when he was sent by al-Mu* iz to conquer Egypt,
A ll high o ffic ia ls , including the sons of fho imam and his brothers, were
ordered to dismount for Jawhar. A ll of them, even including Jawhar, were
41ordered to honour Manjotgin in this way. * A l-M u* iz had obviously 
hoped that Jawhar would succeed in conquering Egypt and a l-* Aziz 
also anticipated similar victories by Mtanjofgin and his troops.
The presence of al-Mashariqa in the army favoured by the 
lm5ms was a direct blow to the pride of al-Maghariba and to their position
39. Antaki, 173,
♦
40. Anfaki, 173; Ibn a l-G a lan is i, 40.* r 9
41. K h ita f, I ,  379.
in the Empire. They had hitherto been the only m ilitary power behind 
the Fatimid Caliphate, but now they could no longer claim that 
priv ilege. The command of the Fatimid army, particularly the troops 
stationed in Syria, which had been under Maghribi personnel, was 
now given to the Turks. Even the social privileges of occupying the 
places of honour beside the Imam during offic ia l ceremonies or at prayer 
times and for the Khutba in the Mosque, the gifts of houses, horses, 
money, slave girls, e tc ., were now a ll shared by the new element. For 
the first time since they had joined the Fatimid cause, al-Maghariba 
realised that their position was weakened and was challenged by a power 
of a different race, culture and background; this power that had defeated 
them and caused their humiliation once in Syria had now arrived to share 
with them the glories of an Empire which they had bu ilt and defended for 
many years,
Even the creation of the new element was the work of their 
Imam, the one in whom they had believed as a divinely inspired leader. 
Al-Maghariba's reaction was opposition, although it  did not reach open 
rebellion. They did not exercise m ilitary pressure on the Ijrnarn, nor did 
they create a special reason which would justify the use of force against 
al-Mashariqa to curtail their power before it  grew stronger. Their 
opposition expressed itself in attempts to get rid of high o ffic ia ls , whom
"  . 42they thought were behind a l-*A z iz 's  po licy. They murmured
43criticism and dissatisfaction of his conduct. The army had not yet 
attained sufficient strength to enable its leaders to bring pressure to 
bear to compel the Caliph to alter his policy, as had been the case in 
the *Abbasid Caliphate, and later in the Fatimid Caliphate, A I-*A z iz  
as Imam-Caliph was s till at the zenith of his power. Although he 
had conferred some high positions in his army on the Mashariqa, he 
had behaved courteously towards the Maghariba chiefs bestowing on 
them generous gifts and honouring them in his court. A I-^A z lz  was, 
however, aware o f their dissatisfaction and their opposition to the pre­
sence of the Mashariqa in the army, and its grave consequences to the
future of the State. He seems, however, to have been unable to create 
any fundamental solution to the problem.
When he realised that he was dying, he summoned two of the 
most powerful chiefs of al-Maghariba, Ibn *Am m ar^ and Muhammad Ibn
42. ibn a l-Q a lan is i, 28; Ibn a l-A th ir, IX, 13; Ibn Khaldun, IV , 54.
Khitafr, I, 379,
44. Abu Mubammad, al-ldasan Ibn *Ammar al-Kutam i, the most
powerful Kutami chief during the reign of a l- *A z lz . His career 
started as a commander of the Fatimid forces between 351-353/ 
962-964. He played a leading role in defeating the Byzantines 
in S ic ily , which brought him popularity in the Fatimid court. In 
361/962 he came to Egypt, leading his troops to support Jawhar 
against the Carmatians. He succeeded in overpowering the rebels 
of the c ity  of Tanis who were in alliance with the Carmatians.
In 362/972 he led fen thousand troops and defeated the Carmatians
67.
45al-Numan and, as chroniclers state, “spoke to them about the future 
of his son". No records of the interview have been preserved but if  
could be assumed that, since none of the Mashariqa chiefs were summoned 
a l-*A z iz 's  motive may have been to avert future trouble which might 
arise from al-Maghariba and an attempt by the dying Imam to save his
son's State from possible crisis, the causes of which he had himself created.
Both Ibn * Ammar and Qadi Muhammad Ibn al-Numan are said to have
*  *
46“sworn loyalty and obedience to his commands".
This, however, did not prevent al-Maghariba from attempting 
to take over power, abolish the prestige of al-Mashariqa in the army, and
= and caused their retreat from Egypt. Between 363/973 and 383/
993 there is no mention of Ibn *Ammar's activ ities, which indi­
cates that he did not hold a significant position in the State, but 
if  appears that he was an important figure in the Caliph's court as 
he acted as a mediator on behalf of the Imam to calm the riots which 
flared up between the Berbers and the Egyptians, In 383/993 he was 
appointed as Wasifa but was dismissed shortly afterwards. For 
information on Ibn * Ammar see al-Musabbihi, Akhbar Mijsr, fo l . 153 f f ;  
Anfaki, 180 ff; al-Rudhrawan, 222 ff; Ibn a l-Q a lan is l, 44 f f ;  Ibn a l-  
Sayrafi, Ishara, 27; Ibn Muyassar, 53 ff; Ibn a l-Z a fir , fo l,  57 ff;
Ibn a l-A th ir, IX, 49; Ibn Khalikan, I II ,  449, 525; al-Dawadari, V I, 
256 ff; Ibn Khaldun, IV, 47-57; MaqrTzi, lt t i*a z , annos, 383, 
386-390 and KhjtaJ, | | / 36, 285; Nuwayri, 'fo IT 93 ff;  ibn Kathir,
X I, 391 ff; Ibn Taghri Birdi, Nujum, IV, 122 f f .
45. Muhammad Ibn a l-  Nu* man, son of the celebrated Q adi Qudat of
the Fatimid State, a l-N u* man Ibn fjayyun. He was appointed as Qadi 
Qudat (chief judge) in 374/984 and held the office until his death 
in 389/999.
46. A l-M usabbihi, quoted by Maqrizi, lft i*a z , anno, 386; Ibn 
Muyassar, 53.
restore their lost position as the only dominating power in the State,
as soon as the opportunity arose. The death of a l- ‘ Aziz provided that
opportunity. The new Imam-Caliph was very young and could easily be
persuaded, or forced if  necessary, to agree with their demands. The
majority of al-Mashariqa were in Syria, so there was no m ilitary power
that could intervene against them. The meeting could be interpreted as
an authorisation by the dying imam for ibn * Ammar to act as administrator
47for his son's State.
In Ramadan 386/996, only two days after the death of a l - ‘ A z iz ,
al-Maghariba made what might be called in modern terms a "coup d'fefaf",
Maqrizi describes the event by saying, "When a!-* Aziz died and al-Hakim
*
succeeded, the Kutamis, who were the most powerful in the State (Ahl 
al-Dawla) stipulated that no-one but Ibn * Ammar should be the administra­
tor of their affairs. They further demanded the dismissal of * Isa Ibn 
Nasturus from the Wasata and that this office should be given to Ibn ‘ Ammar."
Ibn Muyassar adds that they refused to attend the ceremony of a I-
-  . . .  -  49Hakim's investiture as Imam unless their demands were met. They met
no opposition and al-Hakim responded to their demand by appointing Ibn
‘ Ammar as Wasifa and giving him the tit le  Amin al-Dawla (trustee of the
  r  — T"|  1 , .......................I. J .  I ■
47. There are some chroniclers who in fact believed that Ibn ‘ Ammar 
was appointed as administrator of the State, according to the w ill 
of a i - ‘ A z iz . See Ibn a l-Z a fir , fo l.  57.
48. Khitnt, II, 36.
49. Ibn Muyassar, 53. Also l t f i ‘ az, ann, 386.
State) which, as chroniclers state, was for the first time given to an
50
administrator in the Fatimid State.
According to al-Rudhrawari, Ibn al-Qalanisi and some chroniclers 
who may have used thoir records,the aim of al-Maghariba was to abolish 
the institution of the Fatimid Imama and build an Empire of their own.
They say that |bn *Ammar's friends advised him to k ill al-Hakim saying,
NN
"We do not need an Imam whom we have to raise and worship." Ibn
‘ Ammar, who then intended to follow their advice, was later dissuaded
-  51because al-Hakim was too young and harmless. This story seems very
un like ly . Such an important development is not reported by other 
chroniclers nor does i f  appear consistent with the events which followed.
If is more like ly  a quotation from the works of Ibn al-SabP , which un­
fortunately have not survived. The motive behind it  is consistent with 
the anti-Fatim id propaganda which was directed by the ‘ Abbasids in Baghdad 
during the time of Ibn al-SabP .
a
50. al-Rudhrawari, 222; Ibn a l-Q alan is i, 44; Ibn a l-A th ir, IX , 49;
Ibn Khailikan, III,  449.
51. al-Rudhrawari, 222; Ibn a l-Q alan is i, 45; Ibn a l-A th ir, IX , 49;
Nuwayri, fo l.  94. De Lacy O'Leary, Short History of the Fatimid 
Caliphate, 124-5, and P J  . Vafik io tis, The Fatimid Theory of State, 
151, suggest that the Maghariba, led by ibn ‘ Ammar, seemed to have 
favoured a more secular trend with the hope of building an Empire 
through conquest.
70.
i t  stresses two points: (A) it  suggests that even the Maghariba, 
who bu ilt the Fatimid Empire, did not sincerely believe in the 
righteousness of the Fatimid claims: (B) It indicates that the Fatimid 
Imam claimed to be divine and required to be worshipped. These two 
points are very much emphasised in the anti-Fatim id manifesto written 
in Baghdad in 402/1011 . Both al-Rudhrawari and Ibn al-Q alanis i are 
known to have largely followed the information of Ibn al-Sabi* .
a
Antaki, Ibn Muyassar and Maqrizi agree that the aim of a l-  
Maghariba was to achieve po litica l administration and restore themselves 
as a dominating power in the State and following events lead to this 
conclusion.
Immediately after his appointment as Wasita, Ibn ‘ Ammar began 
to allocate high positions to his supporters, Sulayman Ibn Falah al-Kutami 
and his brother ‘ A l l  were given command of the Fatimid army in Syria.
Abu Abdullah a!-Musi!y became the secretary of ibn ‘ Ammar and al-H  usayn
-  52 __
Ibn Jawhar was appointed head of Diwan a I Barid was ql-inshay . Antaki
-  . 53says that a ll important positions were given to al-Maghariba. In addition 
to o ffic ia l positions, al-Maghariba were granted social privileges and 
precedence at o ffic ia l ceremonies and palace functions. They were per­
mitted to enter first Info the court and only they were allowed to sit in the
Stf?^  a%, anno, 386.
53, A nfaki, 180.
71.
54honorary places. Vast sums of money, properties, slave girls and 
horses were bestowed on their chiefs. Maqrizi says that on the day 
Ibn ‘ Ammar was proclaimed Wasita , every Maghribi received twenty 
Dinars and each was promised an additional sixty-four Dinars annually.
He adds that one day Ibn ‘ Ammar gave one thousend five hundred horses
-  -  55to his Kutaml supporters ,
Al-Maghariba's aim was to weaken the power of al-Mashariqa
and abolish their prestige in the regime. The chiefs of al-Mashariqa
56were dismissed and some of their supporters were even executed.
57Annual allowances to a ll Mashariqa were cancelled. Many of them
58fled from Egypt fearing more severe measures. In a short time, a l-  
Maghariba were able to achieve the position they had failed to achieve 
throughout the entire reign of a l- ‘ A z iz , They became the controlling 
power in the Fatimid State,and their chief Ibn ‘ Ammar the real ruler of 
Egypt.
The manner in which Ibn ‘ Ammarseized power and the situation
59to which his rule had led aroused the ambition of Barjawan. He found
54. I t t i ‘ az, anno, 386-387; Khitat, II, 36.
55. I t t i ‘ az, annos, 386-387.
56. Antaki, 180-1; Ibn a l-Q alan is i, 46; Nuwayri, fo l.  93; l t t i ‘ az,
annos, 386-387.
57. Stti‘ a^, anno, 387.
58. Antaki, 180.f *
59. B, Lewis, a rtic le , "Barjawan", E .1 p-
72.
in these events a suitable opportunity to seize power from Ibn ‘ Ammar 
and himself become Wasita . He. entered into communication with the 
chiefs of a I “ Mashariqa premising to restore their lost position. He 
feigned to protect al-Hakim from the tyranny of al-Maghariba and 
spread rumours that Ibn ‘ Ammar's conduct was contrary to the Imam's 
desire. His plan succeeded and indeed many men looked on him as the 
saviour of the Imam from Ibn ‘ Ammar's tyranny,
Manjotgin, who was with a great force in Syria, responded to 
Barjawan's appeal. He harangued his officers and men and compared 
the disorder in Egypt with the security and tolerance during a l - ‘ Aziz's 
reign. His impassioned speech persuaded officers and men a like to 
support him in any suitable measure to restore the policy of the late
60. al-Rudhrawari, 222; Ibn a l-Q alanis i, 45; Ibn a l-A th ir, IX , 49;
Nuwayri, fol .94,
61 . Contrary to other sources Antaki calls him Banjotgin which
is probably due to a different pronunciation of the Turkish 
dialects. His career started in 381/991 when he was appointed 
genera] commander of the Fatimid army; In Syria. This occurred 
after a M A z iz  had feared that the Wali of Damascus had intended 
to rebel and the city had fallen into confusion and disorder. 
Manjotgin came to Syria not only to restore law and order in 
Damascus but also to attempt to put Aleppo completely under the 
direct control of the Fatimids, He succeeded in Damascus and 
also at first in Aleppo when he defeated the Byzantine forces 
which came to support A leppo. But while besieging the c ity  
and trying to deal the final blow to its rulers, the Byzantine 
Emperor came in person with a large army and caused the 
defeat of Manjotgin who retreated to Damascus awaiting the 
support of his Imam-Caliph a l~ ‘ A z iz . The sudden death of “
. 6 2Caliph a l- ‘ Aziz and save the Fatimid State from certain destruction.
He formed an alliance with some of the Bedouin chiefs and a few days 
later le ft Damascus at the head of six thousand troops and marched towards
F f  6 3Egypt.
Ibn ‘ Ammar mobilised his troops under the leadership of Sulayman
ts al~ ‘ Aziz caused the cancellation of the preparation to wage
war against Byzantium and Manjotgin stayed in Damascus until 
he received the news of Ibn ‘ Ammar’s treatment of al-Mashariqa.
For information on Manjotgin see Antaki, 173, 181 ff;( al-Rudhrawari, 
217 ff;  Ibn a l-Q alan is i, 40 f f ;  Ibn a l-A th ir, IX, 49 ff* Ibn 
Khallikan, III, 449; Ibn Khaldun, IV, 54; I t t i ‘ az, annos, 386,
387; Khija t, I, 379, II, 285; Ibn Taghrl BirHTTTOjum, IV, 117 ff*  
Nuwayri, fo l , 93.
62. al-Rudhrawari, 222; Ibn al-Q alanis i, 45; Ibn a l-A th ir, IX, 49;
Nuwayri, f o l , 94,
63. Contrai*)/to a ll other sources, Antaki, 180, states that when 
Manjotgin received the news of ibn ‘ Ammar‘s oppression of a l-  
Mashariqa, he wrote to the Byzantine Emperor offering homage 
(a l-Ta ‘ ah) and asking for his support against Ibn ‘ Ammar in Egypt. 
This information, however, does not seem consistent with the facts 
because Antaki adds that the Emperor refused to support Manjotgin, 
which is very unlikely since, in the same year, he supported
the rebellion in Tyre. The Byzantines were in a state of war 
with the Fatimids and the presence of the Emperor himself in Syria 
at that time was to defeat the Fatimids in Northern Syria and 
secure his interests there. If an offer of allegiance came to him 
from the general commander of the Fatimid army in Syria, the 
Emperor would not refuse i t .  On the other hand, it  seems very 
unlikely that Manjotgin would ask the help of the Byzantines in 
this kind of war and if  such were the case Ibn ‘ Ammar would have 
accused Manjotgin of an allegiance with the common enemy of 
Islam, and since Ibn ‘ Ammar accused Manjotgin only of rebellion 
against al-Hakim , Anfaki's report seems doubtfu l.
74.
-  64Ibn Fa I ah and provided him with the large sums of money which
would be necessary to divert the loyalty of the Bedouin chiefs of
" 6 5  -Palestine against Manjotgin. He also declared that Manjotgin had
rebelled against al-Hakim and forced Bar j a wan and other leaders of 
the opposition to agree. Manjotgin's name was cursed in the Mosques
of Cairo and men were encouraged to join Sulayman‘s army. Even
_ _
al-Hakim was made to appear in public to support Sulayman.
The sources are contradictory concerning the number of
-  67Sulayman's army; Ibn al-Q alanisi reports "sixteen thousand",
64. AbuTamim, Sulayman Ibn Jaf far Ibn Falah ah-Kufami. His 
father, Ja 'fa r, was the most important Kutami chief amongst 
those who came with Jawhar to conquer Egypt. Sulayman and 
his brother, <A fi, played important roles as army commanders 
and sometimes Walis in the Fatimid State, Sblayman's career 
began after the death of his father in 360/970. From thence 
he was Jooked on as the successor of his father and in 369/979 
Sulayman was appointed the commander of a Fatimid army 
which was sent to restore law and order in Syria after troubles 
had broken out in its capital -  Damascus. His campaign does 
not seem to have been successful and he was called back to 
Egypt only a few months after his arrival in Syria. Nothing is 
reported about Sulayman between 369/979 and 386/996, and 
it seems that he did not occupy any important position, sjnce 
most of the positions in the army were given to the Mashariqa.^ 
This is probably why he became a strong supporter of Ibn f Ammar's 
party. For information on Sulayman see Antaki, 181 ff; a l-  
Rudhrawari, 223 ff;  Ibn a l-Q alan is i, 23 ff; Ibn Muyassar, 55 ff; 
Ibn a l-A th ir, IX, 49; Ibn Khallikan, III, 449; Ibn Khaldun,
SV, 56 ff; ltt?*a%, annos, 386-387; Khitat, | | r 285; Nuwayri/ 
fo l, 94 ff; Ibn Taghri B irdf, Nujum, lv /T 1 5 .
65. Ibn a l-Q a lan is i, 46.
anno, 387.
67. Ibn al -Q alan is i, 46.
75,
while I bn Muyassar and Maqrizi say "three thousand Kufamis, eight 
thousand Bedouins and seven hundred Ghilman11 Sources also 
disagree concerning the first move in the war. Antaki and ibn al~
Qalanisi say that Manjotgin was the first to move towards Egypt.
Maqrizi, who seems to have obtained his information from contemporary 
Egyptian sources, states that after receiving the news of ibn Falah's
70march towards Syria Manjotgin marched to meet the Egyptian army.
They agree that the two armies met between Ramla and (Asqaian and
after three days of minor clashes they fought the final battle . By bribes,
Sulayman succeeded in diverting the allegiance of the Bedouins of
Palestine against Manjotgin and thus turned the tide of the battle in his 
? \  -
own favour. Manjotgin was defeated, a large number of his troops were
killed  and he fled towards Damascus where he hoped to re-organise another
force, but the c ity , which had promised support, failed him. Its population
-  72were confused and in disorder and the Alidath seized the opportunity to
_ 73
assume contro l. They invaded Manjotgin *s house and looted i t ,
68. Ibn Muyassar, 50; I t t^ a ^ , anno, 387.
69. Antaki, 180; Ibn a l-Q alan is i, 46.
70. l t t i f az, anno, 387.
71 . ibn a l“G alanisi, 46.
272. For the meanings of this term see artic le , "Ahdath", E , 1,
73. Ibn al™Qalanisi, 47.
76.
Manjotgin realised that he couid expect no support from
Damascus, so he went info hiding. Sulayman offered a reward of ten
thousand Dinars and a hundred robes for his capture, which made if
impossible for Manjotgin to hide amongst the Bedouins. It was *A li
Ibn al-Jarrah, a Bedouin chief,who found Manjotgin and delivered him
to Sulayman by whom he was sent to Ibn cAmmar in Egypt.
Although this war had resulted in victory to the Maghariba, if
also presented them with a problem -  a fast growing and dangerous
opposition in Egypt. The defeated Mashariqa arrived in Egypt and created
a m ilitary threat to Ibn ‘ Ammar's rule, while the majority of al-Maghariba
were in Syria with Sulayman.
To overcome the problem, Ibn ‘ Ammar planned to increase his
supporters and at the same time adopt a moderate line of po licy towards
-  75al-Mashariqa. He instituted a group of Ahdafh recruited from amongst
-  -  76the Maghariba and pardoned Manjotgin, then received him cord ia lly .
He also assured Barjawan and his supporters of his good w ill and
77promised them better prospects for the future.
74. al-Rudhrawari, 223; Ibn a l-G alan is i, 47.
75. The term Ahdath here seems to have meant young men. See
It t i 'a ^ ,  annos, 386-387.
76. Antaki, 181; al-Rudhrawari, 223; Ibn a l-Q a ian is i, 47; ibn a l-A th ir,
IX , 49; I f t i ( a ^ , anno, 387.
77. Ibn a l-Q a lan is i, 46; I t t i 'a z ,  anno, 387.
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Sulayman adopted a similar policy in Syria. He endeavoured 
to convince its inhabitants that his plans were for peace and security.
Without any hesitation he dismissed his brother (A |j on learning that
78 —he had i l l  treated the people of Damascus. He gave general A mans
and Issued a written proclamation in which he pardoned a ll prisoners.
He gave strict orders to his Maghribi troops not to interfere with the
Damascan population. Sulayman seems to have proved himself to be a
successful Wal? , and for the first time since Damascus had fallen to the
Fatimids, a Shi*i Wal? was praised by its people. Ibn a l-Q alanis i says
"Sulayman was a very good leader who possessed great understanding.
His desire to create justice was real and his aims to do good deeds were
true and well observed by his conduct and achievements. He freed many
prisoners and introduced a high standard of equality and justice in a ll
petitions and complaints he received from the people. On one Friday he
rode through a peaceful c ity to the Mosque and with him were many men
giving charity to the poor who gathered in numbers on both sides of the
road. He became a very popular Wali and the hearts of the people turned
7 9
towards h im ." During the short time of his Governorship in Syria, 
Sulayman changed the opinion of the inhabitants concerning a I-Maghariba, 
which had previously been hostile. His policy was an astute attempt to
78. Ibn a l-Q a lan is i, 50; |tti*a z  , anno, 387.
79, Ibn a l-Q a lan is i, 51; see also al-Rudhrawari, 224.
78.
gain the loyalty of the Syrians and make if  possible for Ibn ‘ Ammar
to withdraw some of his troops and thus strengthen his position in Egypt.
Despite his success, Sulayman committed one serious error.
— 80He dismissed Jaysh ibn al-Samsama from the Governorship of Tripoli 
and replaced him with his own brother * A li.  Jaysh, who was a power­
ful Kutami chief, went to Egypt to revenge himself by attempting to
overthrow Ibn 6Ammar. To this end he made an alliance with Barjawan
81 ___
and the chiefs of al-Mashariqa. A  number of Kutami chiefs supported
Jaysh, thus the unity of a I-Maghariba was broken and the prestige of
Ibn <Ammar was weakened.
The Downfall of Ibn (Ammar
With the presence of Jaysh in Egypt, as a Kutami chief opposing 
Ibn ^m m a r’s regime, and the absence of most of Ibn ‘ Ammar*s supporters, 
came Barjawan *s opportunity to gain power.
80. Abu^/Vluhammad, Jaysh Ibn al-Samsama, one of the powerful 
Kutami chiefs. He began his career as W all of Damascus when, 
in 363/973, his uncle, AbO Mahmud al-Kutam i, the general 
governor of Syria, was appointed by al-Mu* iz there. He stayed 
for a short while then was dismissed from the Wilaya and joined 
his uncle as one of the army commanders. In 370/980 his uncle 
died and he succeeded him as the general commander of the 
Fatimid troops in Syria. By the end of 370/980 the command 
had been given to a Turk named Bultigln and from thence the 
sources fa il to supply any information about Jaysh, who may have 
been appointed as Wali of Tripoli until 386/996^ when Sulayman 
dismissed him. For information on Jaysh see Antaki, 182 Ff; a l-  
Rudhrawarl, 224 ff; Ibn a l-Q a lan is i, 9, 10, 25, 48 ff;  Ibn a l-A th ir, 
IX , 49 ff; Ibn Khallikan, IIS, 449; Ibn Khaldun, IV , 50 f f ;  itti^az , 
annos, 386-391; Khitat, II, 285 ff; Nuwayri, fol * 95 f f .
81. al-Rudhrawarl, 224; Ibn a l-Q alan is i, 48; Ibn a l-A th ir, IX, 49.
79.
He created riots and troubles in Cairo and threw the blame 
on Ibn 4Ammar and his supporters. The Turkish Ghilman, the Daylamis
and the bought slaves ( *Abid ai-Shira?) were encouraged by him to
— — 82 
attack the Afydath of al-M aghariba. A number of both parties were
83k illed  and trouble flared in the streets of Cairo.
Ibn 4Ammar, who seems to have been aware of Barjawan's 
intrigue, decided to outwit him and his a llies. He invited them to 
his palace under pretext of discussing with them the problems of the 
riots, but secretly planned their death as they entered the palace cor­
ridors. However, Barjawan, who had many spies in ibn ‘ Ammar’s palace, 
was informed of this and formed a counterplan. He and his supporters 
decided to accept the invitation, protected by a number of their own
guards at the rear. They planned to fo il the attack by retreating amongst
84them, which would expose ibn fAmmar*s treasonable intentions.
Barjawanfs plan succeeded and he and his allies returned to the
Royal palace, declared Ibn 4Ammar‘s treason and armed their troops to figh t
him. With as many followers as he could muster, Ibn tf Ammar le ft Cairo and
camped in the desert, Barjawan followed him and in a battle which lasted
85about a ha lf day, Ibn 4 Ammar was defeated and went into hiding.
82. Ibn a l-Q a lan is i, 48, 49.
K h ija t, II, 3-36; i t t i* a z , anno, 387.
84. al-Rudhrawari, 224 ff; Ibn a l-Q alan is i, 49 -9 .
85. al-Rudhrawari, 225; ibn a l-Q alan is i, 48; Ibn a l-A th ir, IX, 49;
it f i* a g , anno, 387; Khijaj’, I I,  36.
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Barjawan's rule and administration 387-390/997-999
By the overthrown! of ibn ‘ Ammar in Sha‘ ban 387/July 997, 
Barjawan became the most powerful man in the Fatimid State. He 
o ffic ia lly  replaced Sbn ‘Ammar in the office of Wasata and, like him, 
became the real ruler in Egypt.
W ith his succession to power, Barjawan faced a number of 
problems which were consequent upon the struggle between him and ibn 
‘ Ammar. These problems were: the disunity in the army which caused 
its weakness, rebellions and disturbances in some provinces, threatening 
the suzerainty of the Fatimids; and intensified raids by the Byzantine forces 
into Fatimid territory.
In his dealings with these problems Barjawan proved to be a 
successful administrator. Indeed he saved the Fatimid State from a 
dangerous situation and was able to restore peace and stability through­
out most of its provinces.
Internally he followed the policy of the late Caliph a l - ‘ A z iz7 
where tolerance and moderation prevailed. He endeavoured to end, or at 
least to lessen, riva lry and struggle between the two elements of the army. 
Immediately after he took over power he issued strict orders forbidding 
his supporters -  al-Mashariqa -  to cause any inconvenience to al-Maghariba. 
He feared that, in the moment of victory, al-Mashariqa might seek
81 .
0*0
revenge for the Ill-treatm ent they had received from al-Maghariba
86during Ibn ‘ Ammar!s ru le. He also commanded his troops to return
87all looted properties to their original Maghrib? owners. He wrote
A mans to a ll Kutami chiefs and leaders, promising security and showing
tolerance to the circumstances by which they had agreed to be led by 
“ 88Ibn ‘ Ammar. Even Ibn ‘ Ammar himself was pardoned and, as if  to
emphasise his intended continuity of a l- f A z iz ls po licy, Barjawan granted
him the same monthly allowance of money and supplies as he had received
“  89during the reign of al~ ‘ A z iz .
In the appointment of high post's, he endeavoured to create an 
equality which would satisfy the majority of both groups. For example, 
he appointed isma‘ il Ibn Fahl a l“ Kutami -  a Maghribi chief -  as Wali 
in Tyre and Bushara al-lkhshidi -  a Mashriqi chief -  as Wali in Damascus. 
For the general governorship of Syria and the command of the Fatimid forces
there, he chose Jaysh Ibn al-Samsama who was a powerful Maghribi chief
90and was also supported by al-Mashariqa /
He also tried to efface the real causes of the struggle and to
re-unite the army under his own leadership in order to confront the mounting
threats in Syria, Maqrizi says, "Barjawan investigated the cases o f a ll
86 . Ibn a l-Q a la n is i, 49; ! t t i f a^, anno, 387.
87. HtP az , anno, 387.
88. Ib id .
89. Ib id .
90. For these appointments see I tt jtg ^ ,  anno, 387; Khitaf , H, 285 f f .
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officia ls and dignitaries of the regime (Awliya* a l-Dawla) and
91removed the causes of their complaints and dissatisfaction." He
must have realised from past experience that unity was the only strength
which could control not only Syria but ensure continued rule in Egypt.
In addition, Barjawan endeavoured to appear as a popular administrator
whose main concern was the welfare of the people. He employed an
effic ient Christian K atibnamed Fahd Ibn Ibrahim as his secretary and
92
granted him the tit le a l-R cv is  (the master). With the help of Fahd,
Barjawan was able to solve qu ickly and e ffic ien tly  the cases of
complaints and petitions he received every day. Maqrizi describes how
they both worked. He says, "Every day Barjawan waited until a il those
who had complaints and petitions had gathered near his house. He then
took them with him to the royal palace, where his secretary Fahd sat in
the first corridor to study each case. He would then pass to Barjawan,
who sat in the last corridor, a ll those he thought merited consideration.
Barjawan and Fahd would then both go to al-Hakim's court, present such
cases,and al-Hakim 's signed judgement on them was given immediate 
93 ~ -e ffe c t."  Maqrizi adds that because he was so concerned about the 
quickness of solving these cases, Barjawan would often "hide the written
91. I t t i ‘ a z , anno, 387,
92. Antaki, 180; i f t i ‘ az, anno, 387; K h ita t, II, 4 .
93. l t t i ‘ a%, anno, 387; Khitaj’, II, 4 .
<t*mh
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poems presented to al-Makim in his sleeves until he had signed all
94petitions and he would then present the poems,"
Externally, Barjawan was able to overcome the problems which 
had mounted in Syria. His appointment of Jaysh indicates a shrewd 
policy, not only because under Jaysh's command the two elements were 
united again, but also because of his long experience as governor and 
army commander in Syria, which is apparent in his dealings with the 
problems •
Jaysh found four problems confronting him when he came 
to Syria; the rebellion of Tyre, the rebellion of Ibn al-Jarrah, the 
unrest and disturbances in Damascus and the Byzantine raids info Fatimid 
te rrito ry ,
The first problem he dealt with v/as Tyre, an Important port on
the Eastern coast of the Mediterranean: Its people, supported by the
Byzantines, had rebelled against the Fatimid suzerainty during the fighting
between Ibn ‘ Ammar and Barjawan. Their leader, a sailor named
‘ Ullaqah declared Tyre to be independent. He struck his own coinage
on which his slogan was ‘ Uzzun Ba‘ da Faqah a 1-Amir ‘ UHaqah (dignity
95and plenty instead o f humility and poverty . Prince ‘ Ullaqah),
94. I f t i ‘ az, anno, 387.
95. Antaki, 181 , Nuwayri, fo l . 93, adds to the slogan the terms: 
Washaiarafun Bilabaqaih (and cunning with sagacity).
Jaysh appointed Abu ‘ Abd A llah  al-Husayn Ibn Nasir al-Dawla
al-Hamadani to lead the expedition against Tyre while he remained
with the rest of the army in Palestine preparing another expedition
against Ibn a l-Jarrah. He also commanded the Wal is of Tripoli
and Saidon to jo in , together with their warships, the battle against
Tyre. The battle was fought by sea and land and the Byzantine
ships, which supported Tyre, were destroyed. Tyre fe ll before the
onslaught of the Fatimid forces who thus gained a sure v ic to ry. The
Fatimid troops entered the c ity  and declared A mans and safety for a ll
who remained in their homes. ‘Ullaqah was captured and taken to
96Egypt where he was put to death.
This decisive victory emphasised the power of the Fatimid
army and navy and served as a deterrant on any rebellion from the
coastal c ities. If assured the naval supremacy of the Fctimids in the
Eastern Mediterranean and forced the Byzantines to cease their an ti-
Fatimid activities there.
A fter the success of the Fatimid forces in Tyre, Jaysh moved
-  97towards the southern parts of Palestine where Ibn al-Jarrah was in
rebellion. He raided towns and c ity  centres and created a dangerous threat
96. See A ntaki, 181; al-Rudhrawari, 226; Ibn a l-Q a lan is i, 50;
Ibn a l-A th ir, IX, 50; Nuwayri, f o l . 93; I t t i ‘ a^, anno, 308;
De Sacy, Expos6, I, 290.
97. See M . Canard, A rtic le , "Djarrahids", E,1
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to the suzerainty of the Fatimids by attacking the pilgrim
caravans and putting the pilgrimage route under his contro l. When
Jaysh, together with his large army, advanced, Ibn al-Jarrab
realised his inab ility  to continue rebellion and sent a delegation,
begging for Aman and promising future loyalty and obedience to the
Fatimid Imam. Jaysh, who was pressed by more serious problems in
northern Syria, accepted Ibn al-Jarrah's promise, pardoned him and
98withdrew his army to the north.
When Jaysh assured himself that the area between Cairo and 
Damascus was under control, he moved towards Damascus where 
troubles had mounted. Damascus, the main c ity  in Syria, had at 
one time been the centre of the Umayyad State, rejected the Shi ‘ i 
teaching and the rule of the Fatimids. Its people never missed an oppor­
tunity to rebel against them, since Damascus had fallen to the Fatimids 
in 358/968. The Ahdafh always took advantage of crises to seize power. 
A fter the overthrowal of Ibn ‘ Ammar, a number of army commanders and 
troops, encouraged by Barjawan, attacked Sulayman Ibn Falah in Damascus. 
He fled from the c ity  and le ft no ruling authority there. The Ahdafh fought
the remaining Fatimid troops and assumed power in the c ity , which caused
99anxiety and insecurity to the citizens.
98. al-Rudhrawari, 228; Ibn a l-Q alanis i, 51; Ibn a l-A th ir, IX , 50.
99. See Ibn a l-Q alan is i, 50-51; ibn a l-A th ir, IX , 50; ltt?*a%, 
annos, 387-388,
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Jaysh, who was aware that the Afcdath were the main cause 
of the troubles in Damascus, decided to get rid of them once and for a l l .
He planned to k il l a ll its members. Since, however, he had a more 
important problem which was to end the Byzantine raids on northern 
Syria, he decided to delay his plan until this was accomplished. By this 
he would appear as a Muslim hero, and any subsequent cruelty exercised 
in Damascus would be condoned. When he reached Damascus he 
endeavoured to a llay any suspicion among the Ahdath. He invited their 
leaders, together with dignitaries of the c ity , to his camps. A ll received 
equal respect and courtesy. He declared to them that his purpose was 
to wage war against the Byzantines and create peace and security in 
Damascus. To emphasise this, he pronounced the death penalty on any one, 
Fatimid soldier or otherwise, who was proved guilty of disturbing the peace 
of the province. He moved afterwards towards Hims where the Wali 
of T ripo li, together with his troops and a number of volunteers, augmented 
Jaysh*s army in his figh t against the Byzantines who were at that time 
besieging Afamya .^ 1  The c ity  was in great distress and about to fa ll to
100. Ibn a l-Q a lan is i, 50-51; Ibn a l-A th ir, IX , 50*. See also 
al-Rudhrawari, 227.
101. A town of strategic importance and a strong fortress situated
between Hama and Antioch.*
the Byzantines * Jaysh and his troops arrived there at the most critica l
time. The battle lasted only for a few days. A t first, Jaysh was
defeated and his army suffered many losses, but a Muslim soldier
succeeded in k illin g  the Byzantine leader causing confusion among their
troops, which fina lly  resulted in their defeat and flig h t from the
ba ttle fie ld . Jaysh followed the defeated Byzantines to Antioch . He
besieged the c ity  for a few days after which he withdrew his army and
102returned to Damascus, Chroniclers have le ft no explanation 
of this sudden withdrawal by Jaysh and it  is almost impossible to ascer­
tain why he did not attempt to conquer Antioch, Perhaps it  was 
because he feared to engage in a more serious battle w ith the Byzantines, 
whose Emperor had begun preparations for another raid which he personally 
intended to lead. A lte rnative ly, i t  may have been that Jaysh's mission 
was merely to repel the Byzantines and assure the suzerainty of the Fatimids 
rather than attempt more conquests. Peaceful negotiations between the 
two Empires were probably in progress at that time and Jaysh, like 
Barjawan, preferred to make peace with Byzantium in order to concentrate 
on internal affairs, and perhaps did not desire to obstruct that negotiation,
102. Antaki, 182; al-Rudhrawari, 228; Ibn a l-Q a lan is i, 51;
Ibn a l-A th ir, IX, 51; Bar Hebraus, 181; Itt i*a z , anno, 388;
De Sacy, Expos6, I, 291; A Rusfum, History of the Byzantine 
Empire, Beirut, 1955-6, II, 56-58; M . Canard, "The Byzantine 
Empire", Cambridge History, IV /I ,  724.
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Jaysh, however, returned to Damascus to deal a final blow
to the Ahdath, al-Rudhrawari and Ibn al-Qalanisi give a fu ll description
of the manner in which Jaysh executed his plans. They say that he
invited their chiefs to his camps outside the c ity  where he had them all
k illed , after which he besieged the c ity  and sent his troops inside to
103search and k i l l ;  anyone suspected of froublemaking was beheaded,
Ibn a l-Q alanisi adds that twelve hundred men were executed in the course 
of a few d a y s j^  Such action brought fear to the inhabitants of 
Damascus, but Jaysh declared A mans upon the achievement of his object 
and called together a ll the city's dignitaries and gave reasons for his 
actions. He promised them a future of security and peace under the 
suzerainty of the F a t i m i d s . D e s p i t e  the cruelty and ruthlessness of 
Jaysh's methods, i f  was the most effective way ever taken by any 
Fatimid W ali in an endeavour to solve the problem of Damascus, After 
this event the c ity  remained calm and peaceful for many years.
Barjawan not only overcame the problems which confronted him 
in Syria but also endeavoured to guarantee a peaceful future for the 
province which would enable him to concentrate his efforts on infernal 
affairs. To this end he entered into negotiations for peace with
103. al-Rudhrawari, 228-9.
104. Ibn a l-Q a lan is i, 51; Ibn a l-A th ir, IX, 51, says "three thousand 
men of the Aljdath were k ille d ", which would seem to be an 
exaggeration.
105. al-Rudhrawari, 229; Ibn a l-Q alan is i, 15; Ibn a l-A th ir, IX, 51.
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106Byzantium which ended with a fen year treaty ' and thus the major 
threat to the suzerainty of the Fatimids in Syria was lifte d .
While Barjawan's administration was a great success in solving 
problems in Egypt and Syria, it  proved a failure in Maghrib where there 
had been no problem. B&vjawcn crcr:!od one and to ta lly  
failed to solve* This was the administration of the affairs of T rip o li.
This province had been ruled directly by Egypt during the time 
of a I-Mu* iz .  A fter his death, Bulugin Ibn Z i r i , the Sinhaji chief and 
Fatimid Wali in Maghrib, asked a l- fA z iz  to give him rule over T ripo li.
This request was granted and in 365/975 Tripoli was governed by the
107 -  . -  -  __Sinhajis. Bulugin appointed Tamsulat Ibn Bakkar as Wali in T ripo li.
He governed the province for twenty successive years until the death of
Bulugin in 386/996 when a dispute arose between him and Badis, the son and
successor of Bulugin. Tcmsulat wrote to Cairo asking Barjav/an to send a new
- p —  M  w log “
Wal? to T ripo li, Ignoring Dadis's position In the province. Barjawan's 
error was that, without declaring the o ffic ia l return of Tripoli to the direct 
administration of Cairo cr making communications with Badis, he appointed 
Yanis, the Wal? of Burqa, as Wali of Tripoli and commanded him to move,
106. For detailed discussion of the treaty, see below, Chapter V , “The
External Policy of a l-H ak im ".
107. Ibn Khaldun, IV , 59.
108. ibn a l-A th ir, IX, 66; Ibn Khaldun, IV, 5 9 f fa n d V li,  2 9 ff.  For further
discussion see H Jw Idris, La Bcrberie Orientale sous lesZ irids, Paris, 
1959, 1, 99-103.
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together with his troops, to occupy T rip o li, When Yanis arrived in 
Tripoli Badis's apprehension was roused. He wrote to Yanis asking 
him to c la rify  the matter, but received no satisfactory explanation.
Yanis manoeuvred for time in order to successfully use force against Badis. 
Badis, however, realised what Yanis was planning and sent his troops to 
campaign against him. Yanis himself was killed in the battle and his 
troops retreated to T ripo li where they barricaded themselves in , awaiting 
help from Cairo.
Chroniclers fa il to report the reasons that caused an effic ient 
administrator like Barjawan to commit such an error. It may have been 
an attempt to weaken the Sinhaji rule in Maghrib, knowing that there 
was dissatisfaction with his actions against Ibn t Ammar and Kutama in 
Egypt, or he may have tried to emulate the policy of al-Mu* iz in Maghrib. 
I f  this was so, the question may arise as to why he did not obtain an 
o ffic ia l decree from ai-Hakim to reclaim T ripo li. Perhaps al-Hakim was 
against this po licy of Barjawan, or Barjawan may have been aware that, 
w ith or without a decree, Badis would not give up T rip o li. Whatever the 
reasons were, the results were detrimental to the Fatimid State. The clash 
between the Sinhajis and the Fatimid troops was the first of its kind since 
the inception of the State. It affected the relation between the Z ir id  
and their Imam-Caliph in Cairo, weakened the suzerainty of the Fatimids
109. Ibn a l-A th ir, IX, 64; Ibn Khaldun, IV 59 f f  and VII 29 f f ;  
I tt  1*0:5 , anno, 390.
91 .
in Maghrib and strengthened the idea of independence among the 
Z irids . In addition, T ripo li, over which the dispute had begun, was 
neither occupied by the Fatimids nor by the Z irid , but by the enemy of 
both -  the tribe of Zanata. Fulful, the chief of Zanata, siezed the ad­
vantage of the war between Yanis and Badis and moved towards T ripo li.
He entered the c ity  and declared his support for its people against the 
Sinhajis. When, however, he realised that the Fatimids would not accept 
him as their W ali in T ripo li, he declared his loyalty to the Umayyads of 
Spain. Thus the Fatimids lost the whole of the province of T ripo li for 
about ten years (390-400/999-1009) when i f  was reclaimed by Badis after
11A
he defeated Zanata in 400/1009.
Barjawan's Death
111 M
In the month of Rabi* the second 390/March 1000, Barjawan 
was k illed  in a plot arranged by al-Hakim and an o ffic ia l of his courtf
-  112named Raydan or Zaydan. Raydan, together with a number of other
men, carried out the k illin g  in a place called Bustan Duwayrat a l-T in
(a garden near the royal palace) where Barjawan was walking with
110 Ibn a l-A th ir, IX, 64; Ibn Khaldun, IV, 59 f f  and V II, 29 f f .  For further
discussion see H .R. Idris, la  Berberie Orientale sous les Z irids, I, .99-103.
111. Contrary to a ll other sources, Ibn a l-Q a lan is i, 55, and Ibn a l-A th ir,
IX , 50, report the death in 389 A .H .  Ibn Muyassar, 56, puts i t  in 
370 A .H  • which seems more likejja copyist's error.
112. The name appears in both forms, but M aqrizi, Khifaf, II, !3 9 r 
affirms that it  is Raydan and says that even though it is an Arab 
name if  originated from the Slavonic language.
There is no doubt that the main cause behind Barjawan's death
was that the young Imam-Caliph, whose personality was beginning to
assert itself, found himself deprived of his own power by Barjawan
and in order to exercise i t  freely he planned Barjawan's death
Barjawan, as has been mentioned before, was the person who had looked
after al-Hakim since he was a young ch ild . The fact that al-Hakim 
•  *
succeeded to the Caliphate when he was s till a child seems to have
been of significant influence on the relationship between the two persons.
Barjawan appears to have treated al-Hakim , even after his succession to
*
the Caliphate, in the same manner in which he had done previously, over­
looking the fact that he was no longer a ch ild . Ibn a l-Q alanisi says,
“ Barjawan did not allow al-Hakim to ride on horseback when i t  was not*
115the time for rid ing, nor to give gifts to men who did not deserve them".
Despite the fact that Ibn a l-Q alanisi explains this as a kind of compassion
for al-Hakim , it  clearly indicates that Barjawan treated al-Hakim  as a
helpless child unable to see info his own affairs. Ibn al-Muqaffa* reports
113. See al-Rudhrawari, 231; Ibn al-Q alanis i, 55; Ibn a l-A th ir, IX , 50; 
Itti*a z , anno, 390; Khi|a|, I I,  4 ,
1.14. For further discussion see De Sacy, Expos6, I, 293; De Lacy
O 'Leary, Short History of the Fatimid Caliphate, 131; S .L . Poole, 
History of Egypt in the Middle Ages, 125; * Inan, A l-H akim  B? Am rillah, 
49; M ajid, A l-H akim , 130,-131; M . Canard, a rtic le , “A l-Hdkim
Bi A m r il la h '7 T J 7
115. Ibn a l-Q a lan is i, 51. See ajso al-Rudhrawari, 230; Ibn a l-A th ir, IX, 50;
Bar Hebijaus, 132; Nuwayri, fo l, 93.
an interesting piece of information which gives a clearer idea about 
the relationship between Barjawan and al-Hakim . He says, 'The 
first man al-Hakim  killed  was al-Ustadh Barjawan because he had n ick-
m
named him al-Wazagha (the lizard). He summoned him, the message ran:
te ll Barjawan that the lit t le  Wazagha has become a large dragon and
wants him n o w " .^ ^
Maqrizi reports that al-Hakim once said, "Barjawan was ex-
*
tremely ill-mannered. I summoned him one day while we were riding
on horseback. He came, putting his foot on the neck of his horse, and
while I was speaking to him the sole of his shoe was turned towards my
face and he did no t seem to think it  was wrong. Incidents like this
117were so many that mentioning them all would take a long tim e ." Ibn 
Muyassar and Maqrizi consider this treatment as Istibdad (tyranny or dictator­
ship) on the part of Barjawan. It caused al-Hakim's resentment which
*
-  118resulted with the death of Barjawan.
There were also other reasons which appear to have increased 
al-Hakim 's resentment and encouraged him to plot against Barjawan. He may 
have feared that Barjawan was planning to supplant him and build his own
116. See Ibn a l-M uqaffa*, II, 121; B. Lewis, a rtic le , * Bard ja wan” , E .I.^
anno, 390. See also Khifat, I I,  4 .
118, Ibn Muyassar, 56; lt t i*a z , anno, 390; Khitgt, I I,  4 .
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Empire. Ibn a l-Q alanis i says, "Raydan said to al-Hakim , 'Barjawan
*
is planning to emulate the career of Kafur al-lkhshidi and proposes to 
deal with you as Kafur dealt with Ikhshid's son by isolating you and 
eliminating your power. The right thing to do is k ill him now and ad­
minister your State a lone'. A i-H akim  replied, 'I f  this is your opinion and
119advice then I need your help1."  The fact that might have given weight 
to Raydan's accusation was that, since he had overcome the problems which 
confronted him in Syria and Egypt, Barjawan had adopted a new line of 
policy aiming at consolidating his power and prolonging his ru le . He 
removed his rivals to a safe distance from the court and appointed his sup­
porters to the high positions. Maqrizi reports that in 388/998 Barjawan 
appointed Yanis -  one of his great rivals -  as Wali in Bqrqa. In the 
same year he gave his friends key positions. Khawad was appointed chief 
of the police in Misr, Maliq as chief of the navy, Maysur as Wai? in
Tripoli of Syria, Yamin, h i$  own brother, as Wall in Ghazza and *Asqalan
120andQayd as chief o f the police in Cairo,
Although this does not necessarily mean that Barjawan planned 
to build his own Empire, and it  is more like ly  that he was trying to ensure 
his rule against possible coups from his rival Ibn ‘ Ammar, the fact remains
119. Ibn al-C'.alanisi, 5 1 . See also cii-Rudhrawarf, 231.
120. l t t i ‘ a ^ , anno, 388; K h ita t, | | ,  286.
that such policy was bound to arouse the suspicions of the young imam-
Caliph and become an effective weapon in the hands of Barjawan's rivals*
The reasons which were given by al-Hakim and circulated to a ll
parts of Egypt, explaining why he k illed Barjawan, add another element
to the story* It states that Barjawan had changed from a good administrator
to a bad one and suggested that he was using his position for personal 
121gain. The accounts of Ibn Muyasrxir and Maqrizi corroborate this and 
give an interesting and detailed comparison between Barjawan's administration 
during the first two years of his rule and that during the following year*
122They also add that al-Hakim personally had to take over Barjawan's work.
The reports concerning Barjawan's accumulated wealth confirm that he had 
used his position for his own interest. It is known that he had been a slave 
brought up in the court of a l - ‘ A z iz , yet some reports state that the officer of 
Bayt a l-M al found in his house: one hundred scarves (Mandil) of different 
colours, with one hundred Sharabiya (another kind of scarf), one thousand 
pairs of trousers (Sirwai) , one thousand Armenian silk Takka (special belt), 
an uncountable quantity of clothes, jewels, gold, perfumes and furniture, 
three hundred thousand Dinars, a hundred and f if ty  horses and mules for
121, it f i*a 5 , anno, 390; J . al-Shayyal, M a jm u^t al-Watha*?q a l-  
Fatimiyya, I, 309.
122. Ibn Muyassar, 56; l t t i ‘ az, anno, 390; Khifct, II, 4 |285.
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his own rid ing, three hundred pack horses and mules, a hundred and
f if ty  saddles, twenty of which were pure gold. This was In addition
123to a very large number of books.
By ridding himself of Barjawan, al-Hakim was able to assert
*
himself as the real ruler of his Empire and he gradually concentrated 
a il po litica l powers in his own hands and ruled until his death in 411 / 
1021 as an absolute ru ler.
123. al-DhakhaMr wa al-Tuhaf, 232; it t i 'a ? ,  anno, 390.
CHAPTER Hi
ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE
STATE
Political Administration
As a result of the struggle for power between the two elements 
of his army, al-Hakim  faced a very serious problem; a threat to his own 
power arising from the growing influence of Mudabbir a I-Pawl a (the ad­
ministrator of the State Affairs), better known as al-Wasita (the mediator or 
executor of the Caliph's orders). Ambitious chiefs took advantage of a l-  
Hakim's youth and attempted to take over power leaving to him only the 
tit le  of Imam-Callph. As has been mentioned before, both Ibn * Ammar and
fcM
Barjawan, by means of force seized power and appointed themselves as 
Wasitas. This was the first sign of a crack in the po litica l powers of the 
Imam-Callph and showed, for the first time in Fatimid history, that he was 
no longer the supreme authority o f his Empire. His own complete control 
over the administration was usurped by the Wasitp who was no longer a 
a mere executor o f the Imam's orders. Orders were given by him and the 
Imam was invited to approve them. Neither could the Imam appoint or dismis 
the Wasifra or any of his great supporters. The most powerful man appointed 
himself until another more powerful man overthrew him. On the whole, the
Imam-Caliph's po litica l powers were no longer his own and he was 
reduced to a puppet.
In the face of this threat al-Hakim was able to assert himself, 
regain his power and to rule, during the last twenty years of his reign, 
as a supreme ru ler. His attitude towards each successive Wasita was 
well and carefully planned to control his exercise of power, lim it his 
influence and prevent any danger to the po litica l power of the Imam- 
Caliph. A fter he had rid himself of Barjawan in 390/999, al-Hakim
]
immediately declared his Intentions to administer his State personally. Although
this diminished the need for a Wasita and indeed there were occasions when■
2 ^ 
non© was appointed, al-Hakim did not abolish the institution of Wasata
However, he clearly defined the limits of power delegated to the Wasita
and reduced his position to the literal meaning of the term. He declared the
Wasitp to be merely a slave appointed or dismissed by the Imam according
3to his w i l l . His duties were only to execute the Imam-Caliph's orders.
The Wasita was not allowed to deal with any problem outside his own 
office which was in the royal palace under the supervision of the imam .
Maqrizi says that after the appointment of al-Husayn Ibn Jawhar as 
Wasita in 390/999, he was ordered not to receive or deal with petitions at
1. Ibn Muyassar, 56; Maqrizi; lffi*a%, anno, 391.
2 „ Antaki, 209; See also Ibn al~Sayrafi, ishara, 26*
3. Ibn Muyassar, 56; Maqrizi, ! f t i ‘ az, annos, 391-2 and Khi^af;, II,
3, 14, 285 f f .  '
his own house or in public streets; those who had cases of complaint
should be fold to deliver them to him only at his office in the palace.
He adds that al-Husayn, together with his secretary Fahd Ibn Ibrahim,
would come early to the palace, receive the petitions, study them and
carry them to al-Hakim for the final judgment*^ If is also recorded by *
Maqrizi that strict orders were given to al-Hakim's chamberlain not to
- 5prevent any petitioner from reaching the Imam. Even in addressing
petitions to the Wasita or while speaking to him, people were commanded
not to apply to him any names or titles except his own name and the tit le
which was specifically given to him by a l-H akim .^
With such extreme lim itation of their powers, al-Hakim
anticipated retaliation from his Wasifas. This made him appear very
careful, cautious and mistrustful in the appointment of, and attitude
towards, the Wasifas. He selected his men from amongst those who
appeared less dangerous. Except for al-Husayn Ibn Jawhar and ‘ Al?
*
Ibn Falah, none of the Wasifas had a m ilitary history. None of them was 
a powerful tribal chief or a chief of a certain element of the army. Most 
of them were of a poor background without the traditional descent of
anno, 390 and K h ifa f, II, 14-15, 285. 
aqno, 390 and Khitat, II, 286, See also Ibn Muyassar,
6 . Khifat, 31, 15.
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powerful families or tribes. Some of them were freed slaves and a 
considerable number of them were Christian. No Wasita was allowed
_  , t . . .
to remain in office for a long period. In the course of his twenty one
years of rule, more than fifteen Wasitas were employed. Some of them
G —held the office for as litt le  as ten days. The Wasita was carefully 
watched, spies informed the imam of his activities and the slightest 
error received the maximum punishment of the law. Cruelty and ruthless­
ness were the prominent features in al-Hakim's attitude towards his 
Wasitas and the majority of those who occupied that office were brutally 
executed.^
Two major factors helped al-Hakim to maintain this policy; the 
riva lry amongst the high officia ls and the efficiency of his Da* w a. The 
struggle for power amongst the chiefs o f the m ilitary elements did not cease
7. See Antaki Js reports on the Christian Wasitas. Antaki, IS 6,
190-9, 227. See also the annual reports of Maqrizi which offer 
some^details on the names and backgrounds of the Wasitas.
IttH az, cmnos, 390-406 and Khitat, II, 285 f f .
8 . See the appointment of Ibn al-G-ashuri in Antaki, 196;
ltti*a%, anno, 401, and Khitat, II, 287.
9. For examples of al-Hakim's punishments of high officia ls see
Antaki, 183-230; lfti<az, annos, 390-406 and Khitat, I I ,  285, 
f f .  See also ah-Rudhrawari, 230 ff; Ibn a l-M uqaffa*, I I,  124-135 
Ibn al~€*lalanisi, 55, 79; Ibn a i-Z a fir, fo l, 57 ff; Ibn Hammad, 
57; al-Nuwayri, fo l, 54; Ibn Hajar and Ibn Shahin, in the 
supplement to Kindi's book, History of Egyptian Judges, 608 ff;
Ibn Hajar al-< Asqalanl, Raf* a i-lsr <An Qudat Misr, ed,
H . *Abd a l-M a jid  and others, Cairo 1957-61, 207 f f .
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with the death of Barfawan or Ibn *Ammar; i t  continued throughout a l-
Hakim's reign and could be clearly seen in the plots and conspiracies
they made against each o th e r .^  a I-Hakim was fu lly  aware of their
riva lry and employed it  as a means to strengthen his position at the
cost of the struggling chiefs. Nuwayri clearly states that when al-Hakim
planned the execution of Barjawan he relied on the help of Ibn Jaw ha r.^
The reports of Maqrizi suggest that a 1-Hakim relied on al-Fadl Ibn Salih
« .  .  *
*12 __
to rid himself of Ibn Jawhar. The annual reports of Maqrizi contain a
13considerable amount of information which supports this point. The 
Da<wa had undoubtedly interpreted such an action by al-Hakim  with justi- 
fiable reasons. Antaki noticed the tendency and said, "They interpreted 
every abomination and blameful action ho committed, such as executions
14and foolish deeds, in a way which made them appear most beautiful
Unfortunately, the surviving literature of the Ismaili Da<wa does 
not contain enough information to throw light on the method of the Da* is 
of al-Hakim's time which gives an explanation to the way they interpreted 
his attitude towards the Wasitas and other high o ffic ia ls . But other reports 
suggest that they had emphasised the belief in the Imam's divine guidance
10. Antaki, 222, says, 1 .s  * l o j j l  " .  ql-Rudhrav/ari,
230 ff; Ibn a l-Q a lan is i, 55 ff; Bar Hebr^us, Chronographia, 182; 
ltt?<a%, annos, 390-406 and Khifrat, II, 3, 31, 285 ff, give details 
on plots of high offic ia ls against each others.
11. Nuwayri, fol .53.
i l l i iS S /  annos/ 398-9.
13. Ibid, annos, 390-406.
14, Antaki, 222.
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and superhuman qualities, perhaps to credit his actions to divine 
inspiration and thus become unquestionable* Antaki states: "They 
claimed that a ll his deeds were inspired by secrets and purposes, the 
causes of which were beyond the capacity of understanding of human 
beings.
The Druz writings consider such actions of al-Hakim as "miraculous
»
16qua lities", and thus confirm that at least a part of the Ismaili Daf is
interpreted them as such. If is also recorded that o ffic ia l orders forbidding
people from discussing the Imam's actions were frequently issued .^
The Da* wa also seem to have magnified the errors of those
whom al-Hakim  had executed or severely punished and showed them in a
way which made them appear as tyranny or high-treason. Ibn al-Sayra f i ,
who usually gives the view of the Fafimid court, condemns a ll the Wasitas
who served al-Hakim and says, "None of them remained in office for long 
*
18because of strange deeds they committed."
In the annual reports of Maqrizi, which are based mainly on the 
information of al-Hckim 's contemporary, al-M usabbihl, if  is noticeable 
that errors or crimes of some of those whom al-Hakim executed are over-
15. Antaki, 222.
16. See al-Risala a l-M ustaqima, Druz Ms., B .M ,, N o . add. 11,558, fo l.
108 f f ,  published in al-Mugtabas, V , 306, under a wrong t it le  (ah-Sijil
a l-M u^a llaq ). See also Risaiaf Haqlqat M5 ya%har A mam Mawlana a l-  
Hakim, Druz M s., B .M ., no.add. 11,558, fo l. 79 f f .
l f t i 'd z ,  annos, 399-405.
18. Ibn al-Sayrafi, Ishara, 26.
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19emphasised. It is recorded by a number of chroniclers that al-Hakim
would cause a written explanation, which would justify his action, to
20be made and circulated to a ll parts of the Empire, and sometimes he
would himself explain his reasons to the high officia ls and dignitaries
21who attended his court. It is also recorded that the testimony of
the victim  was sometimes used to justify the action. Ibn Hammad reports
that a l-Jarjara7 i,  a high o ffic ia l who had lost both hands by the command
of al-Hakim , would tell those who remarked upon such treatment that:
“This was a punishment which 1 deserved for betraying Amir a l-
22Mu7minin‘s orders."
A l-H akim  recognised the threat to his power which the army *
could present. Both Ibn ‘ Ammar and Barjawan used it  to achieve and 
hold their office and al-Hakim was sufficiently astute to realise that 
there could be a re-occurrence of the threat under similar conditions. He 
adopted an attitude towards the army chiefs which seems to have been the 
outcome of his own fear and which culminated in similar cruelty and 
ruthlessness. Maqrizi relates that after the appointment o f al-Husayn Ibn 
Jawhar /" " the commander in chief (Qa* id a I -Cl uwad) 7  as Wasita , he
annos, 390-2, 395-404-.
20. al-Rudhrawari, 232; Ibn ai-C;alanisi, 56-7; l t f i f az, anno, 390-1 .
21 . Ibn Muyassar, 56; ltti*a%, annos, 390-1.
22, Ibn Hammad, 57.
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strictly forbade people to address him by the tit le  Our Master (Sayyiduna)
or to come to his own house to deliver their petitions. That was
-  -  23
Maqrizi adds, "Because of his fear of al-Hakim's jealousy" -  this
indicates that al-Hakim feared that the commander in chief might
achieve popularity which he seems to have considered a threat to his
po litica l power. It is noticeable that throughout al-Hakim 's reign
*
every chief or army commander who became popular was executed by
his orders.^  ^ The execution of al-Husayn Ibn Jawhar, and his successor
*
al-Fadl Ibn Salih,are typical examples of al-Hakim's fear. Ibn Jawhar 
was one of the most popular high officials in al-Hakim's State. His 
popularity was derived from the fact of his being the son of Jawhar (the
great Fatimid army commander, conquerer of Egypt and builder of
25 -  26Cairo) and the son-in-law of the famous family of a l-Nu*m an.
During the rule of Barjawan, al-Husayn was of equal prestige and importance
H*4 M
to that o fQ a d i a l-G udat Muhammad Ibn a l-N u ( man. Both of them 
*  - -  *  —  •
23. Khitat , II, 14.
24. A ll chroniclers agree that the majority of those who served al-Makim
as high officia ls and army commanders were executed by his orders.
See the annual reports of Maqrizi, IttP a^ , annos, 390-406. See 
also Antaki, 187, 197;_ Ibn al-M uqaffa*, II, 124-35; al-Rudhrawari, 
232 ff; Ibn a l-Q alan is i, 79; Ibn a l-Z a fir , fo l.  57 ff; Ibn a l-A fh ir ,  IX , 
130, ff;  Sibt, M ir7 a t , fo l.  206 ff; al-Dhahabi, Tarikh al-Islam , annos. 
390-411; al-Safadi, f o l . 18 ff; Ibn Shdhin, TwatTkh al-M uluk wa a l-  
Salatin, f o l . 43, f f .
25. See a rtic le , "Djawhar", E J
26. He was Abu Hanifa al-Nu< man Ibn Hayyun, the famous theologian,
Qadi and Da*"i of the Fatimid State during the reign of al-M u* iz . e
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were treated with special courtesy and respect which none of the other
2 7 «officia ls were privileged to receive. The appointment of al-Husayn
as Wasita after Barjawan's death confirms his prestige, and when the
chief command of the army was added to this, his popularity was
undoubtedly increased. When in 399/1003 al-Hakim ordered a l-
Husayn's arrest, public indignation was strong enough to force al-Hakim
28
to revoke his order and declare al-Husayn!s pardon. In the following
year he fled and sought refuge amongst the tribe of BanuQurra. When
al-Hakim asked him to return he demanded the dismissal of Ibn * AbdUn
from the Wasata and his demands were met.
On his return to Cairo, Maqrizi reports: "A ll officia ls of the
State (Ah! al-Dawla) went out o f Cairo to welcome him. When he reached
the gate of the c ity , ho dismounted from his horse and wajked
towards the royal palace. With him a ll the people walked until they
29reached i t . . , .  i t  was a great day ." The more Ibn Jawhar's popularity
grew the more anxious al-Hakim  became to get rid of him and fina lly  in
For general information see A .A . Fyzee, a rtic le , "al-Nu*man 
Ibn Hayyun", E . 1 "Qadi  a l-Nu*m an", J .R .A .S ., (1934), 1-32; 
R * G otthe il, "A Distinghished Family of Fatimid Qa^is in the 
Tenth Century11, J .A .0  ,S ., XXVII (1907), 217-296.
Khifaj-, 11/ ^4, says: "When Barjawan was W asija, a ll 
high officia ls would come to his house and ride on horseback 
with him to the roayl palace (showing courtesy and respect) 
except al-Husayn Ibn Jawhar and Muhammad Ibn al-Nu<man 
who would greet him only after his arrival at the pa lace."
Khitat, ! l,  14 and Itti^a ^ , anno, 399, says that when al-Hakim 
ordered al-Husayn's arrest, shops and markets * )
in Cairo closed. He pardoned al-Husayn and declared that"no"one 
should close his shop.
I t t i ‘ a z , anno, 400 and Khitaf, II, 14.
27.
28. 
29.
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401/1010 he ordered his execution. Even the high offic ia ls who showed
concern and loyalty towards Ibn Jawhar did not escape al-Hakim's
severe punishment. The Wasita Ibn al*»Gashuri was executed after only
ten days of his appointment taking place because, "Al-Hakim  learned
*
that he exaggerated the honouring of Ibn Jawhar and showed much
-  -  30concern towards his needs", reports M aqrizi.
The popularity of al-Fadi Ibn Salih was derived from the fact
that he was the commander of the army which had defeated and captured
31the rebel Abu Rakwa and saved the Fatimid State from disaster. The
return o f al-Fadl as a victorious leader, after two years o f fierce battles,
was nationally celebrated. He became so popular that al-Hakim  himself
32visited him twice when he became i l l . A year later he suddenly ordered 
his execution.
Al-Hakim 's attitude towards the army chiefs and commanders was 
reflected on the army as a whole. It is noticeable that throughout his 
reign he never tried to improve the conditions or to increase the number of 
his fighting forces. The army on which al-Mu* iz and a l - ‘ Aziz had depended
anno/ 400.
31 • See below, "The Rebellion of Abu Rakwa", Chapter V of this
thesis.
32, Ibn a l-A th ir, IX, 84; Ibn Kathir, X I, 337; Ibn Taghri Sirdi,
Nujum, IV , 217.
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to achieve their vita! aimsjbecame of secondary importance during
al-Hakim ’s time. Its role changed from an offensive force, seeking
to conquer more land, to a defensive force whose main task was to
protect the Empire. Even its a b ility  to quel! interna! rebellions and
33uprisings appears to have become doubtful.
Historians have generally condemned this attitude of al-Hakim 
and considered If as an act of an insane and bloodthirsty maniac, and 
from this angle of his policy he appears to be mainly judged and presented. 
Such presentations, however, do not seem to be quite accurate
d // 34
and may have been hastily arrayed without a thorough investigation.
This part of al-Hakim's policy may be described as cruel and ruthless
but not bloodthirsty or insane. If was a method which most dictators adopted
in order to silence opposition and prevent threats to their own powers. There
is no evidence that confirms that, at any time, he ordered the execution
of someone just for the sake of k illin g . Mis bursts of cruelty, as M .G  ,S •
Hodgson says, 11 v/ere most obviously turned against the great and the
35
proud, the holders of positions and those ambitious to be such." If was
33. The Fatimid army appears weak during the attempt to quell the 
rebellions of Abu Rakwa and of the Jarrahids;for discussion 
see below, Chapter V of this thesis.
34. P ,J . Vcsfskiotis, The Fatimid theory of State, 149.
35. M.H .5 . Hodgson, "al-Darazi and Hamza in the O rigin of the Druze 
Relig ion", J .A .O .S .,  82 (1962), 14.
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more precisely against those of whom he anticipated danger and con­
sidered a threat to his own power. A comparative study of his attitude 
towards Qaffi al-Qu<jat (the chief judge) with the manner in which he 
treated the Was?fas and m ilitary chiefs illustrates this point. If was only 
Q a jis  who opposed his policy who were executed; others were treated 
quite normally. During his entire reign he employed five persons in the 
position o fQadi al-Qugjat. The first four were also responsible for the
direction of the Da*wa . Muhammad 0bn a l-Nu* man died in 389/998 
-  36and al-Hakim himself led the prayer at his funeral, His successor,
al-Husayn Ibn a l-N u tfman served until 395/1004 when he was executed
after being found gu ilty  of the ft. Chroniclers say he stole twenty thousand
Dinars from an orphan whose father entrusted the money to the Qadf .
3 7
They add that his tria l was held by al-Hakim personally. *Abd aI~*Aziz
*
Ibn al~Nu*man succeeded until 399/1008 when he was dismissed, and two
years later he was executed for opposing al-Hakim and supporting al-hjusayn
*
Op w M
Ibn Jawhar. M alik Ibn 5a* id served between 399/1008 and 405/1014
and was executed for opposing al-Hakim's policy as w ill be discussed in
39 -detail la ter. In 405/1014 al-Hakim appointed Muhammad Ibn Abi a !-
* Aw warn as Qadf a l-Q udat and Khatgin as Da* j Du* at (chief Da* i) and
36. ItH *ag, anno, 389.
37. i t t i* 5 ^ , anno, 395. See also Ibn Hajar and Ibn Shahim in the
supplement to Kindi's book, History of Egyptian Judges, 608 f f .
38. I tfH a z , annos, 399-401 and Khijafr, II, 14, 286-7.
39. See below, Chapter V I I . i t  7 &  >
both remained in offiee until the end of al-Hakim's reign.
Economic Policy
i) Monetary
During the years 395-397/1004-1006, commercial life  in the 
Fatimid State was threatened by the fluctuation of the Dirham. Maqrizi 
says that in 395/1004 there was a great confusion in the markets con­
cerning the value of the Dirham, It was declared that twenty-six
*** ^  QDirhams were of the value of one Dinar. ‘ In 397/1006 the same problem
occurred. The value of the Dirham then decreased to th irty-four Dirhams
to the D inar. The government acted by minting a new Dirham and withdrew
the old one from circu lation. The new Dirham was o ffic ia lly  valued at
eighteen pieces to the D inar. Subjects were allowed a period of three
days for exchange and a decree was read forbidding dealings in the old 
41Dirham.
ii) Prices and Taxation
M f fe*
From the annual reports of Maqrizi if  appears that prices of 
merchandise wero not under strict governmental control, neither were the 
units of measure and weight. This caused price inflation and put subjects 
in the mercy of shopkeepers and merchants whenever the economy appeared
* ltti*a z  , anno, 395 .
41 . Ibid, anno, 397.
no.
42to be threatened, ‘
al-Hakim endeavoured to overcome the problem by stabilizing 
*
the units of weight and measure and putting the prices of merchandise 
under the control of his government. This step was taken in 395/1004 
when a decree was read commanding the stabilization of the units and 
threatening with severe punishment those who purposely mishandled th e m .^
in 397/1006 Maqrizi reports a decree which he says "fixed the prices of
44bread, meat and most other commodifies". Similar decrees appear
m*
frequently in the annual reports o f Maqrizi concerning the period 395-
406/1004-1015. In addition there are also many records which state that
shopkeepers and merchants who did not obey these reforms were severely
4 5
punished and some were paraded in the streets and executed, ^
Tax exemption appears to be an important feature in al-Hakim's
■" 46internal policies. Chroniclers consider i f  as good deeds (Hasanat).
Records suggest that during the years of low N ile  or other adversities which 
affected agriculture, land owners were exempted from paying fax. Some-
4 7
times exemption covered certain areas and other times the whole country.
If is also recorded that all imported goods were exempted from taxation.
42. The annual reports of Maqrizi, I if i*a g , annos, 395-405, show that low 
N ile  and rebellions were the apparent danger to the economy.
• ltfi*a% , anno, 395 .
44. Ib id ., anno, 397.
45. Ib id ., anno§, 395-406.
46. Ibn al-Dawaddri, V I, 259.
^ m Itti^az, annos, 398, 401, 403-4.
111.
Local industries such as silk, soap and refreshments were exempted a is o .^
Agricultural Policy
The two major threats to the agriculture of Egypt at that time
were the shortage of wafer during the years of low N ile  and the loss of
cattle resulting from ep idem ics.^
a I-Hakim attempted to lessen the effects of these problems as
much as possible. Maqrizi reports that he ordered wafer courses and
50troughs to be constantly cleaned and bu ilt many additional ones. ai~
Musabbihi quoted by Maqrizi says that in 404/1013 al-Hakim  paid 
* .
' -  51fifteen thousand Dinars for the cleaning of the Canal of A lexandria,
He even endeavoured to solve the problem of the low N ile  andffbr this
purpose he employed the famous engineer of that time al-Hasan Ibn dl-Hayfham.
al-Hasan, who was liv ing in Iraq, was known to have said, " I f  ! were in
Egypt S would have done to its N ile  something which would make its wafer
52
useful during both periods of flood and draught." Chroniclers speak of a
special welcome made to al-Hasan when he arrived in Eg^pt. al-Hakim
» *
53personally went outside the gates of Cairo to greet him which undoubtedly
48. \Awwa! al-M anqui, III; Ibn Hammad, 54; !tti*a z , annos 398, 404.
49. See Ibn ( Sdhari, I, 256 and Ibn a i-A fh ir, IX, 77 who speak of 
plagues spreading through North Africa k illin g  people and cattle .
I f t^ a z , 390-1 .
51. Khitat, I, 171; J . al-Shayyal, Tarikh Madinat al-lskandariyya,
Cairo (1967), 56.
52. Q i f t i , 166-7; IbnA b i Usaybi*a, II,  90-1.
112.
suggest his deep concern to have al-Hasan in his service. al-Hasan went■ »
on an expedition to study the possibility of building a dam. But as 
Q if t i  states, "He realised that he was unable to add anything to what 
had been done already by ancient Egyptians"
To save cattle for agricultural purposes, al-Hakim ordered that
cows should not be slaughtered except on occasions of religious ceremony
55or if  they were unfit to pull the plough. This order, however, was strictly
enforced throughout his reign and was repeated during the Caliphate of his
56successor, a l-Z a h ir.# *
In addition, if  may be relevant to mention that he granted most
of the State land to his subjects and it  was not only offic ia ls and friends
5 7
who benefited but any person who petitioned for his a id . He also made 
significant cuts in the palace spending and confiscated most of the properties 
belonging to the members of his family and added it  to the treasury of the State. 
In the ligh t of this it  is possible to suggest that his po licy was an
53, Bar Hebraeus, Chronographia, 189?Q if t i ,  166-7; Ibn Abi 
Ujaybi^a, II, 90-1.
54. Q if t i ,  166-7; Ibn Ab i Usaybi*a, II, 90-1.
55. ltti*a%, anno, 395, 403.
*=*
56. Itti*a% , anno, 415, says that a decree was read threatening with the 
death penalty those who disobeyed the order.
57, A ntaki, 206. Similar information is given by M aqriz i, Stfi‘ a£, annos,
39G> 393, 395-405 and Khitat, I I,  285 f f .
58, Antaki, 195,
attempt to half price inflation and to strengthen the sources of his State's 
economy and save if  from dangerous threats.
Legal, Social and Architectural Reforms
Two of the administeria! departments appear to have received
U t  M  m  le *
more attention than others from a l-Hakim ; these were the Diwan al-M azalim
•  ' —  1--JT
-  -  “ 59and Diwan ai-Qada* . He publicly declared that the doer of his court would
be open to every man who led a case of complaint and that he himself would
60 ** deal with the complaints. Ibn AAuyassar and Maqrizi report that his staff
were ordered to a llow  access to any petitioner, either at his court or while
61he walked in the Street. If is also recorded by a number of contemporary
chroniclers that he would not only a llow , but encouraged, access to him in
the streets and would assign a time and place to the p la in tiff in which he
62would discuss his problem.
In the ligh t of this, it is more like ly  that although the responsibility
* *  «MP
of investigating the Mazalim was given to the Wasija and sometimes to 
QadT al-Q udat, al-Hakim was closely supervising the function of Diwan
— -  -  • 9For information on the function of these Diwans see a rt. "D iwan", E J .
See the S ijil which was written after Barjawan's death in M aqrizi's^ 
lft?*ag, anno, 390, edited by J . al-ShayyQl in Majmu*at al-Wafha* iq 
a l-Faflm iyya, i,  309. See also Ibn al-Dawadari, IV , 267, who says H
11 £3 ^  kL» S lK I . i A £
Ibn Muyassar, 56} ]ff?*a%, annos^ 390-1. •
A n tak i, 217; Ibn al-SabP, quoted by Sibt, M?rygf,  fo l, 207 f f .  and by 
IbnTaghrf Birdi, Nujum, IV, 180, I t f isa ^ , annos, 391-404*.
59.
60*
61.
62.
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al-M azalim  „
In his selection of a candidate for the post of Qadt a l-Q udat (the 
chief judge) he was surprisingly unbigoted. The post, which was pre­
viously held only by !smaf ilis , was opened also to Sunnis. According to Sbn
*»■ w  c a
Hajar and Ibn Shahtn , when al-Hakim appointed Muhammad Ibn Ab i 
al»«Awwam he was fold that this man was not IsmaMi, and he replied: "He 
is pious, honest and of a good knowledge of Muslim law and that is a ll that
ftm
concerns m e," * He ordered that al-Shuhud at-*udul (the registered legal
witnesses) should be present at every court proceeding and participate in
65the delivery of tho verd ict. The selection of these witnesses was given 
more attention and only those who were of good reputation were chosen for 
the p o s f .^  Two of these witnesses were appointed in every police department 
in the country and al-Hakim commanded that no punishment should befall any 
subject before he was tried by those witnesses. Large numbers of informers, 
including old women,were employed to report to the authorities and help them 
determine the gu ilt or innocence of suspects.^ Moreover, al-Hakim  was very
63. See ibn al-Sayrafi, Ishara, 26; Sbn Muyassar, 56} al-Dhahabi, Tarikh 
a l-is la m , anno, 411, also quoted by Ibn Taghri Bird!, Nujum, IV , 
184-5; Ibn Ayas, I, 53; Suyuti, IS, 18.
64. Ibn Hajar and Sbn Shah in in the supplement to Kindi's History of Egyptian
Judges, 610, See also, Hodgson, "al-DarazI and Hamza in the origin of 
the Druze re lig ion", J .A .O  .S ., 82 (1962), 18.
65. Antaki, 209; lffi*a% , anno, 391 .
66. Antaki, 209.
67. Antald, 205-6.
#•
68. Ibn a l-M uqaffa*, II,  124.
115.
generous w ith his chief Q ad is and perhaps with a ll Qa<jis in his State.
He paid them high salaries and bestowed on them many gifts. He
explains the cause of his generosity as a means of preventing material
needs from influencing the Q a d ifs work.®
Amwdf al-Yatarna (money of the orphans) appears to have been
a subject o f temptation to the Qadis . Muhammad Ibn a i-N u* man was
70
accused of appropriating a sum of fourteen thousand Dinars from i t .
His successor al-Husayn Ibn al-Nu*man was executed after being found
71gu ilty  of stealing twenty thousand Dinars. The known procedure was 
that money and property of orphans was put under the care of the Qadi
or the Amin (trustworthy person) whom the parent chose. The Q adi or the
“  . 72Amin would then act as guardian and supervise the child's expenditure.
From this the problem sprang. Some Qadis or Amins took advantage of
the situation, appropriated part of the money, and claimed that it  was a ll
spent on the ch ild . al-Hakim changed this system and Amwal al-Yafama
m niPMIMlB. HI |I| ■ Ml Ili
were ordered to be stored in a certain place where no one had access to it  
except at times of payment to the orphan. Even then, four trusted witnesses 
together with the Qadi and the Amin were to be present and any sum of money
69. 8tt?*az, anno, 395.
70. Ib id ., anno, 389.
71 . ib id ., anno, 395. See also, Sbn Hajar and Sbn Shahim in the
supplement to Kindi's History of Egyptian Judges, 608.
72. I f t i f a^, anno, 389, 395.
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given to the orphan was to be registered and documented in the
73presence of them a ll •
In 400/1009 al-Hakim created a new Diwan which he called
a 1 “-Diwan al-M ufrad (the separatetlor unconnected). The function of this
Diwan was, according to M aqrizi, to deal with the confiscated money and
74property of those whom al-Hakim executed or punished. Perhaps if  was a 
department o f investigation to trace the legalify of properties of suspects 
in order to half corruption.
Social reforms
An interesting part of al-Hakim's policy was the many orders
«
and decrees he issued concerning social life . Some of them indicate 
religious devotion, such as the prohibition of making, selling and drinking 
wine and beer; fhe k illin g  of and prohibition of breeding pigs; the encourage­
ment o f his subjects to fu lf il fhe duties of Islam by granting money and food to 
those who remained in fhe Mosques to fast during fhe month of Ramadan*
Some of them suggest concern towards public hygiene and health. The 
cleaning of fhe streets of Cairo was ordered; fhe sale of decayed Tupin seeds 
(Tjrmus) was banned; kneading of flour by fhe feet was also considered against 
fhe law. The destruction of dogs was carried out on two occasions, perhaps
IffM az, anno, 389,
74. ib id .,  anno, 400 and Khitat, S3, 14, 286,
117.
as a result of rabies. Others could be classified as “ moral" decrees.
Nudity in public baths was prohibited -  subjects were commanded to
wear a towel around the waist. Brothels were strictly banned and
soliciting in the streets by women carried heavy penalties. W itchcraft
and for tune-te lling were equally forbidden. People were ordered
to attend to their own business and not discuss the affairs of others.
Appropriating lost property or the removal of covering enclosing if
was regarded as an offence against fhe law . Some of these decrees do not
appear to make sense except, of course, to al-Hakim . If is d iff icu lt to
«
understand why he Banned the game of chess, prohibited fhe sale of Jew*s
mallow (Muiukhiyyq) and wafer cress (Jar j in) and forbade fhe fishing for and
7 5
selling of scaleless fish.
75. A ll o f these reforms are reported by Maqrizi, lff i*a z  , annos,
390-405 and Khitat, I I / . ‘286 f f *  some by AntSKf, 191-206; Ibn 
a l-M uqaffa*, II, 124 ff; -Awwal al-M anqui, fo l.  109 ff; fAzim i, 
anno, 402; Ibn a l-Z a fir , fo l . 56 ff; tb n a l-A fh ir , IX , 130 ft*
Sibf, M ira f, fo l . 206 ff; al-Dhahabl, Tarikh al-Sslam, anno, 411; 
Ibn Hammad, 54; Ibn Khallikan, III ,  449 ff;  ibn Khaldun, IV, 60; 
a l-Safadi, f o l . 18 ff; Ibn Shahin, Twarikh, f o l . 4 3 ,ff;  Ibn Ayas*,
I, 52 f f .  Some of these chroniclers tried to explain some of fhe 
peculiar orders. Antaki says that fhe reason which caused the dog 
destruction order was that al-Hakim was annoyed with their whining 
during fhe night. Ibn al-Muqaffa* says, " If wasjpecause his ass was 
once startled by a dog". Ibn a l-Z a fir and Maqrizi (in Itti^az only) 
say that al-Hakim prohibited Mufukhiyya because i t  was Mu^awiyah^ 
favourite dish and so wasJar jln  for * A 9 isha. Although there is no 
serious explanation for any of these orders, i f  is more like ly  that 
al-Hakim  was influenced by Shi*E law. Q adi al-Nu^man in his 
Kitab aM qtisar, 96, clearly says that scaleless fish was not to bo 
eaten ^
118.
Architectural achievements
His enthusiasm in this respect appears to have been influenced
by love for learning and religious devotion. According to fhe available
information, It is almost certain that he did not try to build palaces.
Meanwhile in 395/1004 he bu ilt Par aM jikm a (the house of wisdom) which
76became the best centre of learning at that time. He also bu ilt moie 
Mosques than any of his predecessors and, perhaps, more than any other 
Muslim Caliph* !n 393/1002 he ordered fhe continuation of a Mosque, ihe 
building of which had begun during fhe last years of his father s reign.
„  K .  * ■  “
al-Musabbihi quoted by Maqrizi says that forty thousand Dinars were 
estimated for fhe cost and adds that in 401/1010 al-Hakim  paid five 
thousand Dinars to furnish that .viosquc which became known
”  . 77
as Jami* a l-Hakim . in 393/1002 he ordered fhe building of another
Mosque which was accomplished in 395/1004 and was named Jami* Rashida.78
He also bu ilt another Mosque which was known as Jami< al-Maqs. If- is
also recorded that he ordered the restoration of many old Mosques.
76. For details on Par ol-Hikma, see below, page 125,
77. Khitat, II, 277.
78. Ib id ., 11, 282.
79. Ib id ., 11, 283.
80. Ibn Hammad, 52; al-§afadl, J 8  ff; lfti<3^, anno, 403. For 
more dejajls concerning al-hjakim's enthusiasm for building Mosques 
see Antaki, 186; Awwal al-Manqul, fol. 110; Ibn al-Athlr, IX , 130
119.
Certainly a most important factor of a I-Hakim's administration
was his punctilious enforcement of the law. For example, since Islam
existed, i t  forbade wine making, selling and drinking, but a total and
complete enforcement of this law was never o ffic ia lly  exercised by any
Muslim Caliph. A l-Hakim  was determined to enforce i t .  In addition to
the severe punishment he ordered for disobedience he commanded his police
to search and destroy wine wherever they found i f .  Shopkeepers were
commanded not to sell grapes or raisins except in small quantities which
would prevent any purchaser from making his own wine. The import of
both (grapes and raisins) was banned, and on one occasion he ordered fhe
81
destruction of vineyards and grape harvest's throughout Egypt. Even non-
Muslims were subjugated to fhe law, perhaps in order to prevent Muslims
82getting wine through them. Another example appears in his attempt to
put an end to brothels, but when he realised fhe difficu lties of observing
this law, he ordered that no woman should be seen outside her home.
Police were authorised to arrest any woman seen in the streets unless she
“  Sib}, Mir* a t, 206 ff;  Ibn al-Bawadari, V I, 259; Khitat, IS, 285 and
Stti*az, annos, 392-395.
— —— ■ — M
t j  fc3 men
81. See fhe annual reports of M aqrizi, iff?*az , annos, 391-405; also in
Khijay, I I,  285 f f .  See a lso /A w w ala l-M anquI, f o l . Ill; Stbf, M ir*a t, 
fo l . 193, and ibn Ayas, I, 52 ff,  say: "al-Hakim ordered the destruction 
of vinyards throughout Egypt". Sbn Shahin, Twarikh, fol .43 , adds: "and
Bi lad a I-Sham". See also a l-S iji l a l-M anhl f ih i *an? al-Khamr, Druz Ms.,
B. M .,  no . add. 11,558; Anfcikl, 186, 192, 200, 202; Ibn al-M uqaf fa * ,
H, 125; «Azim i, anno, 402; Sbn Hammad, 53; al-Bustan a l-Jam i*, 84;
Ibn al-Dawadari, V I, 259 f f . ,  al-Safadi, fo l,  18 f f .
82, Antaki, 200.
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carried a license to be there. Such licenses were issued to widows, mid-
wives, women who had to appear in court, were preparing for pilgrimage
83or funerals or carrying a petition to the Bmam .
Offenders of fhe law were severly treated. The maximum punish­
ment prescribed by the law was applied in almost every case and many
84people were persecuted. Such extremism appears to have been an 
attempt to create fear amongst subjects which would force them to obey 
fhe laws. This is apparent in the many reports by Maqrizi and other 
chroniclers. Many of those who were punished were paraded in fhe streets 
of Cairo and other cities and posters ware written explaining their crimes 
and p e n a ltie s .^
In spite of the stringency of his laws and the fact that many 
people fe ll victim  to his rufhlessness, his administration achieved a great 
deal of success and was beneficial to the majority of people. He achieved a 
high standard of justice as indicated by many reports. Antaki, for example, 
says, "He provided fhe kind of justice which his subjects never knew before.
83. Antaki, 208; Nuwayri, fo l . 57; See also al-Dhahabi, Tarjkh a l­
lslam, anno, 411; Sibf, M irat, fo l.  201, explains al-Hakim's 
stringency as a method of punishing women unloyal to their husbands. 
He relates a story in that context which he quoted from Ibn al-Sabi* .
84. For example, see Antaki, 186-224; ltt i*q z , ‘annos, 390-405.
annos, 390-405;411, and Khitat, II, 286 f f .  See also 
'Awwai a i-M angu l, fo l.  109 ff;  Sibf, M irat, fol .201; al-Bustan 
al-Jdm i*, 84; ibn Shahln, Tv/arikh, fo l.  43.
They slept in their homes secure in fhe possession of their p ro p e rtie s ."^
He adds that many complaints, which had been brushed aside by petty
offic ia ls and perhaps forgotten altogether for several years, were invest?-
87gated and submitted to a fa ir judgment. Bis justice became fhe 
favourite theme of writers of story and myth, and poets. Many of their 
stories, anecdotes and poems, which praise al-Hakim and picture him as
the champion of justice, show fhe impression his rule le ft on people's
88imagination. There is a fragment of Hebrew w riting , evidently from
H I
al-Hakim's time, praising his unparalleled justice with apparent sincerity.
The severity which he adopted in dealing with offenders of his 
laws, together with the system of informers, helped tremendously in reducing 
fhe number of crimes and protecting people against monopoly of certain 
conditions and exploitation by merchants and shopkeepers. For example, fhe 
crime of theft was reduced to a minimum. Chroniclers say that naf times of
86. A ntaki, 206.
*
87. Ib id .
88. For exampies,_see Ibn a l-M uqaffa*, | ] ,  125; al-Safadi, fol. 19;
Ibn al-Dawadcri, V I, 592; IbnAyas, !, 52 ff; Ibn a l-F u ti, quoted 
by M aqrizi, Sffi*dz, anno, 411, See also Sbn Shahin, Twqrikh, 
fol ,43; ibn Taghri Birdi, Durar al-Lata fa Dhikr al-Saltana wa a l-  
Khilafa, anno, 411, who say "al-Hakim was a just ruler at fhe 
beginning of his reign11. Ibn Ayas, I, 52, says "W henal-Hakim 
succeeded to fhe Caliphate he showed justice". al-Hakim's change 
to a bad ruler occurred, according to Muslim chroniclers, during 
fhe la tor part of h is ju le , when, they believe,he claimed d iv in ity .
See Ibn al-Dawadari, V I, 257.
89. D . Kaufman, "Beitrtfge Zur Geschichfe A*gyptens ans judischen Q ue llon",
Z » M , G c, 5 1 / IW f)4 4 2 ; J , Mann, I, 32 ff;  Hodgson, "al-Darazi s
prayers shopkeepers would leave their shops open and unguarded
90without fear of th e ft."  Sbn Ayas reports a story of a man who lost
a case fu ll of money in one of Cairo's streets and when, after a few days,
he passed fhe same place he found i t  untouched. Ibn Ayas comments that no-
91one dared to touch i t  for fear of al-Hakim 's punishment. In 397/1006
during fhe peak of Abu Rakwa* s uprising, merchants and shopkeepers
fried to exploit fhe situation, The prices of food increased sharply
creating d ifficu lties and confusion to fhe poorer subjects. al-Hakim's
*
severe punishment o f offenders brought the situation under contro l. Maqrizi
says, "People calmed down and commercial life  returned to normality after
-  92
al-Hakim whipped and paraded a number of merchants and shopkeepers."
The Progress of fhe Da* wa during al-Hakim's Reign
A careful study of fhe history of fhe Fatimid Da *wa shows that 
considerable changes and developments took place as a result of the care
-  and Hamza in fhe origin of fhe Druze re lig ion11, J ,A»Q ,S,, 82
(1962), 18. See also A . Neubauer, "Egypfien Fragment",
J .Q ,R. , SX (1896), 24-6; S*D. G oitien, A Mediterranean 
Society, Berkeley, Los Angeles, 1967, 434,
90. Ibn Ayas, 1, 54 f f .  See also fhe reports of Antaki, 206; Ibn a l-
Z a fir , fo i . 59; al-Safadi, fo l.  19, which contain similar 
information.
91. Ibn Ayas, 8, 54 f f .
92, lt f i* a ^ ,  anno, 397.
and attention al-Hakim paid to fhe progress of his propaganda machine
o
progress which the Da* wa never reached before cmd which could be 
considered as Its golden age.
In spite o f its importance to the State, fhe Da* wa had not 
previously Formed its own separate administration. if  had hitherto been
linked w ith other departments and its direction was an additional post
-  94often given to Q adi a i-Q udaf or perhaps to the W a z ir. The staff
(al-Du* at) would also hold other posts or be engaged in business o f their
own and thus a complete dedication to fhe Da*wa was rare amongst its
Da* is . During al-Hakim's time, this began to change and gradually the
Da* wa became a separate and independent department with its own
orientation and function. Its direction was given to a man whose profession
was propaganda and was to devote his entire duties to its function. He
u ~  —  M 95
was granted only one t it le  which was Da* i a l-D u*aQ while previously
93, This account of fhe Da* wa is confined only to its progress in 
relation w ith fhe policy of ai-kjakim .
94, Traditionally, Qadi a l-Q udat v/as the person in charge of the
Da*wc's activitieso But during a l-* Aziz 's reign his Wazir
Ya*qub Sbn K ill is is reported to have supervised fhe Da*wa's
function. For details see ibn Khaldun, IV ,56; if t i*a z , annos,
392, 398 and Khtfcif, I, 403, II, 273, 286; Hodgson, a rtic le , 
"D a*!11, jE J  2
95, The information available on this point suggests that, although 
the term Da* i al~Du*qt may have existed earlier, i f  was for fhe 
first time applied in Fatimid Egygt, See a l-N u* man, Ta*wil 
Da*d*im aH slam , 41; a l-K irm ani, Rahat a l-*A q l, 135-138, 296 
and al-Riscila al-Durriyya, quoted by M .K . Husayn in Rahat al~*Aql, 
2, and in Diwan ql-Mu^ayyad, 54, and byA./VU M ajid, al-Hakim , 
115. See also Antaki, 209, whose reports indicate that fhe applica­
tion of fhe tit le  to offic ia ls of fhe Da*wa was new; Khitat, S, 391 .
124.
**• O/
a number of other titles were applied to him, such as Hujja and Bab.
Like other heads of the adminisferial offices, Da* i a l-D u*at was
-  97
authorised to appoint his own secretary (Katib) and a staff of pro­
fessional Da* is trained and fu lly  graduated and o ffic ia lly  employed 
by the Imam . The first step of employing Da* is with o ffic ia l and 
regular payment appears during a l-* Aziz 's reign. Sn 378/988 the W azir
Ya*qub Ibn K ill is employed th irty  five men and provided them with
98accommodation nearby fhe Mosque of a l-Azhar, Their task was to
explain fhe teaching of fhe Da* wa . From thence fhe idea developed
and in al-Hakim 's time propagation became a fu ll time and remunerated 
«
profession. The author of an Ismaili Manuscript called al-Azhar speaks 
of Da* is joining fhe school of Par al-jjikm a for fu ll time courses after 
which they would graduate and be assigned to a certain part of fhe Muslim
world where they would operate for fhe support of the Fatimid cause and
-  9 9
fhe acknowledgement of al-Hakim as the rightful Imam-C a liph .
96. For information on these terms see Hodgson, "Hudjdja" and
B. Lewis, a rtic le , "Bab", E J
97 • a l-Q  alqashandl, Subh al~A*sha, X , 434-9; [* inan,
a l-fjak im , 255.
98. Khitat, IS, 273.
99. A l-A zhar, quoted by M . Ghalib, A* lam al-isma* iliy y a , 126,
See also a l-Falak al-Dawwar quoted by M .K . Husayn, Diwcn 
al-Mu*ayyad, 57, which gives similar information.
125.
The method of teaching the doctrine developed remarkably 
and the facilities provided for this purpose completely changed.
Previously doctrine was read and discussed in private courts, the Imarc^s 
palace and ch ie fly in Mosques
During al-Hakim's reign a scientific approach was adopted* A 
special building was constructed in Cairo and equipped w ith every 
fa c ility  to assist the Pa* wa and create the atmosphere for the best 
possible results of its function. A large number of books on various 
subjects, a ll materials for w riting, copying and studying were provided. 
Staff o f clerks and servants were employed for its upkeep. Many scientists 
and learned men were employed as lecturers. The new centre was named 
Par al-H?kmq or Par a l-* Uium (the House of Wisdom or the House of 
S c ie n c e )^  and was esteemed the best of its kind at that time. Although 
Par al-Hikma was principally bu ilt to fac ilita te  the function o f the Pa* wa
100. Khijafr, !, 391, II,  273.
101. For information on Par a l-H ikm a, see a l-S iii i a l-M u*a llaq
Ms., B .M ., no. add ^  11,558, fo L  6, edited by M ajid, a l-tjSkim ,
242; S ijil Waqf al-Hakim *A la Par a l-ffikm a reported by MaqrlzT,
KhUat/ 11/ 273 f f . and quoted by Mnan, al-Hakim , 252, and by 
A . f a f l * , A§l al-Muwahidin al~Druz wa u$u Luhum, 72^ al~ 
Musabbihr quoted by Maqnzt, Ichitat, I, 458 ff;  Antaki, 188; 
al-Dhahabi, * Ibar, i l l ,  72; 8tti*az , anno, 395; Ibn Taghrl Bird?, 
Nujum, IV , 222; Risalat a l-Azhar, quoted by M , Ghalib, A* lam 
126; al-Falak ql"Dawwar, quoted by M . K. Husayn, Diwan a I"  
Mu*ayyad, 57; S .L, Poole, History of Egypt in the Middle Ages, 
129; J .W . Thompson, The Libraries of Medieval Islam, 356; 
M ajid , al^Hakim, 80. See a Iso artic l e, "Par a I -H i kma",
126.
i f  rapidly became an academy of culture rather than merely a centre of 
religious instruction, a school where medicine, logic, mathematics,
philosophy, history, languages and Muslim theology, including Sunni
102
law were taught. Students from a ll parts of the Mtuslim world 
came there to study and specialise in an atmosphere of Shi* i  Ismaili 
preaching and teaching, where the Du* at operated in every branch 
of study and the Imam in person would v isit the lecture halls, often
joining debates and granting generous gifts to encourage noticeable
„ . 103proficiency.
This atmosphere no doubt influenced the students who came 
*° ^ qr and obviously enhanced the Fatimid cause by adding
to if  the support of many learned and intellectual men.
The lectures which the Da* is held were known as Majalis 
(sessions) and were given in different levels according to the capacity 
of understanding amongst the audience. Some were designated as 
Majalis al-Khassa (sessions of the selected)and others as Majalis 
al-*Amma (sessions for the public). In the special meetings c * the Da* is 
read works incorporating philosophy, science, logic and ta*w il (the
102. Antaki, 188; al-Musabbihi, quoted by M aqrizi, Khitat, i,  458 ff;
al-Dhahabi^ * jbar, HI, 72; H fi*a z , annos, 395, 398-9; I bn 
Taghri Birdi, Nujum, IV , 222,
103. al-Mushabbihi quoted by M aqrizi, Khitat, I, 458.
127.
allegorical interpretation of the Holy books). From the picture given 
by al-Musabbihi and Ibn al-Tuwayr, both quoted by M aqrizi, i f  would 
appear that Majalis al-Khassa were attended only by Ismailis In 
the others, the lecturers read were merely explanations of the doctrines 
which concerned the meaning of 111 mam V the theological differences 
between Shi* i and Sunni laws and their historical background. Special 
emphasis was given to those parts which supported the claims of the
mm
Shi*a to be the group of the right path and the Fatimids as the rightful
105leaders and Caliphs o f the Muslim Umma.
■i i m i i  p in > ii i<
9*4
in a I--Hakim's time they expanded in an endeavour to reach 
every group of people including even visitors to the country and women. 
The special meetings were divided info two. One was for the high 
officia ls and learned men and was known as Majalis al-Awl?yay; the 
other was for the ordinary officia ls and a branch of it  was specially for 
women of the palace. The public sessions were divided info three -  one
for men of the general public, one for the women and one for the visitors
106to the country,
•s*
During the early periods, the Du* at concentrated their efforts
104. Khita|,/ !,  391.
105. See a l-N u* man, Da*a* im ai-Bslam and a l-lg tigar, the basic
v/orks on Ismail! law a t that tim e. Both were taught as text books 
in the Majalis which gives an idea about the subjects emphasised 
there.
106. aljMusabbifji quoted by Maqrizi, Khitat, I, 391; M ajid, a l-  
Hakim, 80.
128.
mainly upon tribal chiefs, wealthy merchants and public figures in
107order to achieve a quick po litica l success for the cause. A fter
the settlement in Egypt, and particularly during al-Hakim's time,
the objectives o f the Da* wa extended to the people as a whole.
The doctrine was introduced to every person as a way of l i fe .  Women
received lectures and training in order to indoctrinate their children
and, apparently for the first time, women participated in the Da* wa
— — 108and were even accepted to work as Pa* is •
The Da*wa flourished during a!-Hakim's reign and is noticeable 
by the number and qualify of the scholars if  produced, the development 
of ideas in its teaching and in the success amongst people both inside 
and outside the Fatimid Empire, in the fields of philosophy, theology 
and other sciences, if  produced a number of fine scholars. Amongst these 
are: al-Kirmani (died 411/1020), a philosopher, theologian and great Da*? 
who contributed many works considered, even today, to be the basis of 
Ismaili philosophy and doctrine, Abu al-Fawaris and a l-N is a b u r il^
107. This is apparent in the history of the Da* wa during its early 
phase. See for example, the activities of Abu *Abd Allah a l-  
Shi* i in Ibn a l-A th ir, V III, 12 ff; Khitat, II, 10 f f .
108. See Ghayat a l-M awajid an Ismaili work quoted by W. Ivanow,
Rise, 21; M ajid, a I-Hakim, 79.
109. See W . Bvanow, Ismaili Literature, 40; M .K . Husayn in his
introduction to R5hat a l-*A q j, T  ff; M . G halib, A* lam# 126.
110. W . Ivanow, Ismaili Literature, 42; M . Ghalib, A* lam, 89, 126.
129.
In other fields fhore wasQa^i al-Qudaf M alik Ibn Sa*id and Ibn .
Yunis al-M asri who contributed works on astronomy; Abu * Abd AHah
al-Yamani who wrote the history of philologians, the biography of
111Jawhar and a number of other works. There was also al-Musabbihi
*
whose works were the main sources of Fatimid history for many chroniclers.
A study of the Ismaili literature of the periods before and
during al-Hakim 's reign shows a significant development in the qualify
of writing of the Ismaili scholars. Those who joined Dar al-Hakim  appear to
have acquired more knowledge and a deeper understanding of ancient
philosophy and religions other than Islam. They enjoyed a wider
variety of subjects than those of the earlier periods. Thetr method of
discussion and tones of argumentation indicate a broader and less
fanatical outlook. Even in their allegorical interpretation o f the Holy
books and traditions, al-Hakim's contemporaries appear more sophisticated 
112and less bigoted. Indeed a detailed and comparative study of the 
Ismaili literature of these periods would be a very interesting and useful 
subject for a student of Muslim theology.
^  * ltf? *az, anno, 400. On Ibn Yunis see Ibn A b i Usaybi*a, IS, 90.
112. See a l-K irm ani, al-Riya<j, e d .A .T a m ir , Beirut, 1960. The
author makes a comparative study of the works of the earlier Da* is 
a l-S ijjz i (d . 331/942), Abu Ida tim al-Razi (d . 331/942) and a l-  
Nasafi (cl* 331/942). He gives many examples which show the changes 
of the outlook of those early Da*is and himself concerning doctrine, 
philosophy, and Ta*w il. For information on these Da* is see W. Ivanow, 
Ismaili Literature, 23 -7 . Another example could be also found in a 
comparative study of the Ta* w il of Q adi al-Nu*man in his Asas a l-  
Ta’ w il and that of Kirmani in Rahaf a l- *A q l.
130,
The results in the spread of the Fatimid teaching by the Da* wa
which created a popular support for a I-Hakim was of equal significance
*
and importance* Externally, as w ill be discussed in detail later, the 
Da^wa played the major role in an attempt to win the Eastern provinces 
of the Muslim world. The influence and activities of its Da* ?s achieved 
a noticeable success in putting Aleppo under the direct control of Cairo 
and in winning the allegiance of the *Uqaylids principa lity when its 
head Qirwash declared his loyalty to ai^Hakim throughout a ll territory 
under his dominion * The tribe of Banu Asad, under the leadership of 
their chief *A1? al-Asadi declared its loyalty to the Imam in the area of
113H illa . Even in Baghdad itself, popular support him was achieved.
internally, the teaching of Par al-H ikm a and the activities of
the Da* is achieved success for the cause. Maqrizi speaks of Egyptians
coming from villages and towns neighbouring on Cairo to attend the lectures
of the Majalis. He adds "that there were occasions when a number of people
died of suffocation among the enthusiastic crowds which came to listen to 
115certain lecturers,
Perhaps the most d ifficu lt task al-Hakim faced in his internal 
policies was achieving support of both groups of the AAuslim population -  
the Shi* a and the Sunnis and at the same time avoiding clashes between
113. See below, "The External Policy of a l-H akim ", Chapter V of 
this thesis.
114. Itti*dg , 395.
115. ib id .
them. Although his reign was the golden age of the Pa*wa, it  was not 
entirely without misfortune. As a result of his encouragements to the 
Da* wa*s activ ities, the Shi*a became more active and extremism grew 
amongst the population as it  did amongst the Da* is. it  reached its
peak in 395/1004 when al-Makim, under the influence of his extreme
&
Da* is , issued a decree which ordered his subjects to curse some of
116the Prophet!s companions, (al~$ahaba), who according to the
Shi*a usurped the rights of *A li and prevented him from becoming the
first successor of Muhammad. Such an action resulted in a wave of
anti~Sunni feeling and Sunnis, who were s till a considerable number in
117Egypt, fe ll under pressure mainly from the Shi*a population. Outside
Egypt the decree became a weapon in the hands of the anti-Fafimids,
which they used to obstruct the progress of the Da* wa amongst Muslims.
Adventurers and rebels, who sought to creat rebellions against the Fatimid
rule, found i f  a useful fool with which to obtain support from the Muslim 
118masses
AI “ Hakim, who sought support and popularity from a ll Muslims,
was suffic iently astute to realise the consequences of his action and the
116. M ajid , ai-Hakim , 87, suggests that al-Hakim did not issue the 
order and like his father prohibited his subjects from cursing.
He adds that fanatic Egyptians were responsible for i t .  This 
suggestion, however, does not appear to have much support in 
the information of the sources.
Khitat, SI, 286, and ltti*a%, anno, 395.
118. Antaki, 188,a 9
emotion it  aroused amongst the Muslim Urnma. He therefore reversed 
his attitude and adopted a moderate line of policy by which he appears 
to have endeavoured to maintain a kind of balance between the two 
groups. To reassure the Sunnis that their safety and security were safe- 
guarded and their freedom of faith would not be disturbed, he withdrew the 
decree and issued others which forbade the curse and threatened with
i
severe punishment those who disobeyed him. He public ly  praised
119the Sahaba and commanded his subjects to do the same. '  in 399/1008
he issued his famous decree in which he commanded his Muslim subjects to
forget the quarrels o f the past and work for the future. He also allowed
them the freedom of choice of the manner of prayers and Sunnis were no
120longer subject to the Shi* i manner in their prayers. From thence and
until the end of his reign Sunnis enjoyed a complete freedom of faith
without any fear of persecution. Shi* i extremists who fried to oppress them
received severe punishments. Their theologians and learned men were
commanded by a I-Hakim to hold debates with those of the Shi* a in an
*
121atmosphere of scholarship, “ Some of them were o ffic ia lly  employed to
119. Anfaki, 195; 8fti*az , annos, 397-404. See also 1 Awwai a l-  
Manqul, fo l.  Sib Sibt, f o l . 2Ql; a 1-Bus ran a l-Jam i*, 84.
120. See Sbn Khaldun, IV, 60 f f ;  Da* i Idris quoted by M ajid, a 1-Hakim,
88. See also Antaki, 195; Stti*az, anno, 399 and K h ita t, SI, 287.
121. Awwai a l-M anqul, fo l.  112; al-Ruhi, Bulghaf qj.-%urafq fi Twarikh 
O  q l-K hu la fq , foL  94, say:" 6—^  61
.<$ L r  See also al-Musabbihi,
quoted by Maqrizi, Khifaj*, 1,459, who gives similar information.
teach Sunni law in Dc:r a i-H iknic^. Many Sunn! judges were also
mm f”*
employed and once tho office of Qacji al-Qudai- (chief judge) was
122given to a Sunni as has been mentioned before.
W hile al-Hakim was able to halt extremism amongst the 
population o f the Shi* a, ho completely failed to halt its expiansion 
among the Da* is. W ith thorn if grew rapidly and resulted in the first 
division of the Da* wa in Egypt. The split was not a consequence of 
al-Hakim 's tolerant attitude towards Sunnis. If was a result of d if-
o
ferences in views concerning his Smama. The Ghuiat (extremists) who
believed that he was not merely imam but the D$ify in person, continued
preaching their views until a new sect emerged and became known as the
123Druz, whose origin w ill be discussed in Chapter VI o f this thesis.
The problem of Ahl al~Dhimma
One of the most significant features of al-Hakim 's policy was
*
his attitude towards A h l q l-P h imma (Jews and Christians) of his Empire.
If was contrary to tho general policies of his predecessors, a challenge to 
the Byzantine Empire with which he had made a peace agreement,and a
122. See Maqrizi, Itfi*az , annos, 399, 405, and Khitat, IS, 288; Sbn
Hajar and Sbn Shahin in the supplement to Kindi's History of 
Egyptian Judges, 610. See also Sbn Taghri Birdi, Nujum, SV, 222, 
who speaks o f Sunni * Ulama employed in Ddr al-Hikma and a!~ 
Suyut.i, Husn al-M uhatjara, S, 169, who speaks of Sunni Qadis 
employed by al-Hakim .
123, See below, Chapter VI of this thesis.
threat to the steady progress of the Stafe!s financial administration 
which was almost entirely dependent on the skill and efficiency of 
the Dhimmis. Such an attitude had aroused the curiosity of many 
medieval and modern historians but no study had been made which could 
satisfactorily answer the question; why did al-Hakim adopt such a 
policy?
Before trying to cope with this question, i t  is necessary to 
mention when his po licy commenced and what measures he took 
against the Dhimmis of his Empire.
Modern historians are divided info two groups concerning the
time of the commencement of the po licy. De Sacy and Canard believe if
started immediately after al-Hakim got rid of Barjawan and had assumed
his rule as an absolute ru ler. They consider the incidents of 392-393/
1001-1002 which resulted in the execution of Fahd ibn Ibrahim (a Christian
high o ffic ia l), the arrest of a number of Jewish and Christian Kutfqb
(clerks) and the destruction of two Churches as the beginning of al-Hakim 's
*
124hostile attitude towards Ahl al-Dhimma of his State.
S. Lane-Poole and J . Mann on the other hand believe that a l-  
Hakim's hostility did not commence before the year 395/1004. They both
124. De Sacy, Expos6, I, 305; M. Canard, “al-Hakim  Bi A m rillah", 
E . l .2
say that during tho first ten years of al-Hakim 's reign (386-395/
996/1004) Jews and Christians enjoyed the immunity and even the
privileges which they had obtained during the tolerant reign of al~ 
a  “  125*A z iz ,
The actions of execution, arrests and destruction of churches 
during 392-3 A #H • were indications of hostility towards Ahl ai-Dhimma 
but the information available from the sources appears to show them as 
isolated incidents resulting from circumstances and not from planned 
policy to attack a religious community, Ibn a l-Q alanlsi explains in 
detail the reasons which led to the execution of Fahd. He says that it
was a conspiracy planned by al-Husayn Ibn Jawhar, the then Wcslta ,
1 ? 6 — 127and his supporters Ibn a l-* Addas “  and Sbn a l-N ahaw i. He continues
that Ibn al-Nahaw i and Ibn al-< Addas had presented evidence to al-Hakim 
*  *  *
which convinced him that Fahd had been stealing a certain sum of money
125. S. Lane-Poole, History of Egypt in the Middle Ages, 126; J .  Mann, 
The Jews in Egypt and Palestine under the Fatimid Caliphs, I, 32 f f .
126. Abu a 1-Hasan *A li Sbn * Umar ibn a!-* Addas. Nothing is known 
about him except that in 381/991 he was appointed as Wasifa by a l-
* Aziz, then ho was^  dismissed in 383/993. In 392/1002 he was the head 
of Diwan a l-K ha ra j. Khjjat, H, 31; Muaaffa*, fol .150. See also 
Ibn a K ^a ia n is i, 53 ff;  BarBebraeus, Chronographia, 182,
127. Abu Tahir Miahmua' Ibn Muhammad a l-N ahaw i- A ll that is known 
about him Is that he was the head of Diwan a l-H ijaz  during the 
early years of al-Hakim's reign. Khitat, II,  31, See also ibn 
a l-Q a lcn is i, 58.
136.
128from the treasury every year, Maqrizi confirms this report by stating
"After Fahd's execution, hIs brother brought to the palace a sum of five
129 -  . hundred thousand Dinars11. Sbn al-Qalcmisi adds that when al-Hakim
learned that both Ibn al-Nahawi and Sbn a l-* Addas had given false
130evidence he executed them, and Maqrizi adds that al-Hakim returned
131the five hundred thousand Dinars to Fahd's sons and fam ily .
The Kuttab (clerks) who may have been accused of making
illegal money, were freed soon after a t r ia l . On this question J . Mann
consulted some of the Jewish contemporary wiitings from the Jewish
Geniza. He states that the Jewish Kuttab were freed because there was
no evidence of their gu ilt and adds that the Jewish community of that time
held special thanksgiving prayers to God for al-Hakim's good conduct of 
132justice. If is possible that these arrests were part of the plot against 
Fahd. The Kuttab in question formed part of his staff which were controlled 
by his o ffice . Ibn at** Addas succeeded to Fahd's office after his 
execution and probably desired to eliminate his staff, St may have been 
that the similar accusation he brought against the staff resulted in the
128. Sbn a i-Q a lan is i, 58 ff; Bar Hebraeus, Chronographia, 182. Maqrizi, 
K h ija f, IS, 31, adds that * Sbn ai-Nahawi and Ibn al~( Addas accused 
Fahd of favouring Christians and suppressing Muslims. 1
129. itti*a% , anno, 392.
130. Sbn a l-Q a lan is i, 59. See also Bar Hebraeus, Chronographia, 182; 
Khitat, SI, 31 and St f i tfa%, anno, 392.
^31. 8tticaz , anno, 392.
132. J . Mann, S, 32 f f .
137.
question of his previous and perhaps wrongful accusations of Fahd
and ended with the freeing of the Kuttab and his own execution.
Antaki says that Ibn al-Muqashshcr, al-Hakim's private physician and 
*
133friend, pleaded for the Kuttab. He perhaps pointed out to him that 
the accusation was coloured by personal reasons. Ibn a l-Q alanisi adds 
that Sit a i-M u lk , al-Hakim 's sister, also intervened and assured her 
brother that a ll charges brought by Ibn al-Nahawi and Ibn a l - ‘ Addas
1 1 134were false.
The destruction of the two churches was not by order of the Imam.
It was a result of an attack by a group of angry Muslims, Antaki says, "The
Christian Jacobites began rebuilding a ruined church in the area of
Rashida. A  group of Muslims attacked them and destroyed the building
135and two other churches which were nearby." The reason for this 
attack is not clearly given by any of the sources, but if  seems that a I-  
Hakim was intending to build a new Mosque on the ruins of the Jacobite 
church. Information concerning such an intention may have been com­
municated by Christians, who were also government o ffic ia ls , to church 
officia ls who commenced its rebuilding before al-Hakim 's intentions became
4
133. Antaki, 186,
134. Ibn a l-Q a lan is i, 59 f f .
135 . Antaki, 186. See also Ibn Abi Tayy quoted by M aqrizi, Khitat,
11/283.
o ffic ia lly  declared, ibn Abi Tayy, who is quoted by M aqrizi, 
suggests that, since Muslim law does not allow Ahl al-Dhimma to 
build new churches in Par a l-ls lam , Muslims were angered by the re­
building of the church which they seem to have considered a 
challenge to their law. He states that both Muslims and Christians
complained to al-Hakim against each other. The Christians said the church
136existed before the Muslim conquest and Muslims said i t  was newly bu ilt*
A l-H akim , however, ordered his Mosque to be bu ilt in the area and
gave permission for the Christians to build three new churches in another
area which was known as al-Hamra. This, as Antaki and Sbn Abi Tayy
-  1 3 7
state, . “Was a compensation for the three churches destroyed in Rashida".
Sn the light of this information it  would appear that al-Hakim 's bostilivy 
against Jews and Christians as religious communities was not rampant before 
395/1004 when o ffic ia l orders specifying new measures were declared*
The first o ffic ia l hostility appeared in 395/1004 when al-Hakim 
issued a decree ordering a ll Jews, except the Khayabira (the Jews who 
orig ina lly came from the town of Khaybar),and Christians not to appear
136. Ibn Abi Tayy quoted by Maqrizi, Khitat ,  II, 283.
137. Antaki, 186; Ibn Abi Tayy quoted by M aqrizi, Khitat ,
I I , *283.
139*
138
in public unless they wore a black Ghiyar (garment) w ith black belts.
139He also forbade slaves to bo sold to them. More severe measures
were introduced as time passed. In 398/1007 al-Hakim confiscated
-  -  140the Church 's revenue and put It under the supervision of the Pawawin.
Jews were ordered to wear a bell and Christians a cross when in public 
141baths. He prohibited Christians from holding ritual ceremonies during
142the times of Epiphany and Easter. * A t the end of this same year he
138. The idea of the Ghiyar was not new to Ahl al-Phimma. Muslim 
theologians claim that It dates back to the time of Umar Ibn al~
Khatiab who, they say, had made certain conditions on Ahl a l-  
Dhimma, who decided to keep their faith under Muslim ru le.
6 Umar's supposed conditions are known as al-Ahkam al~* Umariyya 
One of them was that ncn-Musiims were to wear a distinguish- 
"over coat" which became known as a l-G h iyar. See al-Qalqashandi, 
gublj, X I31, 356 ff; a i-N abuls i, T a jr ^  ed. C . Cahen,
B J  »F«A *G * (1958-60), 139 f f .  See also A .S . fr it to n , The Caliphs 
and their non-Musi ?;n Subjects, 5 ff;  A rtic le  "G hiyar]', £ J  
Black, as the colour specified for the Ghiyar, in al-Hakim's order, 
is said to have been chcsen because black was the symbolic colour 
of the Abbas ids. See M aqrizi, Ifti^az , anno, 395.
*8J ta* 0*0
139. A nig Id , 187; a i-S tji i al~Ma*anaq and Risaiat al-Yahud wa a l-
Nasara, Druz Mss,, B .M . no. add. 11,558, fols. 2, 12-21;
Awwai al-M anqul, fo l.  l l l j  Sbn a l-M uqaffa*, i t ,  124; Sbn a !- 
Z a fir , fo l.  60 ff;  Sbn a l-A th ir, IX 131; Sbn Hammad, 54; lal-Safadi, 
fo i.J B ; Sibt, fol .206; al-Dhahabi quoted by Sbn Taghri Birdi,
Nujum, SV, 178; al-QalqashancfT, Subh, XS1S, 356, ff; a l-NabuIsi; 
Tajrid, 139 ff; Khitat, It, 285 f f  and Itti* a%, anno, 395; Ibn Shahirr 
Tv/arikh, fo l.  43; a l-N uw ayri, fo l.  53; Ibn Kathir, X I, 339.
140. A ntaki, 195; Ibn al-M uqaffa*, SS, 127; Khitat, SI, 286 and
lfti<a%, anno, 398.
141. Antaki, 195; ItvHaz , anno, 404, puts this in the year 404/1014.
Ibn a I -D qwadar J , V l , 259 ff,  says that a l-H akim  ordered the 
Dhimmis to have their own baths.
142. Antaki, 197; I f t i 'a ; ,  annos, 401,402, puts these events in 401-402/
lo t  1/1012.
140.
“  143gave orders fro destroy Qiyama (frhe Church of frhe Ho!y Sepulchre).
In 399)^1908 a number of Churches were destroyed in Egypt.
In 400/1009 Qiyama was pulled down and a further number of churches
145were demolished and their properties looted.
In 403/1012 a ll measures increased in their severity, Jews and 
Christians a like  were prohibited from riding horses and were only allowed 
fro use frhe backs of donkeys or mules with undecorated saddles. He 
forbade them to employ Muslim servants and to take Muslim girls as 
concubines. They were prohibited from boats manned by Muslim crews. 
A ll Christians were ordered to wear a cross; Jews a piece of wood of 
certain measurement. Even more harshly, he allowed Muslims to spy
143. Most Muslim sources report this event in 398/1007 but accounts 
differ as to whether the decree or the actual destruction occurred
M
in this year._ Some say, "In this year al-Hakim gave orders fro 
destroy Q iyama."  Sbn a l-Q alanis i, 66; Ibn a l-A th ir, IX , 46;
Khitat, IS, 287 and lfrfr?*a%, anno, 398. Others say that the actual 
destruction occurred^in that^year. See ‘ Azim i, anno, 398; Sibt, 
fo l.  195 J f ;  al-Bustan al-Jam?*, 83;^ al-Dhahabi, < I bar \ \\ f 66;
Ibn Kafrhir, X I, 399; a l-Y a fi*”!, AAirafr a l-J inan, If, 429. There are 
also some who give an entirely different date. The author of Awwai 
a l-M angul, fo l . I l l ,  puts i t  in 403/1012; a l-§a fad i, fo l,  18; Ibn a l-  
Dawadan, V I, 293, put It in 408/1017, which are most like ly  errors. 
Antaki, 196, however, gives the precise date of the destruction; he 
says: " I t  was on the fifth  of §afar 400/30th October 1009.*' This 
suggests that although the order may have been issued in 398 A .H . 
frhe actual destruction occurred later. Whether that was because 
Christian offic ia ls tried to delay i t  hoping that al-Hakim might change 
his mind or was reluctant to destroy i t  fearing Byzantine reprisals, 
the sources do not c la rify . C f, M . Canard, uLe Destruction de I'lig lise 
de ia^Resurrection par le Calife Hakim", Byzantiom, 35 (1965), 16 f f .
144. Antaki, 195; jfrti*a%, annos, 398-9 and Khitat, l l ,  287.
145. Antaki, 196.
141.
146upon them and see that these orders were enforced *
The Reasons behind al-Hakim's Policy
Chroniclers fa il fro c larify the reasons which caused al-Hakim 
to take such extreme measures. *Ufrhman al-Nabulsi in his Tajrid Sayf
ta *  to#
al-Himma Lima f i  Phimmati Ahl al-Dhimma, suggests that the reasons 
were p o lit ic a l. He says that ai-Hakim feared that the prosperity of  Ahl 
al-Dhimma, their growing prestige and influence both in the State affairs 
and in the society, might encourage them to penetrate his State. He
confiscated each Dhimmis property when i f  reached a certain value and
147thus prevented them from accumulating wealth.
There is no supporting information, however, from any other 
source and no evidence indicating that al-Hakim ever confiscated 
individual Dhjmmi property* On the contrary, many sources agree that 
he was very generous^^ to the personnel he employed, the majority of 
whom appear to have been non-Muslims. Moreover, there is no informa­
tion which suggests that al-Hakim  had ever interfered with industry, trade, 
or any business run by members of the community of Ahl al-Dhimma. Perhaps
w *  *u*
al-Nabulsi was referring to the confiscation of the Church’s revenue
146. Antaki, 195-208; Itti^a^ , annos, 398-404.
147. a l-N abu ls i, Tajrid , 139 f f .
148. Antaki, 206;  ^Awwai al-M anqul, fo l.  110; Ibn a l-A fh ii^  SX, 131;
Sbn Hammad, 52; al-Dhahabl, quotedby Sbn Taghri Birdi, Nujum,
SV, 178; Abu al-FIda’ , SI, 1514 See also Sibt, fo l . 206; Sbn =
142.
which was due to entirely different reasons, as w ill be discussed later.
Sf al-Hakim's fear was that Christians would support the 
*
Byzantines against his State because of similar religious beliefs, such
a question could not arise concerning the Jews.
Antaki, Ibn al-Muqaffa* and Bar Hebraeus suggest the reason 
*
149was to force Ahl al-Dhimma to adopt Islam. Although it  may be
possible that al-Hakim desired to convert his subjects to Islam, whether 
*
his policy was designed particularly fro achieve that aim is a debatable 
po in t. The chroniclers concerned are a ll Christian and no doubt would 
interpret a ll al-Hakim's actions with the bias of their own religious views.
This is in addition to the fact that their explanations are not always con­
sistent w ith events and are at times obviously contradictory. When
Antaki explains why he believed that al-Hakim was aiming to force Ahl * • T
al-Dhimma to become Muslims he says, "The majority o f his staff were Dhimmis 
and too many to be replaced by Muslims. He made his measures so severe
150that he could force them to adopt Islam." But this is contradicted by the
™  AM M l
-  Shahin, jo l.4 3 ; Sbn a l-Fu fi, quoted by M aqrizi, Stiigaz , anno, 411;
al-Safadi, fo l . 19. See also examples of al-HQkim's generosity 
in Maqrizi*s reports, ift?<5%, annos, 390-404 and Khitat, IS, 285 f f ,
149. Antaki, 207; Ibn al-M uqaffatf, IS, 124; Bar Hebraeus,
Chronograph ia , 184.
150. Antaki, 207,
reports of many sources, including Anfraki's, which say that al-Hakim
*  ■
permitted a ll those who refused to obey his orders to leave the country
safeguarded by the police and to take a ll portable properties and belong- 
151ings with them. It is improbable that i f  he was unable to replace his 
large Dhimmi staff by Muslims that he would allow them to leave the 
country.
ibn aI-Muqaffa< and Bar Hebraeus state that al-Hakim  would
^  152
threaten those who did not adopt Islam and honour those who did so.
Even the execution of Fahd Sbn Ibrahim was, as Ibn al-Muqaffa* says, "A
153result of his refusal to become M uslim ." On the contrary, there are 
many reports which show that even during the years of al-Hakim 's greatest 
pressure upon the Dhimmis , the majority of offic ia ls in his service were 
non-Muslims and that he never dismissed any of them on religious grounds. 
There seems to have been no difference in his method of appointing high 
o ffic ia ls , for everyone, whether Muslim or Dhimmi, received similar 
Alqab (titles) and grants!^ ‘
151. A n tak i^207; Sbn a l-Z a fir , f o l . 63;Jbn a l-A th ir, SX, 131; a l-
Dhahabi, < Sbar, H i, 66 f f ;  Sbn Kafrhir, X I, 339; ai-Yafi< i,  H, 429 
j t t i^ i j^ ,  anno, 404.
152. Sbn a l-M uqaffa*, II, 125; Bar Hebraeus, Chronographia, 1G4.
153. Ibn al-M uqaffa‘ , SI, 124 f f .
154. Antaki, 196-198, 199, 227; Ibn al-Sayrafi, 26 ff;  ItfrHaz, annos
395-405 and Khitat, Si, 285 f f .  * *"
St is reported that he respected the private beliefs of his men 
and did not attempt to change them, Al-Musabbihi, the contemporary 
chronicler who is quoted by M aqrizi, says that al-Hakim  informed himft
when he appointed Salih Sbn *A lt as G o7 id a l-Q uw a d , that he had
said, “ S asked Ibn Surin to write the decree and made him swear on the
155Bible not to te ll anyone before the time was due .11 Moreover,
force does not seem to have been al-Hakim's method of conversion. A
*
156number of reports indicate that he preferred arguments and discussions.
Ample evidence of this appears in his famous S ijii which he decreed in
399/1008 and which begins with the phrase -  La Ikraha f i a I-P in  (Religion
157is not to be forced upon people) and the building of Dar a i-H ikm a, 
which was for the purpose of convincing people by the medium of discussion.
St is quite clear in the reports of many chroniclers that obedience
-  „ 158to Muslim law, not the adoption of Islam, was al-Hakim's purpose.
Had he exercised his policy in order to compel A hl al-Dhimma to adopt
155. Ifti<dz, anno, 398.
156. See Risalaf al-Yahud wa al-Nasara, fo ls. 12-21; al-Musabbihi,
quoted^by Maqrizi, Khifaf, ] ,  458 ff;  6Awwai a l-M anquI, fo l.  112; 
al-Ruhi, fo l . 94; Dd* i idrls, quoted by M ajid , al-Hakim , 111.
157, Sbn Khaldun, IV , 60 f f .  SttHaz, anno, 399 and Khitaj-, H, 287.
See also Antaki, 195; DcPTTdris, quoted by M ajid, al-Hakim , 88.
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158, See Awwai a l-M anqu l, fo l.  I l l ,  Ibn a l-Z a fir , fo l.  63; Sbn a l-
A th lr, IX , 131; Sibt, fo l.  195 ff; al-Dhahabl, Tarikh a l-is lam . 
annos, 403 and £ 8 bar, HI, 66 ff; a L-Q a !q as ha ndi, XSSI, 66, 356; 
al4Sqfadi, fo l.  18; Sbn Shahin, Twarikh, fo l.  54; Sbn Kathlr, X I,
339*; aI-Yafi*1 , SS, 429; Even in the reports of Sbn a l-M uqaffa1' there 
are indications that al-Hakim only enforced Muslim law. See Sbn al~ 
Muqaffa£ r IS, 135.
145.
Ssldm, he would not have exempted the group of Jews known as al~ 
Khayabira from a ll his measures. This was only because they claimed 
to have been exempted from a ll conditions born on Ahl al-Dhimma in 
Par a l-ls lam , although Muslim theologians are in dispute over the 
Khayabira's claim .
A l-Hakim 's po licy, however, appears to have been an attempt 
to solve a problem which socially, religiously and administratively 
menaced his ru le . On one hand he had Ahl al-Dhimma, a large minority, 
with their v ita l importance to the progress of the financial administration of 
the State, and on the other there was the Muslim population which 
resented their presence and any policy that prolonged their influence in the 
State affairs or in social life . I f  he dismissed a ll non-Muslims from the 
offices of State, financial administration would suffer a severe blow and 
thus weaken the treasurey which would result in grave d ifficu lties on the 
power of his State. I f  he continued his father's po licy of tolerance towards 
them, he would be unable to achieve popularity amongst Muslims and 
might lose the support which he already had. The policy of tolerance v/as 
no longer practical under the circumstances. Ahl al-Dhimma had been 
doing too w e ll, They became too rich, powerful and prominent and 
Muslims appeared unwilling to tolerate them any longer, which le ft the 
Imam-Caliph in a dilemma.
159. al-Qalqashandl, XIIV 66, 359-66
146.
The only solution for this problem, as it seems to have
M
appeared to al-Hakim , was to subjugate a ll Ahl al-Dhimma
m i  . . ■ -
lite ra lly  to Muslim law, in which cause It would not be necessary to 
dismiss them from the offices of the State and the Muslims would not be 
able to complain since their law was being strictly observed and Ahl 
al-Dhimma were treated according to its demands.
The idea of subjugating Ahl a 1 himmp to Muslim law was 
neither new nor unique in MusIimlqisfory^ /Vjbny Caliphs and rulers 
exercised i t  either to satisfy tho Muslim population or as evidence that
they themselves were stric tly  religious and desired to enforce Muslim
160law to the le tter, A l-Hakim  was influenced by both reasons: to set
an example as an extreme Muslim imam-Cafiph and the demands of the
Muslim population.
If al-Hakim's policy was merely to observe Muslim law, why 
*
did he include orders for the confiscation of the revenue of churches, the 
destruction of churches and severe measures concerning the Ghiyar, which 
were not a part o f that law?
160. See Antaki, 63; Ibn a l-M uqaffa*, I, 4? al-Qalqashandi, XSIS, 
356 ff;  /VKhitat, IS, 263, 513 f f ;  a l-N abuls i, 140 ff; Ghazi 
a l-W asiti, Rad f aia Ahl al-Djimma wa man Tabi^ahum, ed. by 
G oftheil, J » A .O ,S „  41 (1921), 383 f f ;  Tritton, Muslim 
Caliphs and their non-Musiim Subjects, A Fattal, Le Statut 
Legal des non-Musuimans en pays d'Sslam; M . Perlmans 
"Note on anti-Christian propagandain the Mamluk Empire", 
B oS .Q .A .S ., X (1940-2), 843 f f .
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Available information on this point suggests that behind 
every one of the extreme measures there were other reasons for his 
actions. They did not occur in 395/1004 when the first anti-Dhimmi 
order was introduced. The confiscation of church revenues appeared 
three years later, the destruction of the churches occurred even later. 
These actions do not appear to have been directed against the Jews.
The revenues of their synagogues were not confiscated nor were they 
destroyed by o ffic ia l orders. This indicates that the severity of al-Hakim's 
attitude was not contemplated at the outset and was not aimed at Ahl 
al-Dhimma as a whole.
The confiscation of the Church's revenues seems to have
been directed against the widespread corruption which gained increasing
momentum even among o ffic ia l church circles* Ibn al-M uqaffatf offers
a unique explanation for the incidents which led to such actions. He
affirms that corruption had spread widely amongst Christian offic ia ls of
that time. The Patriarch Inba Zakharius, he states, sold Bishoprics and
Priesthoods to anyone wealthy enough to pay the price. A certain priest
named Yunis desired to become a Bishop, but was not suffic iently wealthy
and the Patriarch refused to support him. Yunis submitted a petition to
al-Hakim  denouncing the practice of bribary which was rife  amongst 
*
ecclesiastic circles. A l-Hakim  at once arrested the Patriarch and gave
148.
f  ^  M
the supervision of the revenue of his church to the State D iwan.
The importance of this report lies in the fact that Sbn al-Muqaffa*
was a semi-contemporary chronicler and himself was a Bishop, aware
of what was happening inside the o ffic ia l circles of the Church. It is
also necessary to point out that Ibn al-M uqaffac does not seem to have
recorded this report for personal reasons* He speaks highly of the
Patriarch and says that it  happened because he was overruled by his
friends and fam ily members who desired to make a fortune by selling
Bishoprics and priesthoods. ^ 1
Antaki says that the confiscation included only the revenues of 
162the churches in Migr. He adds that the revenues were put under a l-
Hakim's name in the State's Diwan and not added to the treasury and *    ,ib
163were later restored without any loss to the church o ffic ia ls . This
strengthens the indication that such actions by al-Hakim  were isolated
*
and temporary and merely an attempt to punish what he seems to have con­
sidered injustice even inside ecclesiastic circles which were a part of his 
State.
161. Sbn a l-M uqaffa*, IS, 127 f f .
162. Antaki, 194.
163. Antaki, 219,
The destruction of the churches appears to have been a
*  M .
punishment for those who seem to have ignored al-Hakim's orders and
*
persistently disobeyed them. Cruel and severe it  may seem, but such 
attitudes were a standard treatment by him against those whom he con­
sidered offenders of the law. According to Muslim law, Ahl ai-Dhimma 
were prohibited from holding ritual ceremonies publicly,/ from raising their 
voices loudly when praying, and even from ringing their church bells 
loudly. If these injunctions were disobeyed Muslim authorities had hthe
right to treat the offenders as dwellers in Par al-Harb and not as Ahl Dhimma 
164-in Dar al-lslam  . Antaki gives some valuable and interesting details
' " "  T - l - ^  - - 1 L -  ■ 4
about the manner in which Christians celebrated their annual ceremonies.
From his account if  would appear that they persistently ignored prescribed
rules for Dhimmi behaviour and opposed a number of ai-Hakim 's orders con-1 ■ ■ 1 1 •
165cerning their ritual ceremonies. He prohibited their parades during
I ^
Easter and Epiphany and ordered them to conform, but his orders seem to 
have been completely ignored when a multitude of Christians gathered in 398/ 
1007 in Jerusalem to celebrate Easter.
164. al-Qalqashandi, X III, 356;ff; a i-N abuls i, 139 f f .  Fora
general discussion see Triffon, Muslim Caliphs, and A .  FattaJ
le  Sfafut Legal.
165. A n tak i, 194.
166. A ntaki, 193-6; lt t i* a z ,  annos, 398-404.
150*
Yet another reason was probably the influence of Muslim
advisers who doubtless emphasised and convinced him that the
Christians had ignored him and disgraced Islam and Muslims by their
parades and ritual displays in Jerusalem. Most of the sources say that
al-Hakim  had enquired about the relative significance of Qiyama with
Easter. His Da* i Khatgin, who is considered by Bar Hebraeus as “Aman
167who hated Christians" replied that, "Every year Christians from a ll 
parts of the world gather in that church while its monks perform fraudulent
practises and pretend to produce what they call *Holy Fire*. This fire
168is made to appear as a miracle from G od ." It was after this that a l-
169Hakim ordered the destruction of Q iyama.
«  in
As a result of al-Hakim's order to demolish Q iyama, a wave of 
anti-Christian feeling mounted. A number of churches were pulled down, 
but whether he ordered the destruction of these churches or not is very
167. Bar H ebraeus, Chronographia, 184.
168. Itt i*a z , anno, 398.
169. Whilst Christian chroniclers, with the exception of Bar Hebraeus
do not mention this story, Muslim sources relate i t  and most of
them agree that the practices of the monies, which they consider 
as a disgrace to Islam, was the cause of the destruction of the 
Qiyama. See Ibn ai-SabP quoted by Sfbt , f o l . 195 ff; Ibn 
a l-Q a lan is i, 68; al-Dhahabl, sUbgr, HI/ 66-7; Ibn Kafhir, X I,
339; a l-Y a fi* i,  II, 429. Sibt, fo l,  195 ff, adds that Saladin
had contemplated demolishing Qiyama for the same reasons but was 
disuaded because of possible reprisals against Muslims and their 
Mosques inside Christian territories. C f. M . Canard, “La Destruction 
de I'Eglise de la Resurrection par le Calife Hakim", Byzantioir ^  35 (1965), 
16 f  f .
151.
d iff ic u lt to determine. Chroniclers1 reports on this issue lack
accuracy and are sometimes self “ contradictory. The majority of them
state that a I “ Hakim ordered the destruction of a il churches in his
170Empire in 398/1007 and they were destroyed, but according to 
the reports of Antaki and Maqrizi only eight churches were destroyed
and many churches were s till in existence after al-Hakim 's hostility
171 ___
was lifted , although both Antaki and Maqrizi adopt the first
statement. Concerning the churches which were actually destroyed,
only Antaki and Maqrizi give details. While Antaki considers the • .
172actions to have been the result of o ffic ia l orders by al-HQkim,
*
7 "  . . 1 7 3Maqrizi fails to c la rify  this point. Hence i t  is possible that when
a l“ Hakim o ffic ia lly  ordered the destruction of Qiyama, fanatical Muslims
took advantage of the situation and expressed their hatred of Christians
17*4by pulling down their churches and looting their property. Similar
attacks resulting from such reasons are reported to have occurred during
170. A n ta k i,,204 says: " ° r~ J 7^  '- k  -J
Ibn a l-A th lr, IX, 46 says: 
j  Sibt, fol .206 and quoted by Ibn Taghri BirdF, i v
Nujurn, IV, 177 says: 11 ^  ^  /  \
al-Dhahabi, Mbaf/ HI, 66, a I-Y a fi< i, II, 429, s a y / 0 >>
", , __ "  p S  i  {}i \ p  cj/i xf' f  ■® c , *
Ibn a l“ Dawadari, IV, 259 f f . c r  * 'F iY ic  }  j  7
l t ti*a%, anno, 403, says: n £ * 0 6  ^ £ ^ 3
171. Antaki, 194-200, 204, 230; IttF a z , annos, 398-404 and K h ita t,
II/5 0 J -5 2 0 . *  “
172. Antaki, 194-204.
Hti^ag/ annos, 398-403.
174. Antaki, 195.
152.
175 -
other periods of Muslim history. AI-Hakim , however, is reported
176to have issued orders prohibiting Muslims from such action. But 
whether that was because he did not orig inally allow  if  or because he 
feared similar action Ggainst the Muslims under Christian rule, is again 
not clear. Later he gradually became more tolerant and permitted the 
rebuilding of destroyed churches.
The Severity of other Measures
O nly Antaki and Maqrizi give details concerning the enforce-
ment of the Ghiyar and the restriction imposed on Ahi al-Dhimma between
the years 395/1004 -  404/1013. In the reports of both chroniclers, it  is
clear that the orders were repeated each year and as time went by they
became more severe. As M . Canard point's out, this repetition of the
177orders indicates that they were probably not obeyed, and since a ll 
reports show the egoism of al-Hakim , particularly when he was disobeyed, 
the resulting severity was most like ly  a retaliation against the offenders,
fclM.
Whatever the reasons were for imposing the Ghiyar on Ahl a l-  
178Dhimma, the fact* remains that i t  was to distinguish them from Muslims.
175. Khitat, I I,  512 ff.
176. Antaki, 197; ibn a l-Q a lan is i, 68; ifti<a%, anno, 398.
177. M . Canard, “al-Hakim Bi A m rillah11, E .1 /
•  ■  ■
178. If is very d iff ic u lt to define the original reasons for imposing the 
Ghiyar on Ahl al-Dhimma, but ?t may be that security measures 
were the main cause. Muslim leaders who conquered a vast land 
inhabited by Christians and Jews may have fe lt i t  necessary,for the 
security of their newly established State, to distinguish between 
Muslims and non-Muslims.
153.
The first decree of al-Hakim in 395/1004 ordered them only to wear 
the Ghiyar when they appeared in public to emphasise that they were 
Jews and Christians and not Muslims. When they did not obey this 
order, punishment followed. He decreed that to wear the Ghiyar was 
not enough and that a further symbol for their religions should be carried 
on their person -  a cross for the Christian and a piece of wood to be 
carried by the Jews was added to the order. When this was also ignored, 
the order was again emphasised. A larger cross and a larger piece of 
wood were ordered and a ll Ahl al-Dhimma were forbidden to ride on the 
backs of horses; mules or donkeys only, with undecorated saddles, were 
allowed for their transport. Boats manned by Muslims were also forbidden 
to them. When further disobedience was reported, al-Hakim  permitted
m
Muslims to spy upon them and report to the police about offenders. He 
also threatened to dismiss every disobedient Dhimmi from the offices of the
State and began a census of Muslim Kuffab who would be capable of
179replacing them. Eventually Ahl al-Dhimma seem to have realised
the stubborn determination of al-Hakim and that his orders should be
*
stric tly  observed and at last they began to accept his measures. Those who 
found if  intolerable applied for permission to leave the country. A l-Hakim
tsm
issued a decree permitting any Dhimmi to leave the Fatimid Empire safeguarded,
179. A ntaki, 203.
154
and with his properties and belongings, as has been mentioned before.
Those who decided to remain in Egypt either adopted Islam or kept their
own faith but gave complete obedience to the law. Later on, the
severity of the measures wc;s lifted . Even those who had adopted Islam
and wished to return fa their previous faith were permitted to do so on the
condition that they should wear the Ghiyar and obey the law of Islam
when practising their religious functions.
If the measures taken by al-Hakim  were merely to distinguish
*
Dhimmis by their religious fa ith , which they themselves seem to have
been proud of and very determined to keep, it  is strange that they
opposed al-Hakim*s less harsh measures which caused them to be used 
*
more severely. I f  may have been that because Ahl al-Dhimma, mainly 
Christians, were a large part of the Egyptian population, too rich , too 
powerful and too prominent, they were socially and administratively playing 
a leading role in the po litica l life  of the country. They probably resented 
any kind of restriction that would affect their prestige. The ensuing 
enforcement of the new laws was a grave challenge to their position. If 
abolished their prestige and even curtailed a part of their freedom as 
ordinary citizens. They were not even free to choose their own dress,
180. Antaki, 231; Ibn al-Muqaffa<, SI, 135-7.
155.
could no longer employe Muslim servants or take slave girls as 
concubines. Worst of a ll was the humiliation and ill-treatm ent 
they began to receive from the hostile Muslim c r o w d s Dhimm? 
offic ia ls, who were numerous, undoubtedly encouraged their co­
religionists to ignore the orders and probably managed to convince 
the police not to be hard on them for offending the law in that respect.
If is noticeable that there is no information which suggests that a group 
o f Dhimmis were punished for their disobedience of these laws when it  
is confirmed that such disobedience had actually occurred, it  has been 
already mentioned that in 403/1012 al-Hakim o ffic ia lly  permitted the 
Muslim public to see that Ahl al-Dhimma observed his orders, which 
indicates that he no longer trusted his officia ls for that purpose.
St is very d iff icu lt to give a satisfactory account of the
results of this policy of a l-Hakim . Chroniclers* reports are very brief
182and lack accuracy. Apart from the destruction of the churches, there 
was nothing else of significant importance. The Dhimmi staff of the
financial administration had retained their positions after either adopting
181. See Antaki, 194-224; Ibn al-Muqaffa*, II, 125-140; M ajid, al-Hakim , 95
182, Antaki, 203-4; 207; ibn al-Sabf quoted by Sibt, f o l . 206 f f ;
Ibn a!-Muqaffa<, II, 130-40; Ibn a l-Q a lan is i, 68; Ibn a I- 
Z a fir , fol L 63; Ibn a l-A th ir, IX , 46,^131; Sibt, fo l.  195Jf; 
al-Dhahabj, * Ibar, III ,  66; Sbn Kathir, X I, 339; a l-Y a fi* i,
I I,  429; Ibn Ayas, I, 53.
156.
”  183Islam or obeying al-Hakim *s orders, thus the financial administra-
*
tion did not seem to have suffered any setbacks, This is supported by 
the fact that there is no information which suggests that financial crises
had occurred as a result of al-Hakim's suppression of Ahl al-Dhimma.
*  J ' n"  " I_  - J
A number of families of both Jewish and Christian communities migrated
from the Fatimid Empire*
This attitude of al-Hakim  had undoubtedly enhanced his
reputation and increased his popularity amongst the Muslim masses* Ibn
al-Q alanis i says that when he ordered the destruction of Qiyama, Muslims
184held long prayers of thanksgiving* St is also apparent in a ll reports
of Muslim chroniclers that his suppression of Ahl al-Dhimma was the most 
appreciated action he had ever undertaken.
183. Antaki, 203-4.
184. Ibn a l-Q a la n is i, 68.
157.
CHAPTER IV
THE EXTERNAL POLICIES OF AL-H AKIM
*
His Policy towards the <Abbas?d Empire
Since the inception of their movement,, the Fatimids aimed at 
the overthrew of the ‘ Abbasid rule and the establishment of their 
suzerainty over the entire Muslim world, Maghrib was the first step 
towards this, followed by their conquest and movement into Egypt, from 
where they hoped to plan and deal the final blow to their enemies in 
Baghdad. But as the Fatimid conquest progressed towards the east i t  was 
met w ith a fierce opposition in Syria. The Qaramita, who dominated the 
southern parts of.Syria and received at times a tribute from the rulers 
of Damascus, found in the conquering Fatimid troops a serious rival that 
threatened their interests in the area. Although they had fought the
M  M
<Abbasids for the lsma‘ i l i  cause, when their interests conflicted with those 
of the Isma* i l i  Imam, they stood against him. The <Abbasid Caliph found 
in his erstwhile onemies, the Qaramita, a very convenient force which he 
supported in Syria hoping that they would be able to ha lt the advance 
of the Fatimid troops towards his cap ita l. The Qaramita succeeded in 
defeating the overconfident Maghribi troops and remained in Syria for 
a number of years, crippling the expansion of the Fatimid power towards
158.
Baghdad, ^
Two factors occurred during this struggle and had far-reaching
effects upon the situation. The sudden death of Imam al-Mu< iz , who
was succeeded by his son ai-< A z iz , and the introduction of the Turkish
and Daylamite element into the Fatimid army, to whom rank and power
were given, creating riva lry  between the chiefs of both the new and old
elements. In consequence, the progress of the Fatimid power was halted,
the spirit of its fighting troops was weakened and the idea of a quick
conquest of the eastern parts of the Muslim world was substituted by a
desire for a lasting settlement in Egypt, a concentration on internal
affairs and finding solutions for the problems which had already been
2disturbing their suzerainty in Syria and Palestine.
A l-Hakim 's dreams of conquering a ll parts of the Muslim world 
were as ambitious of those of his grandfather ai-M u* iz . The difference
1. See A ntaki, 139 ff; Ibn a l-Q a lan is i, 1 ff; Ibn a i-Z a fir , fo l.  49 ff;_ 
ibn a l-A th ir , V III, 242 ff; Ibn Khaldun, IV, 48 ff; Ibn Taghri B ird i, 
Nujum, IV, 74 ff;  i t f i* a z , 248 f f .  For discussion on the Qaramita 
see M .J . de Goeje, Memoire sur les Carmathes du Bahrain et les 
Fatimids, Leyden, 1886; S .M . Stern, "Ismailis andQarmatians11 in 
L^elaboration de 1 "Islam, (1961), 99 f f .
M  M
2 . See the death-bed advice of Ya*qubjbn K iliis  in al-Rudhrawari,
185; Ibn al^Q alanisi, 32; Ib n a l-Z a fir ,  fo l.  54; Ibn a l-A th ir, 
ibn a l-Jaw zi, al-Muntazam, V II, 56; Ibn Khallikan, IV , 359; 
Khltat, I I ,  7.
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between them was the method. W hile a I "Mu* iz relied more on the
•m.
power of his strong army to achieve his dreams, al-Hakim , perhaps due
to circumstances, employed the power of the Isma* i l i  Da*wa» In addition,
3
he used the most effective weapon to gain support -  the gifts o f money*
Since both regimes, the Fatimid and the * Abbasid, fa iled to 
settle their dispute in the battlefie ld and neither of them appeared capable 
of conquering the others1 land, they entered a period of cold war where 
propaganda was the main weapon.
Although chroniclers' reports are very brief and can hardly give a
M
satisfactory picture of this issue, i t  appears that al-Hakim  was planning
*
to in filtra te  the ‘ Abbasid Empire. With the aid of his active and effic ient 
Da* Is he endeavoured to create a popular ground, which he would be able 
to use to overthrow the ‘ Abbasids. Special efforts were made to convert 
the chiefs o f tribes and heads of principalities under * Abbasid rule, such as
Mahmud of Ghazna, Qirwash a l-*U qay li and *A li a l-Asadi, to the Fatimid cause A
3. Antak], 206; Ibn a l- ja w z l, a l-Munta%am, V II, 251; al-DhqhaEt, Tarikh 
a I-Is lam, anno, 4Q3*
4. See A ntaki, 206, who speaks of al-Hakim's attempts to win the_ 
loyalty of provincial rulers in the ‘ Abbasid Empire. Ibn a l-A th ir,
1X^92; Ibn a i-Jaw zi, al-Muntazam , V II, 249 ff; ai-Dhahabi,
Tarikh ai-ls lam , anno, 40b  Ibn al-Dawadari, V I, 283; ltti*a%, 
anno, 401; IbnTaghri Birdi, Nujum, IV , 224; Nuwayri, fol *J56;
Abu al-F?da, I I ,  140,_all speak of his endeavour to gain Qirwash's_ 
support. Ibn a l-Jaw zi, al-Muntazam, V II, 262; al-Dhahabi, Tarikh 
a i-ls lam , anno, 403; I bn taghrt Birdi, Nujum, IV , 232, mention
his communication w ith Mahmud of Ghazna. Nuwayri, fol * 56, 
speaks of ‘ Al? al-Asadi's declaration of loyalty to a l-Hakim .
160.
It is noticeable that the most e ffic ient and distinguished Da* is of the 
isma* i l i  Pa <Wa at that time were assigned to operate inside the 
‘ Abbasid Empire. Khatgin, whom al-Hakim chose later to be the general 
Director of the whole Da* wa, (Da* j a l-D u*q t) was operating in Iraq
5
at the court of the Buyids, who were the true rulers of the ‘ Abbasid Empire.
A l-K irm an i, whose t it le  H u jja ta l-*  iraqayryfjuiia of Iraq and Western
Persia,indicates the area of his operations. According to the Isma* i l i
literature concerning the hierarchal system of the Da* wa, where a Hujja
operated as Da* i Jazira (Da* ? of an island) as in the case of Kirmani,
a number of one thousand four hundred and forty Pa* is would be
operating under his supervision^ It may be that such numeration, in the
Isma* i l i  literature, is not accurate or is perhaps exaggerated for the
purpose of propaganda, but it  s till indicates that there was a large number
of e ffic ien t and skilled Da* is working for the Fatimid movement inside
the ‘ Abbasid Empire. Since the activities and movement of these Da*fs
were kept in deep secrecy, i t  is not surprising that so lit t le  is known about
the areas of their assignments and the difficulties they faced. But i f  is
possible to suggest that the junctions of commercial routes, key towns
and cities wh^ro large numbers of Muslims met, were their main targets.
This i was nicknamed al~*A<^udi (Ibn a l-Q a lan is i, 67) which 
meant that he was in the court of *Adud al-Daw la, the Buyid prince.
6. SeeATam ir, Arba * Rasa* j I jsma * i I ?y ya, 12 ff; M .K . Husaynjn 
his introduction to Diwan al-Mu*ciyyad f i  a l-D in , 54; M . Ghalib,
A* lam al-tsma* i iiyya , 22 f f .
Soon the results of the well organised propaganda began to
emerge. The Shi*a of Iraq, even those of the twelvers group ( I thna
‘ Ashariyya) began to look to al-Hakim as their desired C aliph. In 398/
1007,and in Baghdad itself during a quarrel with Sunnis, they shouted
slogans for al-Hakim (Ya Hakim Ya Mansur).^
In 401/1 OlO a significant event in the Fatimid and ‘ Abbasid
relations of that time occurred. Qirwash Ibn Muqallad, the chief of the
‘ Uqayl tribe and Governor of Musi I, Mada? in, Anbar and Kufa, acknowledged
the Fatimid Caliphate instead of the ‘ Abbasid, He read the Khutba in the
name of al-Hakim  and struck al-Haktm k name on the coinage and flags 
•  *
8 “  — throughout his p rinc ipa lity . Also, in the same year,‘ A li a l-A sad i, chief
of the tribe of Banu Asad, declared his loyalty to al-Hakim  in H illa  and
• •
9the district which was under his r u le /
The declaration of the Fatimid Caliphate in places on the doorstep 
of Baghdad infuriated the ‘ Abbasid Caliph. He immediately began 
preparations to campaign against Qirwash. A large army, under the 
leadership of al-ljusayn Ibn Ja‘ far, known as ‘ Amid al-Juyush, was called
7. Ibn a l-Jaw zi, al-Muntazam, VIS, 237 f f;  Ibn Kathir, X I, 339; 
a l-Y a fi‘ i ,  M i/c3f a l-J inan, III ,  494.
8 . See supra, note 4 . Special details on the Khutba are given by Ibn 
a l-Jaw zi, al-Mluniazam, VSI, 249 ff; ibn TaghrT Birdi, Nujum, IV, 
224 f f .
9 . See Nuwayri, fo l.  56.
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r . . .  10For this purpose.
Fearing reprisals and without Fatimid m ilitary support, Qirwash
was forced to recite the name of the ‘ Abbasid Caliph in the Khufba and
11repudiate his loyalty to a l-Hakim ,
If is strange that al-Hakinrvwho had been very anxious to gain the
*
loyalty of tribal chiefs like Qirwash, did not attempt to defend his friend 
against the ‘ Abbasid Caliph, knowing that Qirwash alone would have no 
chance of success. If is possible that he was not sure of Qirwash !s sincerity; 
or was it  perhaps because he was not too sure of the power of his own 
army? Chroniclers fa il to give a satisfactory explanation. Although 
Qirwash may have been, like other Bedouin chiefs in the area, loyal to no- 
one except himself, there are reasons to suggest that he might have been 
genuinely sincere in his attempt to depose the ‘ Abbasid sovereignty and 
acknowledge that of the Fatimids.
A fte r the death of ‘ Adud al-Dawla (the Shi‘ i prince of the Buyid 
dynasty, who was the real ruler of the ‘ Abbasid Caliphate), in 372/982 the 
position of the 5hi‘ a in the ‘ Abbasid Empire began to deteriorate. The 
decline of the Buyids, which followed his death, accompanied with the 
growth of power of the Sunni Saljuqs in the army, offered the ‘ Abbasid 
Caliph an opportunity to restore some of his own power. Subsequently
10. Ibn Taghri Bird?, Nujum , IV, 227 f f .
11, See supra, notes 4, 8, 10.
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after a long time of absence, he appeared to play an effective role
in po litica l events. A part of his activities was to exert pressure on the
"  12 . -  Shi*a group. Qirwash descended from a family which professed the
i  13Shi* i doctrine. His father, a l-M uqallad, was known as an extreme Shi* i .
When in 380/990 his uncle al-Musayib succeeded in taking over the 
Governorship in Musi I, he acknowledged the Fatimid Caliphate instead
14of the*Abbasid. Denouncing the Sunn? Caliph of Baghdad and declaring 
loyalty to the 5h i*i Caliph of Cairo would enhance Q irwash's prestige 
amongst the Shi*a in Iraq. They might even turn towards him for leader­
ship since the popularity of the Buyids had begun to fade.
If may be that the real reason for al-Hakim !s failure to support 
Qirwash was the weakness of his army. The m ilitary power of the Fatimid 
State was much weaker than before. In 390”*393/999-1001 it  failed to ensure 
the Fatimid suzerainty over Tripoli in North A frica , In 396-397/1005-1006 
i f  almost failed to defend the very existence of the Fatimid Caliphate against 
Abu Rakwa. In 401/1010 if failed even to control the Bedouins of Palestine,
12. A study of the reports of al-Rudhrawad, Dhayl Tajarab ql-Umqm, 
proves th is . See also al-Dhahabi, Tarikh al-lslcim, annos, 395-405;
Ibn Tahgri Birdj, Nujum, IV , 65, 206, 210, 218. More details^in the 
annual reports of Ibn d l-Jaw zi, al-Muntazam/  Sibt Ibn a l-Jaw zi, M i/a t ;  
Ibn Kafhlr; a l-Y afi* i,  M ir*at a 1-Jinan concerning the years 372-400,
13. Ibn Taghri B irdi, Nujum, IV, 202.
14. See al-Dhahabi, Tarikh al-Islam, anno, 390; Ibn Khallikan, III ,  525 ff; 
a l-Safadi, fol .101; jl>n tag h ff Birdi, Nujum , IV, 116. See also Ibn 
al-Sab?*, Dhayl Tajarub al-Umam, 390, who says that in 391/1000 
ai-M uqallad was planning to take over power in Baghdad itse lf.
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This is in addition to its continuous failure to put Aleppo under Cairo's 
direct contro l. These events may haee convinced al-Hakim that his army was 
not strong enough to meet the ‘ Abbasid forces on the doorstep of Baghdad.
The ‘ Abbasid Caliph, who was alarmed when the Fatimid propaganda 
achieved such success inside his Empire, desired to retaliate against a l-  
Hdkim using the same weapon. In 402/1011 he gathered a considerable 
number of learned men to his court and commanded them to declare in a 
written manifesto that the Fatimids of Maghrib and Egypt were imposters
whose claim of ‘ A lid  descent was false. St even accused them of aiming
-  15at the destruction of Islam and Mulsims. If is noteworthy that, since the
claim of ‘ A lid  descent was the core of the Fatimid propaganda, this mani­
festo created a serious challenge to its success. If bore the signature of a 
number of ‘ A lid  dignitaries and learned men in Iraq and was circulated 
and read in every Mosque of the ‘ Abbasid State. Indeed, it  created a doubt 
over the Fatimid descent which up to the present time, historians have failed 
to determine. In addition, the ‘ Abbasid Caliph hired theologians and 
paid them large sums of money to write books in contradiction of the Fatimid 
cause and their d o c tr in e .^
15. For details on the manifesto, see Ibn a l-A th ir, IX , 98; Ibn a l-Jaw zi, 
al-M untazam , V II, 255; al-Dhahabi, Tarikh a l-ls la m , anno, 401, 
and ‘ [bar i l l ,  76 ff; a ljS a fad i, quotes Sibf Ibn a l-Jaw zi, a l-W a fi, 
f o l , 17; Ibn Taghri Birdi, Nujum, IV, 229; Abu a l-F ida , SI, 142. For 
discussion see Mamour, Folemics on the O rig in of the Fatimids, and
H . I.  Hasan, The Fatimids in Egypt, where both 
hisforiansjJiscuss the conflicting opinions of most modern scholars.
16. Ibn Taghri Birdi, Nujum, IV, 236.
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The war of propaganda continued and al-Hakim , in 403/1012,
contacted Mahmud, the powerful prince of the Ghaznavid dynasty.
Chroniclers say that he asked him to join the Fatimid Da‘ wa and declare
I ?
his loyalty to a l-Hakim . Mahmud, with his powerful and well organised 
*  *
18 -  army ,  seems to have appeared to al-Hakim as the ideal a lly  whose
support, i f  secured, would bring about the overthrow of the * Abbasids and
spread the Fatimid sovereignty over the Eastern parts of the Muslim world.
Unfortunately for the hopes of the Fatimid Imam, Mahmud of Ghazna does
not appear to have been interested in joining in the Fatimid Pa*wa . He was
an extreme Sunni and there seems to have been no reason for him to acknow-
19ledge the Fatimid Caliphate instead of the ‘ Abbasid. He fla tly  refused
al-Hakim's offers and, as some chroniclers state, "sent the letters of com-
20munication, after fearing them up, to the Caliph of Baghdad.1
Chroniclers1 reports on this issue are very brief and hardly offer 
any explanation for the reasons which made al-Hakim contact an extreme 
Sunni Suljan and ask him to change his faith and allegiance. Is i t  possible
17. Ibn a l-Ja w z i, al-Muntazam, VSB, 262; a l-Phahabi, Tarikh 
a l-ls lam , anno/403; Ibn Taghri Birdi, N ujum, IV, 232,
18. C .E . Bosworth, "Ghaznavid m ilitary organisation11, Isl, 1960
(Band, 36, N o . 1-2), 37 f f .
19. C .E . Bosworth, The Ghaznavid, Edinburgh, 1963, 50 f f .
20. See supra, note 17.
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■m u* «w
that Mahmud, a t some time, had shown some response to the Isma* t il
Da* is ? Or was i f  a mere plot by al-Hakim to scare the ‘ Abbasid 
  •
Caliph and create some dispute between him and Mahmud from which he 
could only benefit, it  is also like ly  that if  was a po litica l manoeuver to 
.protect the Eastern Persian principalities which csympathised with the 
Fatimids from the growing danger of the Ghaznavid power. The tenth 
century had seen the triumph of po litica l Shi* ism over many areas of the 
Muslim Empire. In the Iranian world Shi* ism was widely spread amongst
the population. Even a number of ruling dynasties professed Shi* i doctrine
21  -  r  ~  -  
openly. The Isma* i l i  Da* is were very active and achieved a significant
success there.
The rise of the young and vigorous Ghaznavid regime was a threat 
to Shi* ism and in particular to the interests of the Isma* i l i  Da*wa. There­
fore al-Hakim  may have endeavoured to win Mahmud's friendship, i f  not 
loyalty, and thus ensure the interests of his Da*wa in the Eastern parts of the 
Islamic w orld .
A l-Hakim 's attempt, however, did not only fa il,  but seems to have 
provoked Mahmud's anger. He intensified his actions against the Ssma* ilis
21. See C .E . Bosworth, The Ghaznavids, 51 f f .  See also S .M . Stern,
"Ismaili Propaganda and Fatimid Rule in Sind", I .C . ,  (G et. 1949), 
298-307; Lewis, "Ismaili N ote j’, B .S ,O .A » S „ X II (1948), 599 f f  
A .M . Hamdani, The Ismaili Da*wa in NortTiern India, Cairo, 1956.
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and sympathisers of the Fatimid cause. For this reason he became the
22defender of the faith and hammer of heretics in the eyes of the Sunnis,
23but according to the Isma* ilis , the enemy of God and the true believers.
Towards the end of his reign, al-Hakim's concentration on winning
*
support inside the ‘ Abbasid Empire began to decline. This was probably 
because of the division amongst the Ssma*ili Da* is in Egypt. For that
reason, al-Hakim  summoned to Cairo the chief Da* i of Iraq and Western
•  1 '  " r " ' T ‘ "
Persia -  a l-K irm an i. Subsequently the activities of the Da* is underwent a 
period of weakening. His method, however, was later adopted by his 
successors and in 448/1056 the Da* is .achieved a significant success 
when in Baghdad itself the Khutba was read, for over a year, in the name 
of the Fatimid Bmam-C aliph.
Ai-Hakim's Policy concerning Aleppo
Aleppo, the great centre of Northern Syria, was of vita l importance 
to a ll Muslims because of its proximity to Byzantium, the traditional enemy 
of Islam and one which remained beyond the reach of the Caliphs. The 
fourth/ten th century had witnessed a number of significant changes in the 
history of Aleppo; the decline of the ‘ Abbasid direct control over the area; 
the establishment of the semi-independent State of the Hamdanids; the
22. C .E . Bosworth, The Ghazanvids, 51 f f .
u r  ^  Tsi m *
23. See Kirmani, Risalat al-Mabasim wa al-Bisharat, published by 
M .K . Husayn in Ta* ifa t a l-D ruz, 55.
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revival of the power of Byzantium and the arrival of the Fatimids and
their conquest of Egypt and Syria (Bilad aNShacn). Towards the
middle of the century/ the Byzantines became very active in Northern
Syria. Their continued and successful raids threatened the stab ility
of the area and forced the Hamdanids to pay tribute to the Byzantine
Emperor. The situation was so d iff icu lt for the Muslims of Northern
Syria that al-Mu< iz , the Fatimid Caliph/ was able to exp lo it if  for
propaganda purposes. The general policy of the early Fatimid Caliphs
was not to a llow , i f  they could prevent it ,  dynastic rule to exist in the
provinces of their Empire, especially provinces in the centre of the
Muslim world which were of vita l importance. Such a rule was undoubtedly
the first sign of decline in vast Empires. This could be seen in a l-
Mu^iz's attitude towards the Hamdanids of A leppo. His plan was to
abolish their rule and put the c ity  under his direct contro l. He said when
he arrived in Egypt, that he did not come to add more land to his
24Empire, but to protect Muslims and Islam from the Byzantines. This
was an indirect hint and tactical propagands manoeuver aiming to
f
prepare pfhe populace *s acceptance for the abolition of the Hamdanids 
rule in A leppo. The Hamdanids seem to have been aware of the Fatimid
24. Itti*a%, 148 f f .
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plans and tried to counter them in a shrewd way. As soon as the 
Fatimid troops succeeded in conquering Damascus, they declared 
their loyalty to al-Mu< iz and sont a delegation to Egypt to con­
gratulate Jawhar (the chief commander of the Fatimid army) for the 
successful conquest. By this they aimed at placing the Fatimid Imam 
in an embarrassing situation which would help to preserve their ru le. 
Since they were on his side and prepared to support his war against 
Byzantium, there would be no reason for him to abolish their ru le, and 
thus they would be able to retain their province and re ly on Fatimid 
troops to defend i f .  But the Fatimid Imam was even more shrewd. He
wrote to Jawhar commanding him to welcome the delegate but not to
25give any promises.
Both the Hamdanids and al~Mu< iz seem to have over-estimated 
the power of the Fatimid army. Ensuring Fatimid suzerainty in Southern 
Syria, which would be accomplished before any movement to the north, 
was not an easy task. A l-M u* iz died before he was able to achieve i f .  
His successor, a l-^A z iz , spent a considerable number of years of his 
reign fighting for i t  and thus the army which was anticipated to march 
towards Aleppo after the conquest of Damascus in 360/970 was never able
25. Itfi^a^ , 141, and Khitaj-, 1, 352.
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to create a serious challenge to Aleppo before 383/993. During that 
time a number o f important developments occurred. Friendly relations 
began to emerge between the Byzantines and the ‘ Abbasid Caliphate,
26resulting in a signed agreement of ten years of non-aggress ion (Hudna) .
The strategy of Aleppo was realised more fu lly  by the Byzantines. They 
became more committed to the idea of keeping it  as a buffer State which
prevented them from direct confrontation with the Fatimids, rather than
27 -  .putting i t  under their direct contro l, The death of Abu a l-M a ‘ a li
Sa‘ d a l-Daw la, son of Sayf al-Dawla (the most famous ruler of the 
-  . 28Hamdanid dynasty) and the succession of his son Abu al-Fada’ il 
with whose rule began the end of the Hamdanids in A leppo. He was 
over-ruled by his Hajib Lulu, who planned and eventually succeeded
29in abolishing the Hamdanidsfldynastic rule in Aleppo and b u ilt his own.
-  30Despite the realistic advice of his Wazir Ya‘ qub Ibn K illis ,
a l-A z iz  decided to fo llow  his fatherfs po licy, which was to take Aleppo
by force, abolish its dynastic rule and put the province under his own direct
26. See al-Rudhrawari, Dhayl Tajarub al-Umam, 37.
27. For details and analysis, see S. Zakkar, The Emirate of Aleppo,
24 f f .
28. For details and discussion on Sayf a l-Daw ia, see M . Canard,
La Dynastie Des Hyamdan?des, Paris, 1953, I, 579 f f ,  and 
"Hamdanids” , E .1?
29. See M . Canard, La Dynastie des Hkimdanides, 1, 706 f f;
S. Zakkar, The Emirate of Aleppo, 30 f f .  See also "Hamdanids",
E .1.2 ---------------------------
control. His efforts went as far as besieging the c ity  but never con­
quering i t .  Defending Aleppo against direct Fatimid rule was a
31priority in Byzantine po litics .
The aims of al-Hakim's policy concerning Aleppo was the same 
as his father's, but his method was entirely different. He realised that 
by the present fore© of his army his aim would never be achieved and 
since he had no intentions of strengthening his army, then a different 
plan should be adopted, and tactical manoeuvers were the answer. The
m*
real power behind the rulers of Aleppo was Byzantium. A l-H akim  made 
peace with the Emperor and thus weakened their reliance on Byzantine 
help. He planned to create riva lry  and local wars between the rulers of 
Aleppo, and their rivals the Bedouin tribes in the area. This riva lry  would 
result in weakening the powers of a ll parties concerned and make the 
inhabitants feel insecure under their ru le . The Da‘ is o f al-Hakim 's 
propaganda would fake advantage o f the situation and convince the 
inhabitants that the only solution for their troubles would be the direct 
rule of the Fatimid Caliph. If the population of Aleppo demanded al-Hakim Js
31. A ntaki, 173 ff; Ibn a l-Q a lan is i, 27 f f ;  A .  Rustum, History of the
Byzantines, II, 50 f f ;  M . Canard, La Dynastie des H'arndanides, I, 715 ff; 
'The Byzantine Empire", Cambridge History, IV (Part I), 718 f f ;
A .A .  Vasiliev, History of the Byzantine Empire, I, 307 f f ;  G . Ostrogorsky, 
History of the Byzantine State, English translation by J . Hussey, 300 ff;
S. Zakkar, The Emirate of Aleppo, 24 f f .
direct rule, Byzantium would have no justifiable reason to interfere
since al-Hakim  had not violated the peace agreement*
The events which occurred in Aleppo after the death of its ruler
Lulu in 399/1008 facilita ted al-Hakim's policy and helped him to
achieve his goals. Lulu's son, Mansur, who succeeded his father,
was faced with a number of enemies: Abu a l-H ayja, the Hamdanid Prince
who came from Byzantium with Byzantine help to restore the rule of his
32ancestors; the Mirdasids, , the Kilabi tribe, which had been en­
couraged by al-Hakim  to menace and weaken the rule of Lulu and had 
been attempting to gain control over Aleppo.
A l-H akim , who did not want to support the Hamdanids in re­
gaining their province, did not agree to have a new dynasty of Lulu 
or the Mirdasids ruling Aleppo and planned as follows.
He supported Mansur against Abu al-Hayja and caused the latter's
33 — "defeat then encouraged the Mirdasids to fight Mansur who was fina lly
defeated. He fled from Aleppo leaving its citadel under the control of one
32. A fu ll account of the Mirdasids and their role in Northern Syria is 
given by S. Zakkar in his thesis, The Emirate of Aleppo.
33. A fter this defeat Mansur declared his loyalty to a l-Hakim . On 
this S. Zakkar comments: " i t  is noteworthy that Mansur Ibn Lulu
was the first ruler of Aleppo who acknowledged the Fatimid Caliphate 
instead of the ‘ Abbasid.11 (The Emirate of Aleppo, 42). This, 
however, does not appear to be consistent with the available reports 
of chroniclers, A considerable number of them suggest that on earlier 
occasions, rulers of Aleppo acknowledged the Fatimid Caliphate 
instead of the ‘ Abbasid. Ibn a l-A th lr, V III, 240; Ibn Taghri B ird i,
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of his Ghilman known as Fath, who was in secrect contact with . # •
al-Hakim , Al~H<3kim was pleased with this result and granted Salih,
*  «  *
the Mirdasid chief, the tit le  Asad al-Dawia (Lion of the State) and
34Fath the t it le  Mubarak al-Davvla (Blessed of the State). He commanded 
his troops in Syria to move towards Aleppo and prevent any agreement 
between Salih and Fath, because Salih had suggested to Fath that he
* •' t * «
should keep the citadel for himself and give the c ity  to the Mirdasids 
and thus unite their forces to defend Aleppo against the direct rule of Cairo.
The H$ia*ili Da* is operated very quickly in influencing the 
Ailepans to gather around the citadel and declare that they desired to be 
under the direct rule of the Fatimids. Fath, who appears to have been 
reluctant to decide, was offered the governorship of Tyre, Saydyn 
and Beirut, together with a ll treasures which the citadel of Aleppo contained
-  Nujum, IV , 58, say that Abu a l-M a ‘ a li declared the Khutba in
the name of a I-Mu* i^. This is confirmed by the reports of 
Maqrizi in l f t i ‘ az, 141, and Khifajy I, 352. Ibn Khali ikan, III,
525; al-Dhahabi, Tarikh al-BslQm, anno, 386; al-Safad], fo l.  iQ l; /  
Ibn Taghri Birdi, Nujum, IV, 116, a ll say
o j  O f course this does not necessarily 
mean that a l- ‘ A z lz  had actually conquered Aleppo, but it  strongly 
indicates that Aleppo was one of tho provinces where his name was 
recited in the Khutba. The deaih-bed advice of ibn K illis  also 
suggests that acknowledgement of the Fatimid Caliphate in Aleppo 
during a !- ‘ A ziz 's time was achieved.
34. For details of events which led to this see Antakj, 209 ff; Ibn ai-^Athir,
IX , 94 ff; Ibn a l - ‘ Adim, Zubat a l-H alab, I, 200 ff; Sibt, M irya t, fo l. 
201 ff; M . Canard, La Dynastie des Hamdanides, I, 708 ff; S. Zakkar, 
The Emirate of Aleppo, 30 f f .  See also artic le  "Hamdanids", E .1 ?
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and an additional honorary t it le .  He agreed, and the Fatimid troops
entered the c ity  after some minor clashes with the Mirdasids and thus in
the month of Ramadan 407/1017 the first Wal? appointed by a Fatimid
35
Caliph entered Aleppo. His name was Fatik and he was known as ‘ Aziz 
36a l-D aw la . A l-Hakim 's po licy after he took control over Aleppo was to
*
gain the confidence of the inhabitants and thus secure the loyalty of the
Aleppans and fac ilita te  the spread of his cause amongst them. He exempted
them from paying fax for a year and sent them free supplies from the stores
of the State, Ibn a f- ‘ Adim reports a decree addressed to the inhabitants of
Aleppo and signed by al-Hakim , which illustrates al-Hakim 's plan. The
• ,
decree says, "When Amir al-Mu<min?n (Commander of the Faithful) learned 
of the tyranny you suffer from the i l l  treatment by those who were in pov/er 
amongst you, burdening you with taxes and harsh duties out of a ll proportion 
to the ways of Islam, he, may God strengthen his power, has ordered 
supplies to be sent to you from the State's stores and to exempt you from 
the Kharaj until the year 407. By this you w ill know that the light of
37righteousness has risen and the darkness of tyranny has been dispelled."
35. See A n tak i, 216.• *
36. A ntak i, 216.
37. Ibn a l - ‘ Adim, Zubda, I, 214.
V /5*
Although the Byzantine Emperor was angered by the success of 
the Fatimid diplomacy, he did not break the non-aggression treaty.
His first reaction was directed against the inhabitants of the province 
of A leppo. He prohibited any kind of trade between them and the
Op
subjects of his Empire, Later he followed a similar line to that of
al-Hakim in order to restore Aleppo to its previous position. He main- 
*
tained good relations with the Mirdasids, perhaps in order to use them
against Fatik. Antaki says that the Emperor allowed his subjects to trade
-  . 39
only with the Mirdasids. But Fatik did not seem to have been in need of 
forceful persuasion to rebel against his master in Egypt. The remoteness 
of Cairo, the threats and offers of the Byzantine influence in the area and 
his personal ambitions to establish his own rule, made i t  easy for him to 
turn his back on a l-H akim . Shortly after his appointment he began to
p
behave as an independent ru le r. He dismissed the Walis and government 
offic ia ls appointed by al-Hakim and employed instead men of his own choice.
A t this stage al-Hakim  realised that force was necessary to keep 
his control over Aleppo and a show of power was needed to maintain his 
sovereignty in the province. He commanded his W alis in Syria to prepare
38. A ntaki, 214.
39. Antaki, 214.
40. Antaki, 216.
for an expedition against Fatik. A t the same time the Emperor of
Byzantium, who appears to have been determined to support his
interest, began moving his troops from the northern borders of his Empire
to the south, preparing himself for a showdown with the F a tim id s .4 1
The sudden death of al-Hakim prevented the two Empires from
*
breaking the peace which had lasted between them for more than twenty 
years.
His Policy concerning Damascus
Syria*s strategic position in the Middle East and its proximity to 
Egypt gave i t  great importance in the external policy of independent 
Egyptian rulers. Its complete control was vita l to the safety o f Egypt. St 
was through Syria that most conquerers came and occupied the land of the 
N ile . The nature of the land that connects the two countries makes Egypt 
a target for easy invasion. The traditional foreign policy of independent 
Egyptian rulers, therefore, was to put Syria, or part of if ,  under the ir
4
control and use i f  as a buffer State to protect their country from invasion.
A t the beginning of their era in Egypt, the Fatimid Imam-Caliphs 
did not pursue such a po licy . To them the conquest of Syria and even 
Egypt itself was a step towards the final goal which was the conquest of
41. Antaki, 239 f f ;  Ibn al~*Adim, Zubda, I, 218 f f .
•  i
42. See S. Zakkar, The Emirate of Aleppo, 30 f f .
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Iraq and the Eastern parts of the Muslim world. Since their advance
towards the East was halted and settlement in Egypt became imminent,
the traditional Egyptian policy began to materialise but w ith some
difference. Syria was not only a defence line but was also a garrison
from which Fafimid operations were launched against the‘Abbasids in
Baghdad. It was also the overland route to Arabia through which trade
and pilgrims* caravans crossed every year. Thus its importance to the
Fatimids was more than to other Egyptian rulers.
The Syrians, who were of Sunni majority and were once the main
supporters of the Umayyads, resented Fatimid Shi* i rule and were always
ready to rebel against i f .  Damascus, the centre of Southern Syria, was the
city  which caused more troubles to al-M u* iz and a l-* A z iz  than any other
43c ity  in their vast Empire. During the first three years of al-Hakim*s reign
two anti-Fatim id uprisings occurred. Thanks to the efforts of the capable
W a li, Jaysh Ibn al-Samsama, in 388/998 the rebellions in Damascus were
brought to an end. But Jaysh's method was to use force. A l-H akim ,
«
whose main aim was to win the loyalty, and not only the obedience, of the 
Syrians, seems to have realised that force was not the right method. His 
plan was to create a popular ground for his cause; people who believed in
43. For details see the accounts of Antaki, 134 ff;  Ibn a l-Q a lan is i,
3 ff;  Sbn Khaldun, IV , 48 ff; Ibn TaghrT Birdi, Nujum, IV , 32 ff; 
I t f i 'a z ,  173 f f .
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the Fatimici doctrine and would be prepared to figh t for i t .  This could
be achieved only i f  the ruler showed a sincere interest in the welfare
of the ruled. In order to ach ieve this, he adopted a line of policy
which served his purpose most. He paid a sincere attention to the welfare
of the Damascenes but did not underestimate their readiness to rebel and
took every precaution to prevent i f .  He chose men whose loyalty was
undoubted as governors of Syria. Amongst these were Jaysh Ibn a i“
Samsama, <AIi Ibn Falah, Tamsulaf Ibn Bakkar, Shatigin, Khatgin,
•  •  •  •
Bushara and *Abd al-Rahim Ilyas, his cousin and would-be successor
44to the Caliphate. He never appointed a Damascene as Wal? in 
Damascus, nor did he allow any W all to remain long enough to earn 
prestige for themselves which might lead to an attempt for independence. 
During his reign, a considerable number of Walis were sent there, some 
of whom were recalled after a few months. According to Ibn al-Qaianisi's 
account, twenty-one Walis were appointed during the twenty-two years of
"  . 45al-Hakim 's ru le . A l-H akim  was very cautious concerning his chosen
•  *
governors of Syria and although he appointed trusted men, he spied upon 
their activities and sometimes used subterfuges to examine their loya lty.
44. See details on jthe appointments of jhese Walis in the reports of
Ibn a l-Q a lan is i, 49 f f ;  and Maqrizi, ltti<az, annos, 386-405.
45* See Ibn a l-Q afan is i, 49 f f .  See also Antaki, 180-227 and Maqrizi,
it t i*q z , annos, 386-405, and Khijq}‘, I I,  285. Both chroniclers offer 
some information about the Walls appointed by al-IJakim .
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Antaki says that when al-Hakim began mistrusting his cousin and* ft
appointed heir *Abd al-Rahim, he dismissed him from the governorship 
of Damascus and commanded him to come to Egypt. But because *Abd 
al-Rahim obeyed the orders and moved towards Egypt, a command of re­
appointment was sent to him which he received in Ramla and from there
46 __he returned to Damascus. He did not hesitate to dismiss any Wall
who appeared to have misused his authority or if  the inhabitants had
complained against him. He dismissed ‘ A ll Ibn Falah when he was told
-  . . . 4 7that <Ali had expressed his dissatisfaction with the orders from Cairo.
Khatgin was dismissed because al-Hakim learned that the troops were not
•
48 —pleased with his conduct. Ibn al-Nahaw i was even executed when a l-
49Hakim was informed of his cruelty and i l l  treatment of the people. In
addition, al-Hakim  sent Dac is to the towns and villages of Syria to spread 
•  '
the lsma‘ i l i  doctrine. From the IsmaMli Manuscript A l-A zhar we learn
that Da* is were commanded, after graduation from Par a l-H ikm a, to go to
-  50Syria and explain to its people the teachings of the Imam.
46. See A ntaki, 227; Ibn a l-Q a lan is i, 70; Itt i^ a z , anno, 409.. r
47. Ibn a l-Q a lan is i, 57 ff; l t t iga z , anno, 392.
48. Ibn a l-Q a lan is i, 57; lf t i< a z , anno, 392.
49. Ibn a l-G a lan is i, 60; Itt i*a z , anno, 392, and Khitat, II,  31.
See quotations from "a l-Azhar11 on the biography of Pa* i 
Ahmad Ibn Ya*qub, known as "Abu al-Fawaris" in M . Ghdleb,
A 6 Iqm ai-lsmaf iliy ya , 126.
5 0 .
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Although the people of Damascus did not adopt lsmac 11 ism
and the majority remained Sunnis, the success of al-Hakim*s policy in
Syria cannot be denied. If was mostly due to his shrewd handling that,
throughout his rule, Damascus never rebelled. The spread of the
Fatimid doctrine in Syrian villages and towns was of significant
importance. St laid the foundation for a steady progress of the Da* wa
activities which resulted later in converting a considerable portion of
51
the population to the Isma* i l i  doctrine.
His Policy concerning a l-H ijaz
The po litica l significance of H ijaz was less than that of other 
parts of the Muslim Empire, such as Syria and Iraq, but it  was v ita lly  
important from a religious standpoint. The Holy shrines of Islam, Mecca 
and Madina, are so important to Muslims that some Muslim historians do 
not consider Caliphs as the rightful leaders of the Muslim Empire unless
52
their names were read in the Khutba in the Mosques of the Holy places. 
To the Fatimids, Hijaz meant something special; the most fac ilita ting  
place for propaganda function in a ll of the Muslim world. It was the only 
place where multitudes of Muslims from a ll corners of the Islamic land met
51. See B. Lewis, The Assassins, 98 f f .
52. a l-M as*udi, MUruj al-Phahab, I, 192; M ajid, al-Hakim , 149
every year during the pilgrimage season, i f  their Da* is could be
allowed to operate freely there, the service to their cause would
undoubtedly be tremendous, if  was in H ijaz during the pilgrimage
season, that the meeting between Abu *Abd A llah al~Shi< i and
the Kutami chiefs occurred, which later resulted in the establishment of
the Fa tim id State.
Since the early years of his reign, aI-Mu< iz had made special
efforts to gain the friendship of both the Hasanids and Kusaynids (the
two rival families in Hijaz for the supremacy of the Holy places). By
diplomacy and gifts of money, he succeeded in creating an atmosphere
of tolerance and friendship between the two families and peace was
53restored after a long term o f wars. As a result, the two families ack­
nowledged al-M u* iz*s goodwill and a bond of good gelations linked 
them with his Caliphate. This might have been the factor which contri­
buted to the o ffic ia l declaration of their loyalty to him as soon as
54Egypt and Syria fe ll to the commander of his army, Jawhar.
53. Ibn ‘ Idhari, 1, 221; jf t i*a z , 145; M ajid, al-Hakim, 150 ff;
M . Canard, “Fatimids11, £.3.2
54. If appears clear in the chroniclers1 reports that the 
declaration of loyalty to the Fatimids was a voluntary 
gesture on the part of the Sharif of Mecca. The Fatimids 
did not send any m ilitary force to conquer H ijSz.
182.
The acknowledgement of the Fatimid Caliphate in the Holy 
places of Islam gave a great moral support to the fimam-Caliphs through- 
out the Muslim Empire. St also offered them an opportunity to counter 
the propaganda of the e Abbasids, which had been throwing doubts over 
their sincerity as Muslims. St is recorded that the splendour and riches 
of the Imams had reached H ijaz since the Khutba was read in their 
names there.
Maqrizi speaks of extensive efforts made by al-M u* iz to send to
Mecca the most luxurious Kiswa ever made to cover the WA&fc sttwfe 
55Kag ba. Money was sent annually and regularly to be distributed to
the pious and poor peoples of the Holy cities on behalf o f the Fatimid
Caliph. Care and attention towards the welfare of the pilgrims were
-  56specially emphasised by the Fatimid imam.
The stragety of Hijaz as an ideal place for propaganda activities 
was the dominating factor in the planning of the Fatimid policy concerning 
the area. As long as the Khufrba was read in their name and their 
missionaries operated freely, their aim was considered achieved. They 
neither interfered with the internal affairs of the province nor tried to 
put i t  under their direct con tro l. Maintaining good relations w ith the
55. IttH az, 193.
56. See Sibt, Mi rat, fol „ 194 ff; Ibn Taghri Birdi, Nujum, IV, 217; 
i t t ^ a z ,  193, K h ita t, I, 492 0
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with the Sharif of Mecca and the families of prestige in the Holy 
cities was the main method of the Fatimid Caliphs by which they 
hoped to achieve their ends.
Al-Hakim 's policy was a continuation of his father's. During
m
his reign an event, which clearly illustrates the policy of the Fatimids
in H ijaz, occurred. As w ill be discussed in detail later, the Sharif 
«
of Mecca rebelled. He public ly denounced al-Hakim and declared
himself instead as Amir al~Mu* minin. A l-Hakim  did not send his
troops to punish the Sharif and restore the Khutba for himself. Instead
he made communications with the dignitaries of Mecca and Medina, a
number of whom were the Sharif's own relatives. He paid them large
sums of money and thus persuaded them to denounce the Sharif and testore
the Khutba in his name. The Sharif, whose rebellion fa iled , wrote to
al-Hakim , apologising and asking for pardon. A l-H akim , who rarely * *
appeared tolerant or merciful with those who disobeyed him, let alone
those who denounced him, did not only pardon the Sharif but sent him
a large sum of money to compensate his losses during the rebellion and
57also re-appointed him as Sharif of Mecca.
57. See "The Rebellion of the Jarrdhids11, Chapter V of this 
thesis.
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His Policy concerning Yamen
Very lit t le  is revealed in the sources about al-Hakim 's policy
concerning Yamen. i t  is very d iff ic u lt to determine whether it  was
because of the remoteness of this country and its distance from the
centre of the Muslim Empire that the imam did not pay its affairs much
attention, or because, since the collapse of the lsma*i!i State there,
missionaries of the Fatimid cause fe ll under severe pressure and thus
their communications with Egypt were maintained in complete secrecy,
which is perhaps why chroniclers appear unaware of them.
A l-H akim , however, appears to have been in continuous 
*
contact w ith his Da* is in Yamen. As Smam and supreme head of their
mission, they reported to him about their activ ities, explained to him
J58
their position, sent the traditional Wajwa , collected from their 
followers and asked for his guidance and instruction. He appointed 
the Da* is, encouraged them to continue their struggle and supported
them with a ll possible means to overcome the d ifficu lties they were
c * 59fac ing.
58. Voluntary money paid by Ssma* ilis  to the spiritual representative 
of their Imam during their religious functions.
59. See al-Hakim 's letter to Harun Ibn Muhammad, the chief Da* i in 
Yamen, recorded by Da* i Idris in his * Uyum al-IAkhbar, V I, 271"*
273, edited by H . FJamdani in al~§ulaybiyun wa al-Haraka q l-Fajlm iyya, 
30?, and b y A *M 0 Majid in aS-Hakim, 239 ~
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His Policy concerning Maghrib
A l-H akim 's policies for the eastern parts of the Muslim world 
may be considered successful, but that which he pursued for Maghrib 
was a total fa ilu re . Barjawan's attempt to put Tripoli under the direct 
control of Cairo, which al-Hakim followed, did not only fa il but it  
led to grave consequences on the interests of his Empire in North A frica . 
Relations between the Fatimids and their representatives in Maghrib, the 
Sinhajis, deteriorated and thus the suzerainty of the Fatimids in the 
area was threatened. (The tribe of Sinhaja was the main force on which 
the Imams relied to maintain their presence in Maghrib.) Tripoli fe ll 
under the control of Zanata (the tribe which had always disowned the 
Fatimid loya lty), and later its chief declared his loyalty to the Umayyads 
of Spain, if  also led to the disobedience of the tribe of Banu Q urra, who 
fe ll out w ith al-Hakim and later became the major support of the an ti- 
Fatimid movements of Abu Rakwa.
The failure of this po licy may be attributed to the treason of 
Zaydan (a high o ffic ia l in al-Hakim's court) and mishandling of the 
situation by a l-Hakim . A fter the death of Yanis and the defeat o f his' 4
army, as has been mentioned before, al-Hakim sent another army under 
the leadership of Yahya al-Andulusi, whom he appointed as Wali in
i  ■
T rip o li. He also commanded Zaydan to give Yahya a sum of money for
186.
expenditure. Zaydan, probably appropriate^ the money, gave Yahya
60instead a signed order to collect the money from Barqa. When 
Yafjya reached Burqa he realised that there was not enough money in 
its treasury to pay him. And since a great number of his troops were 
tribesmen of Banu Q urra, to whom he had promised sufficient payment, 
a crisis among his troops began to emerge. BanuQurra did not only
desert Yahya, they also raided his camps, looted some of his equipment
6? — and returned to their own territory. W ith the rest of his troops, Yahya
entered Tripo li but was overpowered by the Zanati chief, Fulfu l, who
humiliated him and took control over the province and declared his loyalty
62
to the Ummayads o f Spain,
A l-H akim , who appears to have begun to lose confidence in his 
■
m ilitary force, did not send another army to regain T ripo li, nor did he fry 
to clear the dispute with the Sinhajis and ask for their support. A ll he did 
was execute Zaydan when he learned of his treason and committed a great 
error by k illin g  the delegation of BanuQurra who came to Cairo to explain 
to him the reason for their desertion, although he promised them safe 
conduct
60. iffi*a%, annal, 390.
6?. Ibn a l-A th ir, IX, 64; lf f i*a z , anno, 390.
62. See Ibn a l-A th ir, IX , 64, 74; ibn Khaldun, IX , 59; H«R. Sdris,
La Berberie Grientale sans les Z irides, 1, 99 f f .
63. I f f iea z , anno, 390.
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After this the Fatimids were never able to fu lly  recover their 
suzerainty in Maghrib, Their ties with the Zirids weakened and 
gradually the chiefs o f §inhaja began to rule independently and 
regardless of Fatimid interests in the area. Later they even abolished 
the name of the Fatimid Bmam-Caliph from their Khutba and declared their 
token loyalty to the ‘ Abbasids.
AI-Hakim  *s Policy towards the Byzantine Empire
W hile aS-Hakim appears to have followed his father*s policies and 
aimed to achieve what they had hoped to achieve inside the Muslim 
world, he entirely abandoned their plans and attitudes concerning the 
Byzantine Empire. His grandfather, a l-M u*i2 , had always declared 
his intentions of invading and conquering Byzantium. His father, 
al-< Aziz, died while he was preparing a large army to lead against the 
Byzantines. A l-H akim , on the other hand, never declared at any time 
that he intended to wage war against the enemy of Islam (Byzantium) 
despite his extreme religious views. His policy towards Byzantium marked 
a new era in the Fatimid -  Byzantine relations. The state of war 
which had long existed on the borders between the two Empires was 
substituted by peaceful relations and they both agreed on a ten-year
188.
Hudna ( tru c e ) .^
Chroniclers fa il to c la rify  why suddenly the two belligerent 
Empires decided to be peaceful towards each other, but if  is possible 
to suggest that they were both forced by circumstances. The in­
capability of the Fatimid army to defeat the Byzantines had long been 
realised by wise politicians of the Fatimid court. On his deathbed, Ya^qub
Ibn K ill is advised a l - f Aziz to “ be on peaceful terms with the Byzantines
65as long as they remain peaceful" .  During the first two years of a l-  
Hakim's reign his armies in Syria clashed continually w ith Byzantine 
forces, but fa iled to achieve a decisive v ictory. In addition, there were 
infernal problems which needed to be solved, and Barjawan, who
assumed power at that time, appeared to be more interested in solving them
66than waging war against Byzantium.
On the Byzantine side there appears to have been similar circum­
stances. In addition to the Emperor's realisation of his inab ility  to to ta lly  
defeat the Fatimids and capture Syria as he had hoped,he had other 
problems. “The menacing insurrections of Bardas Sclerus and Bardas 
Phocas in Asia Minor and the continuing Bulgarian war demanded Basil's
64. See A ntaki, 184; ibn at-Q alan is i, 54 ff; Ibn a l-A th ir, IX , 50;
A Rusufm, History of the Byzantines, II, 56; G . Ostrogorsky, 
History of the Byzantine State, 308; M . Canard, “The Byzantine 
Empire11, Cambridge History, SV (I), p .724; A .A . Vasiliev, History 
of the Byzantine Empire, S, 311.
65. See supra, note 2 .
66. These problems have been discussed in Chapter 11 of this thesis.
67undivided a tten tion ."
Chroniclers' opinions differ concerning who started the first 
move towards the Hudna. Antaki says that Emperor Basil took
the first in itia tive  by sending two envoys to negotiate peace with the
68 — ~ M 
Fatimid authorities. Sbn al-Q alanisi says that Barjawan started the
move by sending a friendly letter, composed by his Christian secretary Fahd
-  “  69Ibn Ibrahim, which expressed the desire of the Fatimids for a Hudna.
The date of this agreement is not mentioned in the sources, but it  seems
more like ly  that if  was some time during the year 389/998, because
after this year, wars between the two Empires had completely ceased.
4
Although the agreement was in it ia lly  for a period of ten years, 
i f  was observed throughout al-Hakim 's entire rule and friendly relations
between the two Empires grew. Envoys and presents were exchanged between
70
the two sovereigns. Trade and commercial relations went on uninterrupted
71except for a brief period. Sometimes the Byzantine Emperor even requested
67. A ,A .  Vasiliev, History of the Byzantine Empire, I, 311.
68. Antaki, 184*
*
69. Sbn al~Qalanisi, 54-55.
70. Iffi*a% , annals, 391 and 405. See also fA z itn i, annal, 387.
71. Antaki, 214, reports the Emperor's command to stop trade
between the subjects of his Empire and those of "Bilad a l-ls lam ".
This occurred after the success of the Fatimids in faking direct 
control over Aleppo, but if  did not last long and trade was resumed 
shortly after that.
al-Hakim 's help against a common rebel r Sbn at-*Adim  says
that when the menace of a rebel known as al-Asfar became unbearable
*
in the area of Shayzar, the Byzantine Emperor Basil asked a l-H akim  for
help. The Smam-Caliph instructed the Walt of Damascus, who came with
72a large number of troops and chased al-Asfar from the area. It is also
recorded that in 393/1002 the Emperor Basil II himself made a private
73pilgrimage to Jerusalem, of which al-Hakim was informed. He sent 
a messenger to the Emperor and said, “Tell him to be of good cheer, for S
74have no evil intention against h im ." * Although if  might be a mere 
legend, this story indicates people's impression about the Byzanfine-Fafimid 
relations at that time.
One striking fact in the Fatimid-Byzanfine relations at that 
time was that, in spite of al-Hakim 's cruel treatment and persecution of the
9
Christians in his State, the Byzantine Emperor never broke the peace 
agreement or retaliated against al-fjcikim 's attitude. Such a policy on the 
part of al-Hakim  had undoubtedly greatly chagrined Basil as a Christian 
Emperor, but he did nothing, apparently, in the defence of the persecuted
72. Sbn a i - tfAdi rn, Zubda, I, 196,
73. Khusraw, Diary of a Journey, 59; f A ^ im i, anno, 393.
74. Khusraw, quoted by A<A 0 Vasiliev, History of the Byzantine
Empire, S, 312, f f s
191.
75Christians and their sanctuaries. i t  may be that the Emperor, who 
was fu lly  occupied with solving great problems on the northern and 
western borders of his Empire, did not consider what was happening in 
Egypt as a grave and direct threat to Byzantine interests. Records fend to 
suggest that unless Byzantine interests in Aleppo and Northern Syria were 
seriously threatened, the Emperor was not prepared to break the peace 
agreement with Egypt.
The only event for which peace between the two Empires was 
threatened was when Fatik (the Fatimid ruler of Aleppo), under the 
Emperor's influence, rebelled against Cairo, When al-Hakim  commanded 
his Syrian armies to march on and take Aleppo by force, Basil II 
withdrew his armies from the northern borders of his Empire and prepared 
himself for war against the Fatimids, as has been mentioned before.
75. A  ,A , Vasiliev, History of the Byzantine Empire, I, 311.
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CHAPTER V
THE ANTI-FATIMSD REBELLIONS 
DURING AL-HAKIM'S REIGN
The Rebellion of Abu Rakwah, 395-397/1004-1006
In 395/1004 al-Hakim faced the most serious challenge to
his authority; a rebellion that shook the foundations of his State and, for
two successive years, inflicted defeats on his armies. This was the
rebellion of Abu Rakwah, an Umayyad claimant who was able to unite the
forces of the Berber tribe of Zanata with those of the Arab tribe of Banu
Qurra and lead them against the Fatimid Caliphate in Egypt.
Historical sources contain a considerable amount of information on
this issue, but the most important accounts are those of al-Musabbihi, pre-
*
served by Maqrizi in his Itti^asj, of al-Antaki and of Ibn al-Athir which
, ^
seems to have been based on the version of ibn a I-Sabi* J  There are also 
some valuable observations by Ibn Fjazm, Ibn * Idhari and Ibn Khaldun.
1. Although the actual version of Sbn al-Sabi? on this issue has not
survived^, the similarities of the information given by Ibn aNQalanisi 
Ibn a l-Zafir, Ibn al-Athir, Ibn al-Jawzl, S?bt Ibn al-Jawzi, al-Dhahabi, 
Ibn KafFiir and Ibn Taghr? Birdi suggest that all of these chroniclers 
were influenced by a common source. And since if is certain that Ibn 
al-Qalanisi, Sibt Ibn al-JawzT and ibn Taghri Birdi have been influenced 
by the account of Ibn al-Sabi*, it may be that the other chroniclers 
were, directly or indirectly, influenced by the same source. Ibn a i-  
Athir's account, however, is the fullest and most detailed.
Modem works on the subject of the rebellion are very few. The
earliest and fullest account is given by S. de Sacy in his Expos6 de la
P
Religion des Druzes, Paris (1838), which appears to be based mainly
on the account of Ibn al-Athir. The account of De Lacy CVLeary in
A Short History of the Fatimid Caliphate, London (1923) and shorter
account by S .L. Poole in History of Egypt in the Middle Ages, London
(1901) are both based on the work of De Sacy. In Arabic two works have
discussed this challenge to al-Hakim's sovereignty. One is given by
*
M .A . i  Inan in al-Hakim b? AmriHah, Cairo (1932) and the other by A *M * 
Majid, al-Hakim bj Amr Allah al-Khallfa al-Muftara <Alayh, Cairo 
(1959).
The Origin of Abu Rakwah
Little is gctually known of his background. Even his real name does
not seem to have been known to most of the chroniclers. They gave his name
as Al-Walid/ Sbn Hisham, the name by which he became known after the
2rebellion. Abu Rakwah was a nickname which Egyptians gave him. It
3
means the man of the leather bottle. Rakwah is a leather bottle or bag
in which travellers, and especially Sufis,carried water during journeys for the
4
Wudu* (the wash that precedes prayers).
2 . Antaki, 189.♦ #
3 . Ibn Manzur, Lisan al-< Arab, Beirut, 1955, X IV , 333; M .M . a l-  
Zubaycfi, Taj al-<Arus, Beirut, 1966, X , 155.
4 . Ibn Khaldun, IV , 58.
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Almost oil chroniclers are uncertain about his origin and immediate
parentage. According to their accounts he may have been an Umayyad
Mawla (slave or supporter) or prince From the line of Marwan Ibn a l-
Hakam, or < Uthman Ibn <Affan. Such confusion was certainly a result
of the circumstances which surrounded his movement. Abu Rakwah was
not born in the area where he rebelled. He was a foreigner who came
from a distant land and preached secretly against the Fatimid Caliphate
amongst tho tribes of theBurqa district where he claimed to be a descendant
of the Umayyad dynasty. And it was by that claim he was known to the
people who supported him. Chroniclers, who lived far away from the
area, had never heard of him until his uprising. It was only then that
they began to trace his origin and background. Their reports, therefore,
were based on the information accumulated after the rebellion. No
local reports have been mentioned and no thorough investigation appears
to have been made. Those who said that he was an Umayyad prince from
the line of /Marwan did not try to trace his geneology. Some of them
stated that he was al-Wafid Ibn Hisham Ibn ‘Abd a l-M alik  Ibn *Abd al~
Rahman. But none of them clarified who *Abd al~ Rahman was or which 
•  •
5
*Abd al-Rahman they meant. Others found it easier to say, "al-Waii'd Ibn 
Hisham, a descendent of Hisham Ibn *Abd al-M alik  Ibn M a r w a n T h o s e  Who
5 , Ibn Khaldun, IV, 58; Itti^az, anno, 396.
6. Ibn al-Gialanisi, 62; Jbn al-Athir, IX , 81; Ibn at-Jawzi, al-Muntazam, 
Vll,_233; Ibn al-^Amid, anno, 399; al-Dhahabi, < Ibar, Ilf, 6 2 ; lEri 
Kathir, X I, 337; Ibn Taghri Birdi, Nujum, IV, 215.
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stated that Abu Rakwah was from tho line of * Uthman Ibn <Affan 
have not offered any geneology. They named him as "a l-W aiid 
Ibn Hisham a I - f Ufhmant" or “a l-W alid ibn Hisham from the line
i U  IW  ^
of 6 Uthman Ibn *A ffan ". Even those who doubted his Umayyad name and
9origin suggested no alternative.
The most important piece of information here is offered by the 
geneologisi Ibn Hazm (died 456/1064) ;when he speaks about a tribe called 
?AI Numarah he says; "From them was the man who rebelled with Banu 
Qurra in Barqa, Yahya ibn Numarah, who claimed Umayyad descent.
He was a son of Numarah Ibn Sulayman ibn Muhammad.. .  ibn Numarah 
Ibh L a k h m ."^  Al-Musabbihi supports this by saying, " i t  is said that 
he was the son of a man who was one of the Umayyad Mawal? (slaves 
or supporters)."^^
In the light of this if  would appear more like ly  that Abu
Rakwah was not an Umayyad, but he may have been a strong supporter
of their cause. His real name as given by Ibn Hazm was Yalya Ibn 
Numarah and a l-W alid  Ibn Hisham was a name he assumed to support
7 . Ibn Khaliikan, III ,  449.
8. Antaki, 188; tfA zim i, anno, 396.
9 . fldhari, I, 257; Ibn Khaldun, IV , 58; a l-N uw ayri, fo l .5 4 .
IQ. Ibn Hazm, Jamharat Ansab c iM Arab, ed. by Provencal, Cairo, 
1948*, 398.
tm  wm * *  r —
11 . al-Musabbihi, quoted by a l-M aqriz i, lf t i*a z , anno, 396.
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his claim to Umayyad origin and by which he became known amongst
12his supporters. Yahya was born in Umayyad Spain in about 360/970.
He grew up during a period which was towards the end of the Umayyad
rule in Spain, in his twenties he fled from Spain when al-Mansur
Ibn ‘ Amir took over power and began persecuting members of the
13Umayyad fam ily and their supporters. He travelled to Maghrib, Egypt,
Yamen, Mecca and Syria testing the possibility of creating a party strong
14
enough to support the Umayyad cause and to re-establish their State, 
in this he attempted to emulate *Abd al-Rahman a l-D akh il, the Umayyad 
prince who fled the ‘ Abbasid persecution and succeeded in establishing an 
Umayyad State in Spain during the middle of the second cenfry of the 
H ijra .
Although Yahya was a learned man who had acquired a great know­
ledge of traditions and was a very e ffic ient propagandist, he seems to have 
failed to find sufficient response in these places. Perhaps this was because 
(as O'Leary puts if) "the Umayyads had long passed out of the main current 
of Islamic life  and i t  did not seem that their name could anywhere be
used as a ra lly ing cry for the dissatisfied; there was no religious attachment
15to the Umayyads as there was to the A lid s ."  Here it  is possible to understand
12. Nq_date of his birth was given by chroniclers but al-Musabbihi, who saw
Abu Rakwah in 397 A .H fl says, "He was ?n his th irties ." 8tti*az, anno, 396.
13. Ibn a l-A th ir, IX, 82; Ibn Khaldun, IV , 58.
14. Ibn a l-A th ir, IX, 82; Ibn Khaldun, IV, 58.
15. De Lacy O 'Leary, A Short History of the Fatimid Caliphate, London,
1923, 128.
why some chroniclers believed that Abu Rakwah was from the line of 
( Uthman fiIbn *Affan; Zanata the Berber tribe which supported his
— ! cmovement was believed to have borne a traditional loyalty to < Uthman, 
Yahya might have realised that they were more prepared to support a 
descendent of < Uthman than any other Umayyad figure. Perhaps i t  was to 
gain their support and loyalty that he claimed some kind of relationship 
to the orthodox Caliph.
A t last he settled in the area of Barqa where two power­
ful tribes among the inhabitants appeared dissatisfied with the Fatimid 
rule; the Berber tribe of Zanata who had never w illin g ly  acknowledged 
the Fatimids and was often the source of anti-Fatim id uprisings and
rebellions in Maghrib, and the Arab tribe of OanuQura who had been
17cruelly treated by al-Hakim. He began his career as children's teacher. 
He taught the youngsters of Banu Qurra writing and reading the Holy 
Qur<an.
By his extreme piety and religious devotion, Yahya attracted 
the attention of the chiefs of Banu Giurra who asked him to lead 
them during their prayers and gradually became very fond of him.
From thence, he began to disclose his purpose and asked them to support
16. Akbhar al-Barbar f l al-Qurun al-Wusta, ed. by Provencal, Rabat, 
1934, 50.
17. See above, Chapter SV, note 61.
18. al-Musabbihi, quoted by M aqrizi, BttPag, anno, 396. See also 
Antaki, 188; Ibn a l-A th ir, SX, 82; Ibn Khaldun, IX , 58.
- 1 9the cause of the Umayyad Q aJ im . (the divinely guided). The first 
problem which Yahya faced was the old enmity which had existed 
between Zanata and Banu Q urra . To solve it  he acted as a mediator and
as such succeeded, and the chiefs of the two tribes met and decided to
20unite their forces under his leadership.
The Teaching of Abu Rakwah
Very lit t le  is revealed about his teaching and the qualities and 
conditions which he applied to the G a ; im for whom he propagated. A ll
sources agree that this Q a? im was to be an Umayyad. Ibn Khaldun adds
„  , -  21 
that his name as given by Abu Rakwah was "al-W alid Ibn Hisham."
al-Maqarri adds a very interesting piece of information. He says, "He
claimed that Maslama Sbn *Abd a l-M a lik , who was alleged to have
acquired the knowledge of the future from Khalid Ibn Yazid Ibn Mu^awiya,
had spoken of the rise of Ibn Hisham. He recited to them Urjudha (a kind
of poetry), which he claimed Maslama had said, if  goes: "The son of
Hisham shall rise in Burqa. By him cAbd Shams shall achieve their
righ t. Among its Berbers, his rise shall be and the Arabs of BanuC:urra shall
22be honored by h im ."
19. Ibn a l-Z a fir , f o l . 57; Ibn a l-A th ir, IX, 82; Ibn a l-Jaw zi, a l-  
Munfazam, VIS, 233; al-Dhahabl, * 8bar, III, 62.
20 . Sbn a l-A th ir, V I, 82; Ibn Khaldun, IV, 58.
21. Ibn Khaidun, IV, 58.
22. a l-M aqarri, Nafh a l-T ib , ed. M .M * *Abd a l-fjam id , Cairo 1949, 
111,411.
it  is not certain that in his preaching he claimed any divine
*=* mm
quality or miraculous powers for this Q a; im as did the Shi( a for their
Mahdj. This may be for the lack of evidence or because of the
traditions purported to state that the divinely guided Mahdi or
Qa* im would be a descendent of the Prophet's family (Ahi a 1-Bait),
thus excluding the Umayyads. It may have been that since he intended
to declare himself eventually as the Qa* im , he did not apply any such
qualities in order to avoid future complications. It seems to be more
like ly  that al»Qa* im, in Abu Rakwah's teaching, was d ivinely assigned
to appear and rule, but not to be of any divine qua lity . He would
appear in righteousness and distribute equality and justice, but
never perform miracles.
A ll sources affirm that Abu Rakwah's teaching was identical
with that o f Sunnis. There are, however, some indications that he might
have expressed some Kharijife sympathy, perhaps in order to win the support
of Zanata tribe, the majority of whom were believed to have professed
the Kharijife teaching. In Antaki*s report the term Khariji is often
23applied to Abu Rakwah, But whether Antaki meant that Abu Rakwah was
23. See Antaki, 188 f f .
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a Kharijite or meant by this term that he was a rebel is not clear.
6 IdWari states, "When Abu Rakwah found some response from the people
24of Bqrqa (Intasaba llayhim) he declared himself as one of them.
But whether this hitjisab was religious, po litica l or otherwise is not clear
tz *
either. Neither is i t  clear whaHdhqri meant by the people of Barqa -  
whether it  applied to the BanuQurra, Zanata or the inhabitants of the 
province of Barqa as a whole is d ifficu lt to ascertain. However, after 
he succeeded in taking over power in Burqa and declaring himself as
Imm * *
Amir al-lVk^m inin (commander of the fa ith fu l) he is said to have based
" 2 5the religious foundation of his State on Sunni law. But the sources
fa il to disclose the rite  which he meant to exercise.
The Reasons which Created the Right Atmosphere for the Rebellion
Besides the rooted opposition of Zanata and dissatisfaction of Banu 
Qurra with their i l l  treatment byaNHakim, there was the economic 
reason which seems to have been the main cause behind the rebellion. 
Bqrqa as a province was very poor. Even its treasury was insufficient 
to supply the needs of the small army which al-Hakim sent in 391/1000 to
24. ‘ Idhari, S, 257. C f. T . Lewicki, "La Repartition G&ographique 
des groupements Ibadites", R .0  ., XXI (1957), 316 f f .
25. Antaki, 189.* *
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2 6restore the Fatimid suzerainty in T ripo li. Its commercial life  was very 
limited and its national income was subject to its small agricultural 
products and to the travellers'1 caravans which passed through the desert. 
Most of the inhabitants were tribes liv ing a semi-nomadic life . Their 
livelihood was dependent on the products of their sheep and camels.
Similar conditions to those of desert life  prevailed. In addition to this, 
there were economical crises throughout the whole of Maghrib during the 
period that preceded the rebellion which resulted in 395/1004 in a general 
catastrophe. Sbn cIdiSfi describes i t  by saying, "In 395 A .H .  there 
was a catastrophe in A friqya . The poor died and the money of the rich 
vanished. The prices rose and food became impossible to find . The
•Ml
people of the Badiya le ft their homes. Houses became empty and there was
<27
no one to occupy them. W ith a ll this there was a plague of cholera"
9m
Abu Rakwah realised the strife of the tribesmen and their urgent need 
to face their d ifficu lties and concentrated his efforts on this point. The 
brief information gathered in the sources about his propaganda campaigns 
shows that he told the tribal chiefs that his aim was not to achieve personal 
success, but to provide them with prospects of a better life .  The glory 
would be theirs as would be the conquest. He was only the instrument
26. See above, Chapter IV, note 59.
27. ‘ Idhari, I, 256 f f .  See also !bn a l-A th ir, IX , 77.
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28of deliverance. When they agreed to follow his leadership and
rebel, the first agreement they made was concerning the booty and
gains resulting from war. It was to be divided into three shares; one
for each tribe and the third to be kef>f under Abu Rakwah *s control in
29
order to form a treasury to help continue the war. Even after he achieved
the first success and took over Barqa, Abu Rakwah promised to give the
chiefs the palaces and houses of the Fatimid State offic ia ls in Cairo and
30other Egyptian c ities. He also promised the people of the tribes certain
31fe rtile  areas in Egypt in which to settle and enjoy a prosperous life .
Antaki suggests that the main reason behind the rebellion was the
reaction of the tribes against al-HaSdm's policy which had demanded the
32cursing of a number of the Prophet's companions (al-Sahaba). There 
is, however, a contradiction to this suggestion; a l-H akim fs supposed decree 
which ordered the cursing of the Saha ha appeared in 395/1004 and Abu 
Rakwah's revolt broke out in the same year. It had necessitated at least a 
few years of preparation. St may have been that Abu Rakwah had begun his 
propaganda even before al-Hakim succeeded to the Caliphate in 386/996 in
28. al-Musabbihi, followed by Maqrizi, I tt i^ a g , anno, 396.
29. Ibn a l-A th ir, IX, 82,
30. Al-Musabb?hi, followed by Maqrizi, l t t i tfaz#, anno, 396.
31. See ib id .
32. See Antaki, 188.
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which case ihis reason could not have been used by Abu Rakwah during the 
preparation period of his rebellion, but there is no doubt that he used if  
against al~Hakim after 395 A eH . This is, perhaps, what Antaki meant 
to infer but failed to make clear.
The Beginning of the Rebellion
A fter he assured himself of a sufficient response from the two tribes,
Abu Rakwah began to canvass the tribes of neighbouring districts
lecturing about Islam in a revolutionary manner, carefully constructing
a better po licy than that exercised by those in authority, and he called
upon them to support a l-W alid I bn Hisham, the Umayyad Saviour who
would appear in the near future to abolish tyranny and construct justice
3 3  ^
and better prospects of life . The tribesmen were fascinated by his
eloquence and in every place he lectured he met with success. The
tribal chiefs accepted his teaching and gave him the acknowledgment of
34
leadership (Bay* a) .
Sandal, the Fatimid Wali of Barqa realised the dangers of Abu
Rakwah's activ ities . He reported to Cairo explaining the situation and
asked for permission to campaign against him. AI-Hal<imfwho did not appear
#
to have realised the urgency of the problem, neither gave permission nor
33. See supra, note 19.
34. al-Musabbihi, followed by Maqrizi, l t f i* a z , anno, 396; 
Antaki, 188, Ibn a i-A th ir, SX, 82.
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35sent help but recommended diplomacy as a solution. Sandal's 
diplomacy fa iled , however, and Abu Rakwah gathered his supporters 
and moved to invade the C ity of Burqa. Sandal and his troops met them 
outside the c ity  and after fierce fighting he was defeated. He retreated 
and barricaded himself info the c ity  hoping for help from Egypt. Mean­
while he communicated with Ibn Taybun, the chief of the Berber tribe of
«
k u  3^
Lawata, with whom Sandal seems io have had friendly relations.
Sbn Taybun came to the rescue and forced Abu Rakwah to break the siege
of Burqa but failed to defeat him. Abu Rakwah in flic ted a heavy defeat
on Lawata!s forces. They lost many fighters, including the chief Sbn
Taybun himself. The rest of the tribesmen fled, leaving their equipment
and supplies in the hands of Abu Rakwah's troops, who returned to Burqa
37victorious and more powerful.
The inhabitants of Burqa, with their Wali Sandal, took advantage 
of Abu Rakwah's temporary withdrawal from their c ity . They meanwhile 
strengthened its walls, dug huge trenches around them and stored as much
38food and supplies as they cou Id . When Abu Rakwah returned to the siege 
he found i t  much more resistant th&n before. He spent several months in 
a vain endeavour to take the c ity . His threats and even his promises of
35. Ibn a l-A fh ir, IX, 82.
36. Antaki, 188.
37. Anfciki, 188,
38. Antaki, 189.
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safe conduct and just treatment failed to convince Sandal and the
♦
inhabitants of Bqrqa to surrender,^'
The nows of Sandal's defeat, together with the success of Abu 
Rakwah and his threat to Bqrqa, were treated seriously by al-Hakim .
He sent an army of five thousand men under the leadership of Yana I
40 \ /  -(a Turkish commander). Yanal had to cross a considerable stretch of
desert before he reached Burqa * Abu Rakwah sent a body of cavalry
across the route to f i l l  in the wells. He then waited at the point farthest
from Egypt to meet Yanal's force who arrived tired,exhausted and thirsty
from its desert march. The engagement which followed gave the advantage
to Abu Rakwah. Yanal Bs army was defeated and he himself was captured
and put to death. A ll his equipment and supplies fe ll into the hands of
Abu Rakwah who returned triumphant towards Bqrqa.
The news of Yanal's defeat destroyed the hopes of the inhabitants
of Bqrqa. Sts Wali Sandal, together with a ll his fam ily members, fled
towards Cairo. The merchants and businessmen of the c ity  fled to Egypt
and some of them to Maghrib, carrying as many of their possessions as 
4?
possible. In the month of Dhu a l-H ijja  395/October 1005, Abu
39. Antaki, 189.
40. Antaki, 189, ah-Musabbifii, followed by M aqrizi, jtti*c% , anno,
396; Sbn a l-A th ir, IX, 83.
41 , ibn al-A^thir, IX, 83. See also Antaki, 189; al-Musabbihi, followed 
by M aqrizi, * Ift i^ q z , anno, 396; Ibn Khaldun, IV , 58.
42. Antaki, 189. See also al-Musabbihi, followed by M aqrizi, Itti^ag , anno, 
396. IbnaLA th ir/fX , 83, says that the army of Yanal arrived after the 
fa ll of Bqrqa but this does not appear to be correct.
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Rakwah reached Bqrqa and entered it  without any resistance. He then 
declared himself as a l-W aiid Ibn Hisham, the Umayyad Q a y im for whom 
he was previously fighting. He formed his new State and declared
himself as Amir a l-M u7 minin (Commander of the Faithfu l). His self-
-  43
given t it le  was ai-Nagir Li din A ll ah (the Assistant of God's order).
This was struck on the coinage; the Khutba was read in his name and
Sunni law was declared supreme throughout the land of his conquest. ^
Despite the fact that both States, the Umayyad's in Spain and the
cAbbasid's in Baghdad, would be interested in supporting an anti-Fatim id
movement, there is no indication which suggests that Abu Rakwah made
any communication to gain the support of either State. He gave no token
of acknowledgement nor mentioned the name of any ruling Caliph when he
read the Khutba in Burqa. It is more like ly  that he planned to establish
a new and completely independent State in which he would declare himself
Caliph. al-Musabbihi says that Abu Rakwah's supporters regarded him as 
45
Caliph, which suggests that there was no other candidate for the Caliphate 
in their minds, i t  also indicates that he did not prepare them to acknowledge 
any certain Caliph or Caliphate during the period of propagation.
43, al-Musabbihi followed by Mac^izi, ltti«a ? , anno, 396; Antaki, 189; 
‘ Azim i, anno, 395. ib n a l-Z a fir , fol . 57; Ibn a l-Jaw zl, aT-Muntazam, 
V II, 234; and al-Dhahabt, Mbar, III, 62, say that his fifle ^w a T ^P fT i^ ir 
Bi Amr A lla h . Nuwayri, fo i . 54 says "a l-Tha* ir Bi A mr A llan al~
Jyluntognr) min A <d(? AUah.
44, Antaki, 189.
45, dl-Musabbihi, quoted by Maqrizi, itt i^a z / anno, 396.
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The position of Bqrqa*s economy did not offer Abu Rakwah a 
very warm welcome. The c ity  was nearly empty when he entered i f .  
Commercial life  had been suffocated by the long siege which preceded 
its fa ll and the absence of businessmen who had fled . Anfaki states that 
Abu Rakwah confiscated a ll money and food supplies which remained with
46 —the inhabitants of Bqrqa. According to the estimate of Ibn Kafhir, a ll
—  47that money was only "four hundred thousand Dinars1'.
As time passed, he realised that he had to move out of Bqrqa.
The necessity for supplies was increasing da ily . Bread was becoming very 
d iff ic u lt to find and epidemics and famine began to spread throughout 
the whole of M a g h rib .^
About a year after his triumphant entry info Bqrqa, Abu Rakwah 
was driven out, not by the Fatimid troops, but by the threats of famine 
and plagues. Antaki describes it  by saying, "He and a ll his supporters, 
Arabs and Berbers together with their families and cattle, le ft Bqrqa as if
they were migrating from one land to another. They moved until they
49reached the districts of A lexandria. M
Sandal, who reached Cairo safely, was able to explain to a I-Hakim
• u
the significance of Abu Rakwah's movement. He warned him of his great
46. A n jak i, 190.
47. Ibn Kathir, X I, 337.
48. Antaki, 190; *ldhc3ri, I, 256; Sbn a l-A th ir, IX, 77.
49. Anfaki, 190.
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50power and advised him to send large armies against him. al-Hakim
considered the urgency of the situation and began his preparations
to meet i t .  He appointed al-Fadi Sbn Salih as general commander of
the Fatimid armies and ordered him to arrange a large force to lead against 
51Abu Rakwah, But while these preparations were under way, the news of
his movement towards Alexandria arrived in Cairo. a l- rFadi sent a small
«
-  . 52army under the leadership of an Armenian commander known as Q abil 
to intercept Abu Rakwah and prevent him from reaching the c ity . The
two armies met in a place called Dhat a!-Hamam in the province of
53Alexandria. Abu Rakwah won a decisive victory over G abil who, 
together with a large number of his troops, was killed in the battle . From 
there Abu Rakwah moved towards the c ity  of A lexandria. He besieged 
it  and for several months attempted to capture it ,  but without success. The
inhabitants1 fear of fa lling under the mercy of Abu Rakwah's tribesmen
5 4
offered a fierce resistance. in addition to this, he does not seem to 
have had the necessary equipments to break through the strong walls which 
surrounded the c ity . Neither had he any naval power to threaten the sea 
route through which its supplies came,
50. Al-Musabbihi followed by Maqrizi, l t t i ca z , anno, 396.
51. ANMusabbihi followed by Maqrizi, Itti^az , anno, 396; Antaki,
190; Sbn a l-A th ir, IX, 83; See also, Ibn al-G^alanisi, 65; 'A z im i, 
anno, 397.
52. Antaki, 190.
53. Antaki, 190.
•  *
54. A n ta k i, 190.
209,
The news of Abu Rakwah's victory over Q abii and his siege of 
Alexandria were extremely alarming in Cairo. A general mobilisation
of the regular troops was declared and high wages were offered to encourage
55 —new recru its / al-Hakim appealed for the help of the Beduin
chiefs o f Syria and Palestine who came together with a large number of
56 —their tribesmen. The forces of the Fatimids and those o f Abu Rakwah
appear to have been equally powerful and the leaders of both reluctant
to make attacks. al~Fadl did not move to rescue Alexandria and Abu
Rakwah did not move to invade Cairo. Neither of them was confident of
victory by one decisive stroke.
Espionage, strategy and bribary began to play their part.
al-Hakim ordered his men to tempt Abu Rakwah to march to Cairo by
promise of support and assured victory. By these tactics al-Hakim
sought to break the siege of Alexandria and draw Abu Rakwah's forces
to Cairo where they could probably be ambushed. An additional fear was
that i f  Alexandria fe ll to Abu Rakwah, the task of defeating him there would
be in fin ite ly  greater. al-Fadl also managed to bribe one of Abu Rakwah's
«
chief commanders, Madt, whom he used to obtain information concerning
55. al-Musabbjhi quoted by Maqrizi, ltti< a z , anno, 396. See also
Ibn a l-A th ir, IX, 83; Ibn Khaldun, IV, 58; Ibn Taghrl Bird#,
Nujum, IV , 216.
56. al-Musabbihi foHowed by Maqrizi, ltti<q%, anno, 396; Antaki,
190; Ibn a i-A th ir, IX , 83; Sbn Taghfi Bird#, Nujum, IV, 216.
57. al-Musabbihi quoted by Maqrizi, Itti^az, anno, 396; *tdhari, 1, 258.
Sbn a l-A thV , IX, 83; Sbn Khaldun, IV , 58, say that the high officials
of the Fatimid State wrote to Abu Rakwah without al-Haklm's know­
ledge, but this does not seem to be correct.
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58his master's plans. On the other hand, Abu Rakwah too tried to bribe 
the Beduin chiefs of Palestine. He contacted them through some chiefs
(M
of BanuQurra and offered to establish an independent state for them
-  -  59in Bilad al-Sham if  they deserted the Fatimid army and fought on his side.
Abu Rakwah's failure to capture Alexandria and the promises of support
which he received from both the Fatimid officia ls and the chiefs of the Beduin
tribes convinced him to move towards Cairo. He reached a l-Fayyum ^
where he camped, to plan the final blow against the Fatimid armies.
al-Hakim sent a small army under the leadership of A l i  Ibn Falah to
m i  61
be stationed in Jiza and prevent Abu Rakwah's troops from raiding in
62 “areas very close to the C ap ita l. Abu Rakwah learnt of this army and
sent a division of his troops which ambushed Ibn Falah, k illed  many of
63his men and took their equipment and supplies. Skirmishes between the
two forces continued and at last they met face to face in a place called
64 — ***Ra*s al-Burka ‘ in al-Fayyum d istrict. The agreement between Abu
Rakwah and the Beduin chiefs of Palestine was that when he attacked,
they would withdraw from al-Fadl's army and thus create fear and confusion.
58. Sbn a l-A th ir, IX, 83.
59. Sbn a l-A th ir, IX, 83.
60. A fe rtile  area to the north of Cairo. Khitat, I, 241 .
61 . A v illage on the N ile  near Cairo, K h ita t, I, 205.
62. a I-Musabbilji followed by Maqrizi, Itti^a^, anno, 396; Antaki,
190; Sbn a l-A th ir, IX, 83.
63. al-Musabbihi, in itti*az  , anno, 396; Antaki, 191. See also 
some details in Ibn a l-A th lr, IX, 84.
64. Anfaki, 191.
211.
al-Faqjl was fu lly  informed of this and on the day of the attack, he
called a ll the Beduin chiefs to his tent and at the same time warned the
65commanders of his army of the time and place of the attack. When the 
attack took place, the Beduin chiefs who were kept in al-Fadl's tent, 
were unable to play their part. Their troops, who were unaware of their 
masters' agreement with Abu Rakwah, fought fie rce ly . Abu Rttkwah's 
troops, who were expecting easy victory, were ambushed and thought 
that they had been cheated by the chiefs of the Beduins. Consequently,
PU*
they were defeated. A large number of them were k illed  and Abu Rakwah
himself fled to the South, heading for N u b ia .^  al-Fadl followed him and
offered the King of Nubia a large sum of money for the exchange of Abu 
67Rakwah's person. He was surrendered and was brought to Cairo where
68he was paraded through the streets arid fina lly  put to death.
Ibn a l-Q alanisi says that Abu Rakwah wrote a poetic letter to
al-Hakim , begging him for mercy. al-Hakim read the letter but did not* •
69 . “pardon him. ' al-Musabbihi, however, seems to disagree and suggests 
that a l-H akim  intended to pardon Abu Rakwah. He says, "al-Hakim told
65. Ibn a l-A fh lr, IX, 84.
66. al-M usabbihi,Mquoted by Maqrizi, l t t i f az , anno, 396; Anfaki, 191; 
Ibn a l-Q a lan is i, 65; Ibn a l-A fh ir, IX , 84; Ibn Khaldun, IV , 58.
67. a 1-Musabbihi quoted by Maqrizi, ltti<az, anno, 396.
68. al-Musabbihi, followed by Maqrizi, l t f i ‘ a z , anno, 396}
Antaki, 191; Ibn a l-A th ir, IX , 84*
69. Ibn a l-Q a lan is i, 65. See also Sbn a l-Z a fir , f o l . 57 ff; Ibn a l-A th ir,
IX, 84; al-M aqarri, Nafh a I-T ib , III,  413.
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me, once while we were talking about Abu Rakwah, he said, l l did not
70
want to k il l him and what happened to him was not of my choosing1. 11
Ibn a l-A th ir says that Abu Rakwah died suffering from humiliation and
71
cruel treatment during the parade and was not executed. So if  is
possible that al-Hskim  did not intend to execute Abu Rakwah and was
awaiting the end of the parade .to grant him mercy. The sources are
completely silent concerning Abu Rakwah's private life .  It is not known
whether he had a family or what happened to them after his defeat. Ibn
* Idhari speaks of a rebel named <Abd A llah Ibn a l-W alid  Ibn al-Mughira
who appeared in 403/1012 in Maghrib. He was previously a school master
who propagated for himself. He entitled himself a l-N asir Amir a l-M uy minin
and made communications with some tribal chiefs. He commanded them
to obey him and promised to appear in 404/1013 to abolish the rule of
Sinhaja and construct his own. In 403/1012 he was captured and
72
paraded in the streets of Qayrawan where he was executed. The name 
of this rebel, his self-given t it le , his profession and the time in which he 
appeared, indicate that he might have been ffefc son of Abu Rakv/ah. But 
unfortunately, the lack of information makes if  d iff ic u lt to determine 
whether he was or not. Ibn ( Idhari makes no connexion between him and 
Abu Rakwah and other chroniclers fa il to mention anything about him.
70. al-Musabbihi quoted by Maqrizi, l f f i ‘ az, anno, 396.
•  H M ***.......
71 . Ibn a l-A th ir, IX , 84. See also Ibn Tahgri Birdi, Nujum, IV , 217.
72. < Idhari, I, 260.
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The Results of Abu Rakwah^ Rebellion
This rebellion appears to have had significant effect on the Fatimid
State and on the policy of al-Hakim* The economy of Egypt had suffered
two long years of food and other shortage. al-Musabbihi quoted by
%
Maqrizi says that “prices went up sharply and fresh bread became d if-
73
ficu lt to obtain. Stale bread was wetted and sold six Rails for one Dirham,
^  _  7 4
while the fresh was previously sold fen Rails for one Dirham11. al-Hakim
p.l'l' HI .1 l _ r - —  r-f—  * ^
formulated strict measures to cope with the situation. He instituted the
75death penalty for those who inflated prices or hid commodifies. The
cost of the war had depleted the treasury and many millions of Dinars had 
76been spent. Agriculture, industry and trade had been disturbed and the
loss in national income had been heavy. Many men had been killed on
both sides and the war brought disease and plague together with ma!nutrition,77
al-Hakim's attitude towards Sunnis began to change. He became 
*
more lenient and seemed opposed to the extreme views of the Shi* i 
-  78lsma*ilis. His policy became more far-seeing. The tribe of BanuQurra
no longer feared his revenge and severe punishments. His attitude towards
73. MaqrTzi, lfti*a z  , anno, 396-397.
74. ib id .
75. Anfaki. 191.• '
76. al-Musabbihi followed by Maqrizi, it f i*a z , anno^ 396. See also
Antaki, 188 ff; Ibn a l-A th ir, IX, 81 ff; ibn Taghri Birdi, Nujum 
IV* 215 f f ,
77. Antaki, 191.
*
78. See above. Chapter H i, notes 88 & 89.
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them certainly appears to have become more realistic. He recognised
the motives which made them follow Abu Rakwah and seems to have
decided to eliminate the cause. They were pardoned and later granted
7 9
a large area of fe rtile  land in Lower Egypt. The realism in his policy
is reflected in his treatment of the Beduin tribes of Palestine when they
80
later rebelled in 400/101 o«
The Rebellion of the Jarrcihids          »----
In 401/1010 al-Hakim faced another problem. This time if  was
created by Arab tribes in the region of Palestine and lasted for about three
years. This was the rebellion of the tribe of Banu a l-Jarrah. They were a
part of the Yemani tribe Tayy who had settled in the Southern parts of
Palestine in the BalqaJ region, in the mountains of al-Sharat and in the
North of the Arabian Desert where there were the two hills of A |a > and
Salma known as the mountains of T a y y .^  a l-M ufarrij Ibn Dahgfal known
as ibn a l-Jarrah , led the uprising. His father Daghfal was the first chief
of the Jarrahids to be mentioned in the chronicles during the second half
82of the fourth century A .H . Unfortunately the sources do not make his
79. M aqrizi, |tfj<a%, anno, 405.
80. See below, the Rebellion of Sbn al-Jarralg.
81 . M . Canard, a r t., nDjarrahids11, E.1.2 , A  fu ll geographical des­
cription of the area is given in an unpublished American University of 
Beirut M .A  . Thesis by M .A .M . al-Hayyari, a l-* Imajrah al-Ta* jyyah 
ft Bilad al-Sham during the 13th and 14th Centuries, Beirut, 1969, 24 f f .
82. Ml* Canard, a r t . ,  "D jarrahids" , a l-Hayyari, 54 f f .
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origin any clearer. Whether al-Jarrah was actually the father of
Daghfal or merely an ancestor is not proven. Nor is i t  certain when
he appeared and gave his name to that part of the tribe of T ayy .
Unlike the revolt of Abu Rakwah, ibn al-Jarrah*s rebellion
was not influenced by religious teaching, nor was it  a severe threat to
the Fatimid army. Sts only important significance was that al-Hasan
*
Ibn Ja*far a M A Ia w j, known as Abu al Futoh, the Sharif of Mecca, 
from the line  of ‘A li and FajTma had been persuaded to declare himself 
as Amir al-Mu< m in in. a l-H ijaz  and Palestine accepted him and as a 
consequence an important part of the Fatimid Empire acknowledged an 
AI id as Amir al-M u* minin instead of al-Hakim .
I I  .............  ■■■■.!,, ft
Abu al-Gasim, al-Husayn Ibn f A li a l-M aghrib i is considered by 
the sources to have caused this anti-Faiim id movement among the Jarrahids 
and other Beduin tribes in the region and convinced the Sharif of Mecca 
to denounce al-Hakim and declare himself as Amir al-M u* minin . His
« ■ i    ■--- ------- -----  n  i - n i i i
motives were those of personal revenge upon al-Hakim who had previously
ordered the death of Abu al-Qasim and his two brothers. Abu al-Qasim
escaped with h:s life  while his brothers were caught and executed. From
— 83thence he planned to avenge them by creating troubles for al-Hakim .
83. Ibn a l-Q afan is i, 62, and al-Dhahabi, Tarikh al-ls lam , anno, 402; 
suggest that the execution of the members of the Maghribi family 
was a result of struggle for power and riva lry between them and the 
Christian high o ffic ia l Ibn Abdun. Consequently Ibn ‘ Abdun 
succeeded in presenting a case against the Maghribis and convinced 
a l-H akim  of their g u ilt.
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He travelled in secrecy until he reached the land of the Jarrahids and
there he composed a poem eulogizing Hassan, the eldest son of a i-
84M ufarrij, who welcomed him as a guest. Then he began his activities
85until he persuaded a l-M ufarrij and his son Hassan to rebel against Cairo. 
But whether Abu al-Qasim's activities were entirely responsible for the 
rebellion or whether his influence was strong enough to create i t  for no 
better reason than personal revenge remains an unanswered problem. By 
studying the records and information available on this point it  would appear
*«* M i
that Abu al-£:asim's grievances were not the actual cause but merely 
instrumental in activating the result. The primary cause would seem to 
be that the Jarrahids desired to emulate other tribes in the regions of 
Mu§ui and Aleppo which had established semi-independent emirates.
When the centra! authority of the < Abbas id Caliphate in Baghdad began 
to weaken/ independent and semi-independent States began to appear in 
the Muslim w orld , firs t in the distant provinces and later in thos sur­
rounding Baghdad. A number of Arab tribes who had settled in Syria
to*
and Western Iraq took advantage of the situation and succeeded in 
establishing semi-independent emirates such as the Hamdanids in Mugul and 
later in Aleppo and the f Uqaylids in Musul and Kufa.
84. ibn al-CViaianisi, 62, gives the whole poem.
85. al-Rudhrawari, 233 f f ,  gives fu jl details of Ibn al-Maghribi*s
activities .^See also Ibn a l-Q a lan js i, 62; Ibn a l-Z a fir , f o l . 59;
!bn a l-A th ir , IX, 137; Ibn al-<Adim, Bughya, IV , f o l . 23; ibn 
a l-J  awzi, ai-Muntazam, VIS, 250; al-Dhahabi, Tarikh al-lslam , 
anno, 402.
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The Jarrahids who first appeared during the middle of the fourth
century A*H * were less fortunate than the other tribes. They were located
in Palestine which was, at that time, ruled by the powerful governor of
Egypt, Kafur a l- lkh sh id i. The death of Kafur, which was followed by
a struggle for power among his successors, gave the Jarrahids an opportunity
to assert themselves. The arrival of the strong Fatimid army in Egypt
immediately crushed that opportunity. The Fatimid regime was new and
powerful. The policy of its Caliphs was to abolish dynastic rule in the
Syrian provinces and centralise their own power. The Jarrahids opposed
this po licy of the Fatimid Caliphs and reacted against if  w ith many an ti-
86Fatimid rebellions during the second ha lf of the fourth century. Every
opportunity to rebel was taken by the Jarrahid chiefs in an effort to put
Palestine under their control. Whenever they were successful they made
their own C ap ita l. But this success never lasted long. The powerful
Fatimid army would force them to subside. They rebelled so many times that
they became considered in the eyes of Fatimid politicians as the menace of
87peace and a danger to the sovereignty of the Fatimid Caliphate,
In 401/1010 conditions appeared favourable for yet another attempt. 
Abu al-Qasim* a l-M aghrib i, who took refuge among the Jarrahids, had been
86. See M . Canard, a r t . ,  "D jarrahidsn, EJ a l-tja yya ri, 50 f f .
87. See the Advice of Ibn K ill is cited Chapter IV , note 2 .
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a high o ffic ia l in ai-Hakim's court. His previous knowledge con­
cerning conditions in the Fatimid regime made his advice valuable to a i-
_ 88
Mufarrij and his son Hassan. The Fatimid army was no longer as 
powerful as i f  was before, its weakness was realised during the revolt of 
Abu Rakwah when the Jarrahids themselves were requested to support if  as 
has been mentioned before. A t this time al-Hakim exerted severe pres­
sure on his Christian subjects and destroyed the Church of the Holy Sepulchre 
in Jerusalem. Therefore the Byzantine Empire might help and support 
Ibn al-Jarrah if  he promised to l i f t  that pressure. It was also possible 
that the Christian officia ls of the Fatimid regime might support his 
rebellion for the same reasons. In fact, i f  is reported by Maqrizi that
Zar<a Ibn Nasturus, a l-Hakim ’s Wazir had communicated with Ibn a l-
•  — '**■ ■
-  . -  89 -Jarrah without al-Hakim's knowledge during the rebellion. Abu a l-
Futuh the Sharif of Mecca,who supported the rebellion, was a rich man
and controlled the treasury of Mecca. He had no army nor a powerful
tribe under his command, thus to proclaim him as Amir a l-M u > mini n
would be merely titu la r. The armed power would remain in the hands of
the Jarrahid chiefs who would be the real rulers. The treasury of Mecca
would be useful to expend on the operation.
88. Abu al-Qasim had been a high o ffic ia l in a l-H ak inA  regime. 
al-Dhahabi, Tarikh a l-ls lam , anno, 402.
89. IffH az,  anno, 403.
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The beginning of the Rebellion
In 401/1010 al-Hakim appointed a new W ali for Damascus.
-  90He was a T urkish army commander named Yarughtigin. He, together
with his family and a number of troops as escort, travelled together
with the merchants* caravan towards Damascus. On the way they were
attacked by the Jarrahids who raided their caravan and captured
*
Yarughtigin near the town of ‘ Asqalan. From there the Jarrahids moved 
towards Ramla (the main c ity  in Southern Palestine and the residence of 
the Fatimid W a ll) , and after a fierce baffle with the Fatimid troops stationed
. 9 1in the c ity , they captured i f .  a l~Hcikim was very much alarmed by 
the news of these events and tried to counter the rebellion before if  
became a serious threat. He wrote a letter of remonstration to a l-M ufarrij and 
offered him a sum of f if ty  thousand Dinars in return for the safety of
Yarughtigin . Meanwhile he threatened him with severe consequences if
92 .he caused him harm. But Abu al-Qasim was able to convince Hassan,
a l-M ufarrij *s son, that if  Yarughtigin was released he would return with a
93 . 9 4large army to fight them. Hassan immediately executed him,
90. al-Dhahabi, Tarikh al-lslam , anno, 4 0 2 The name of this com­
mander is given in different forms; Antaki, 200, says "Barukh or 
Yarukh"; al-Rudhrawari, 233, gives if  as "Yarukhtikin; Maqrizi, 
l f t i* a z , anno, 401, says "Barukh". The cause of this may be 
that the name was foreign.
91. A ntaki, 201; al-Rudhrawari, 234, f f .
92 . al-Rudhrawari, 235.
93. al-Rudhrawari, 235.
94. A ntaki, 2Ql/al-Rudhrawari, 235; IttH az, 403.
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After Shis the Jarrahids declared Ramla as their C ap ita l. Mean-
«
P»9 a  . W
while Abu ai-Qasim headed for Mecca to convey news of success to Abu 
al-Fufuh and to urge him to come to Ramla where he would be proclaimed 
as Amir a l-M uy minin. On his way Abu al-Qasim made contact with the
,________________________________ ■ V  „
chiefs o f the Beduin tribes of H ila l, Suiaym, ‘ Aw f ibn ‘ Amir and others.
-  95
They a ll promised to support Abu al-Futub. On the arrival of Abu a !-
Oasim in Mecca, Abu al-Futuh proclaimed himself there and received
96the Bay*a from the Hasanids of the Holy C ity . From there he moved, 
together with Abu al-Qasim and a number of tribal chiefs, towards Ramla.
In Ramla he received a warm welcome from the Jarrahids. They kissed the 
ground before him and greeted him with the Bay‘ a as Amir a l-M uy m inin.
He then mounted the pulp it to read the Khutba in his own name and entitled
-  9 7
himself al-Rashid Li Din A llah  (tho Guide to God's Order). H ijaz and
98most of Palestine acknowledged him and coinage was struck in his name.
The following move of Ibn al-Jarrah was to endeavour to gain support
*
from the Byzantine Empire. The Christians in his domain were well treated 
and he ordered the re-building of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre. He also
95. jbn al~*Adim, Bughya, IV, fol .23.
96. al-Rudhrawari, 236; Ibn a l-*A d in , Bughya, IV, fo l.  23.
97. Anfaki, 201; al-Rudhrawari, 236; Ibn a l-Jaw zi, al-Munfazam,
V II, 250; Sibf, M irat, fo l.  198; al-Dhahabi, Tarikh al-lsldm , anno, 
402.
98. Antaki, 201; al-Dhahabi, Tarikh al-islam , anno, 402.
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99appointed a Bishop by the name of Inba Thawfilus as Patriarch in 
Jerusqlcm and promised him every help and protection So far ibn
a l-Jarra l/s  operation was successful ♦ The whole region between
:fc>
Tqpriyya (North) and al-Farm3 (South) was under his control except for the 
main cities of the coastal area But this did not last long. The new 
State needed able administration and finance. A ll supporters of Sbn a l-  
Jarrah were tribesmen and except for Abu al-Qasim none had experience 
of state administration. The treasury o f Mecca which Abu al Futuh had 
brought with him, together with the money the Jarrahids found in Yarughtigin's
caravan and the treasury of Ramla, soon vanished in an attempt to buy the
102 -support of the greedy Beduin chiefe. The tribes which supported
Abu ai-Futuh and Ibn al-Jarrah had no stable finance on which a State
could exist. They lived by breeding cattle and gains from raids on.which they
could hardly be expected to pay fax. The coastal cities w ith their organised
administration and rich incomes as key centres of trade were beyond Ibn a l-
Jarrah's reach and in spite of many attempts to divert them, they remained
103loyal to the Fatimid Caliph. The Byzantine Emperor did not seem eager 
to support the Jarrahids. Perhaps i f  was because he was faced with problems
99. Anfaki, 201.
100. Anfaki, 201.• *
101. Anfaki, 201.• *
102. Antaki, 201.
103. A nfaki, 201 •
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on the northern borders of his Empire; or perhaps he was waiting until 
ibn al-Jarrcsh had the coastal cities under his control.
When ibn al-Jarrah realised that there was no help forthcoming
o
from Byzantium, he changed his attitude towards the Christians of
Palestine. He allowed his troops to raid their homes and confiscate
their properties. This forced many of them to leave Palestine and move
104to other regions in Northern Syria and to Byzantine territory.
Mf
al-Hakim's method of dealing with the problem
By the proclamation of Abu al-Futuh in H ijaz and Palestine, the
*
rebellion began to mount to become a serious threat to the interests of the 
Fatimid Caliphate. HijOz which was v ita lly  important to the propaganda 
was no longer under Fatimid suzerainty. This was in addition to the fact
to*
that Abu al-Fufuh was an ‘ A lid  and acknowledged in the Holy places 
of Islam which made him a serious rival • Only a few years previously an 
* A iid  named Abu Hashim plotted in Egypt to overthrow al-Hakim  and a 
number of high officia ls had supported h im J ^
al-Hakim followed a most successful policy in dealing with the
tom M
problem. First he planned to discredit Abu al~Futuh in Mecca and 
regain H ijaz , He made communications with another < AI id in Mecca
104. Antaki, 202.
105. Itti*a%, anno, 392.
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known as ibn Abu al-Tayyib who had been the rival of Abu al-Futuh 
in the Holy p l a c e s , H e  appointed him as Sharif of Mecca and sent 
him a large sum of money which he used to oppose Abu al-Futuh. Con­
sequently ibn Abu al-Tayyib succeeded and Fjijaz was restored to the
]07
Fatimids. al-Hakim then began to discredit Abu al-Futuh in 
Palestine. He contacted Hassan and offered him a large sum of money 
to denounce Abu al-Futuh. He also made similar offers to *A li and 
Mahmud, sons of a l-M ufarrij Abu al-Futuh realised that he was no 
longer Amir ai-M u*m inin but an object for bargaining and his own life
was in danger. The Jarrahids, and particularly Hassan, appeared
-  109 -  -w illing  to accept a I-Ha kirn's offers. He pleaded with Abu al-Qasim
*
and a l-M ufa rrij to assist him to return to H ijaz . They gave him protection
as far as Mecca where he deposed himself openly and read the Khufba in
110the name of a l-Hakim . He also sent a letter o f apology to Cairo in
111which he begged for pardon.
106. al-Rudhrawari, 238.
107. al-Rudhrawari, 238.
108. al-Rudhrawari, 237; See also A n ta k i, 201; Ibn a i-Jaw zi, a l-  
Munta^am, V II, 250; al-Dhahabi, Tarikh al-lslam , anno, 402;
Sbn Khaldun, IV , 57.
109. Antaki, 201; al-Rudhrawari, 237, f f .
110. Antaki, 201; al-Rudhrawari, 238,
111. Antaki, 201; al~Rudhrawari, 238; Sbn a l-*A d im , Bughya, SV, fo l.  23.
The Jarrahids* rebellion should have ended, but in fact if  * 9
did not. Although they accepted af-Hakim's offers and took his
money, they retained mastery of Palestine and continued to menace
the peace and security of the area by their raids on towns and c ities. The
pilgrims from £gypt could no longer travel to Hijaz to perform their
112annual duty because their caravans were like ly  to be plundered.
In 404/1013 al-Hakim decided that force was necessary. He
113sent an army of twenty thousand men under the leadership of *A li
Ibn Falah to whom he gave the t it le  GiutH al-Dawla (Magnate of the 
114State). He also commanded the provincial rulers of Damascus and
-  115the coastal cities to march together with their troops in support of < A li. 
A l-M ufa rri} died suddenly, perhaps poisoned under al-Hakim 's instructions, 
and thus the position of the Jarrahids became much weaker. Hassan, the 
new chief, realised his inab ility  to stand against the Fatimid forces. He 
withdrew from Ramla and retreated to the desert while his two brothers,
~ 117
‘ A li and Mahmud, surrendered to Ibn Falah. Q utb al-Dawla entered • * . .
Ramla and restored law and order there before he moved to punish Hassan.
112. Antaki, 224.
«  9
113. a I -Rudhrawari, 238.
114. A ntaki, 207; al-Rudhrawari, 238; ltt?*az, anno, 403.
115. Antaki, 207.
*  9
116. al-Rudhrawari, 239.
117. al-Rudhrawari, 238.
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Buf the Jarrahid chief resorted to the old trick of his fathers. He 
*
sent his mother to Cairo to beg for mercy from a I “ Hakim and to
118 "promise her sonfs future obedience and loya lty . Hassan was
119pardoned and allowed to return to Palestine and repossess his father^ land.
From this time he remained loyal to the Fatimids throughout the last years
of ai-Hakirrds reign.
Abu ai~Qasim, who realised the failure of his mission, fled to
Iraq where he received a warm welcome and was employed by the ‘ Abbasid 
120authorities. According to the authority of |bn al-<Adim , Abu a l-
Qasim wrote a letter to al~Hakim in which he said, nO thou, Imam• *
of G lory, you know that I possess a tongue that can build and destroy.
He who is pleased when his hand is kissed is not a Clement. A  Clement
121is one who forgives when his hand is b itte n .11 On receiving this letter
al-Hakim  himself wrote an Aman which declared a ll charges against Abu
*  1 11 1 r  1
a!-Qasim to be dismissed and allowed him to return to Egypt and to
122regain his office i f  he wished. Abu al-Qasim, however, preferred
118. al-Rudhrawari, 239; M . Canard, "Djarrahids", E J  2
119. a!~Rudhrawari, 239.
120. a l“ Rudhrawari, 238; Ibn al'-QaianisT, 64; Ibn a l-A th ir, IX,
' # 4  M  IM  mmt
138^ al-Dhahabi, Tarikh aMslam, anno, 402; Ibn Taghri 
Birdi, Nujum, IV, 266.
121. Ibn a l-*Ad im , Bughya, IV, fo l.2 3 .
122. Ib id ,, fo l . 24.
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to remain in S1'0^ where he served a number of rulers until he died in 
418/1027.
St may appear strange that a 1-Hakim did not use his army 
immediately after Yarughtigin’s death and the declaration of Abu 
al-Futuh and that he le ft Palestine a t the mercy of the Beduin 
tribesmen for more than two years. The sources fa il to offer any explana­
tion . M . Canard, however, suggests that al-Hakim knew that it  was always
™ . . 124possible to suborn the members of the Jarrahid fam ily, which is strongly
supported by the events of the previous uprisings led by the chief of the
Banu al-Jarrah. In addition to this there may have been other reasons.
it  must be remembered that it  was not only the Jarrahids who were
involved at the beginning of the revolt but the tribes cf H ila l, Suiaym
and aI~‘ Aw f ibn ‘ Am ir. They all acknowledged Abu al-Futuh as did also
the ‘ A lids of Mecca and Madina. There was also the population of Palestine,
who might stand w ith Abu al-Futuh as his speeches were fu ll of promises
125of better conditions. V ictory of the Fatimid army over a ll these d if­
ficulties does not seem to have been certain and if  defeat was in flicted on 
its forces in Palestine, suzerainty of the Fatimids throughout Syria would 
be questionable. Damascus would probably rebel and the Byzantines and
123. Ibn Taghri Birdi, Nujum, IV, 266.
124. M . Canard, a r t . ,  " D ja r ra h id s £.1
125. al-Rudhrawari, 236; Ibn a l-Jaw zi, al-Munta%am, V II, 248-250.
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‘ Abbasids might attempt in filtra tion and claim some parts of Fatimid 
Syria. Even i f  the army defeated the Jarrahids and their allies in 
Palestine, there would s till be complications. The Jarrahids would 
retreat towards H ijaz (as they had always done in previous uprisings) 
where they would barricade themselves in the Holy cities of Mecca and 
Madina in which case a l-H akim  would face a very d iff ic u lt position. If 
in any way his troops destroyed the Holy cities, his Da‘ w a , throughout 
the Muslim world, would be severely shaken. If he ordered his army 
to withdraw, H ijaz would be no longer a part of the Fatimid Empire,
Such an outcome may or may not have been considered by a I-  
Hakim but the sources show that throughout his reign he never sent his 
army to solve a problem unless diplomacy and bribary completely fa iled , 
a 1-Hakim, however, was determined to avoid any problem In Hijaz which• m
might affect the operations of his Du‘ qt in that important centre. Abu
al-Futuh was not only pardoned but was also reappointed as Sharif of
126Mecca and a large sum of money was sent to him from Cairo. He also
was very well received in the Capital of the Fatimid Empire where al-Hakim
127treated him as guest of honour a few years later.
126. A n jak i, 201; Maj; ! , a I-Hakim, 153.
127. Majid, al-Hakim , 153.
CHAPTER VI 
THE ORIGIN OF THE DRUZ MOVEMENT
One of the most Important events which occurred during the
reign of al-Hakim was a division in the isrna* i l i  Pa* wa r a spl if
that shook the fundamental principles of its teaching and resulted in the
creation of a new sect in Islam which became known as ai-Dur2yya or 
]
aUDarziyya.
The question of the racial origin of the people who belong to
this sect has been the theme of much speculation by many modern
writers. Many saw them as a race apart, differing in religious theory
2
from a ll other groups in Syria. Others believed that they were the
descendants of the Arab tribes who came and settled in the area after the 
3
Muslim conquest.
1. M .G .S . Hodgson, a r t . ,  "Druz", E,3.2
2 . See R • Pocock, A Description of the East and Some Other Countries,
(London 1745), 94} H . Manndrell, A  Journey from Aleppo to 
Jerusalem on Easter A .D . 1697, (London, 1801), 51-2; G . Washington 
Chasseaud, The Druze of Lebanon, The|fo Manners, Customs and 
Religion, (London, 1855), 97; H . Light, Travels in Egypt, Nubia,
Holy Land, Mount Lebanon and Cyprus inThe Year 1814, (London, 
1818), 225; "Religion des Druzes", R .D .O ., Paris, X (1846), 240;
J ,T • Parfit, Among the Druzes of Lebanon, (London, 1917), p .33^ 
G ,L , Bell, Syria the Desert and the Sown, (New York, 1907), 103; 
F .K * H iff i,  Origins of the Druze People and Religion, (Mew York, 
1928), 18 f f .
3. See Niebuhr, Travels through Arabia and Other Countries in the East,
translated by RT Heron, (Edinburgh, 1792), i l ,  179; A .M . TatT*',
As! al-Muwafah idun al-Druz wa uguluhum, (Beirut, 1961), 15 ff;
A ,A .  N a jja r, Madhhab al-Druz wa al-Tawlird, (Cairo, 1965), 24 f f .
Such speculations, however, have very lit t le  support in the 
historical sources. The people who responded to the new teaching and 
became known as Druz were largely drawn from the Shi* a Isma* iiis 
and were like other people who lived in the area at that time: a 
mixture of migrating hordes who had settled and intermarried in Syria 
throughout its history, From this if  would be impossible to trace the 
origin o f any community in Syria or, at least, confine the origin of any 
fam ily to one particular race.
Druz (or Duruz) is the plural of ^Durzi*' which is an Arabic 
corruption of the Persian term Darzi (ta ilor) and was the name of one 
of the Isma* i l i  Da* is. He separated himself from them and not only 
preached extreme views, but declared the Imam al-Hakim  to be divine.
If was a curious name for a religious community, to be known by, 
particularly as Darzi*s teachings were considered to be evil in its books.
The real founder of the Druz sect, however^was Hamza Ibn *A li,  and 
the teaching of i t  is called Din al-Tawhid (the relig ion of Tawbid) and
— -  ■— M -  ■ ■ — l   —  -  “
there is no reference to the term "Druz" in any of its religious books.
The followers of if  are called Muwafahidun (those who accepted Tawhid as 
their re lig ion ).
The term "Druz" was applied to the Muwahhidun by the chroniclers 
and historians of the middle ages. This resulted from Darzi having been
230.
the first to declare the teaching^ which was followed by the suppression 
and persecution of his followers.
Hamza, who was also an extremist, denounced Darzi and tried 
to convince the offic ia ls and the population of Egypt that Darzi was an
5imposter. His denouncement seems to have been occasioned by the 
pressure on him and his supporters, and the principles he advocated did 
not, fundamentally, d iffer from those attributed to Darzi, Hamza failed 
to convince the chroniclers of any difference between his teaching of 
Tawfrid and the doctrine of D a rz i. In addition there was also the 
hostility which a ll chroniclers bore towards the Druz. If is evident 
that they applied to them licentiousness and moral looseness which have 
no foundation in their doctrine. The application of the term Muwahhidun 
would, perhaps, give the teaching some degree of recognition.
Since the Druz, however,were unable to persuade their 
neighbours to call them Muwahhidun, they gave themselves another name, 
al~A* raf (the benefic-tents) which developed info the term Banu Ma‘ ruf 
(those who help others). This name is s till used together with a 1-Muwahhidun
4 . M .G .S  . Hodgson, "al-Darazi and Hamza in the O rigin of the Druze
Religion", J .A .O .S ., 82 (1962), p .6.
5 . Risalaf, al-§ublja al-Ka* ina, Ms., B .M ., N o . add. 11,559 , 
fo l . 38; De Sacy, Exposfe, U, 164; al-Rida wa ai-Taslim, Ms., 
B .M ., N o . add. 11,558, fo l. 71; E x p o s ^ l l ,  176.
6. A ntak i, 224; Sibf, Mir^af, Fol. 207; ‘ Azim i, anno, 408; Ibn a l-  
Z a fir, f o l . 60; al-DhahabF, Tartkh ah-Islam, anno 408,
lt t i* a z , anno/408; Ibn TaghfT Birdi, Nujpm, IV , 184; Hodgson, 
al~Daraz7 and Hamza", J A  ,G .S ., 82~^T*962), 6 f f .
by those who wish to praise the Sect, while avoiding mention of the term
-  7 Druz.
The Origin of the Founders of the Teaching
There is li t t le  information concerning the origins of the founders 
a l-Taw hid. Chroniclers give no information about any of its leaders 
except Hamza. His fu ll name appears in both chroniclers* reports and Druz 
writings, as Hamza ibn *A li Ibn Ahmad. He was a fe lt maker (al-Labbad),
•  »  ■■■'»! umiK— mM— mmmrnf
8born in Zawzan in Persia, but whether he is actually Persian is not certain.
His titles, as revealed in the Druz writings, are: Hadi a l-M ustajib in (Guide 
of the Faithful), The imam, Sahib a I-21 a man (Master of the Time), Amir al~
Mu*minin, Mawlana, a l-*A q l (the Inte llect), a l-N a tiq  (the Prophet),
The other leaders' names and titles are only given by the Druz 
Rasa*il. The first one who follows Hamza in the rank of leadership is an 
Arab named Abu Ibrahim, lsma*il Ibn Muhammad al-Tam ini. He was Hamza's
t •
7. See examples of the poetry of Wadi* Talhuq; Ilyas Farhat, Ma*ruf 
al-Rasafi, a l-S ha*ir a l-Q uraw i and Mas* ud Samaha quoted by 
A .M . T a li* , Asl al-Muwahlitdun al-Druz wa Usuluhum, Beirut, 1961, 
p . l6 3 f f .  See also A . tsjajjar, Madhhab, 152; Y . 1. Yazb?k, 
Introduction to al-Dawla al-Durziyya, 12.
8. See W . Madelung, a r t . ,  "Hamza b. A l l " ,  E.l . See also Hodgson,
"al-Darazi and Hamza", in J .A ;Q .S . , 82 (1962),and "Druz" in
E.1.2; A . N a jja r, Madhhab, 123; A .M , T a li* , Asl al-Muwbbicfin, 
79; A ,F X . Beeston, "An Ancient DruzV' Manuscript", B .L .R ., V , 
(1956), 286 f f .
9 . See al-Balagh wa a l-N ihaya , Ms., B .M ., N o . add. 11,558, fo l.  55;
a l-Naqd a l-K h a fi, Ms., B .M ., N o , add. 11,558, 39; al-Subhaaal- 
Ka*ina, Ms., N o. add. 11,559; al-Tanzlh, M s., B .M ., N o . add.
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brother-in-law . His titles were al-Ncifs (the Soul), al-Mashi*a (the W ill) .
Hamza appointed him as his successor (Khalifa) and the chief of the Du*at • ■■ "■ 1 1 ■ ib-i,,b 1 • 1
1—  Toand the Ma*dhunin (the Licenced). The second in importance to 5sma*ili
was also an Arab named Muhammad Sbn Wahb al-Qurashi. His titles were
*
al-Radi Safir a l-Q  udra (the Conveyor of the Power), al-Kalim a (the 
Spokesman),.^
The third in importance was Abu al-Khayr, Sajama Ibn *Abd al~
Wahhab al-Samurri (from the town of Samurra in Iraq). His titles were al-
12Janalj al-Aym an (the Right Wing), a5-Mustafa (the Chosen One).
Finally was Abu al-Hasan, *A li Sbn Ahmad al-Samuqi known as
r
Baha* a l-D in . His titles were a 1-Mugtana (the Trustworthy), al-Jdtnah al~ 
Aysar (the Left W in g ) .^
According to the teaching, these five leaders embodied the five
-  11,559, fo l.  22; Kashf al-Haqa* iq, Ms. 8 .M *, N o . add. 11,558,
fo l.  117 ff. See also Hodgson, a r t . ,  "D ruz", £ .8. ,
W . Madelung, a r t . ,  "Hamza B. A l i " ,  E .1 ; A .  N a jja r, Madhhab, 123.
10. Taqlid al-M ujtaba, Ms., B .M ., N o, add., 11,559, fo l.  40. See also
Hodgson, a r t . ,  "Druz", E J  ? , N a jja r, Madhhab, 140.
11. Taqlid a l-R a ji, Ms., B0M ., N o . add. 11,559, fo l.  44. See also
Hodgson, a r t . ,  "Druz", E.l N a jja r, Madhhab, 140.
12. A , N a jja r, Madhhab, 140; Hodgson, a r t. ,  "D ruz", E. I ? .  There is
no Risala of Taqlid for al-Mus.fafa. A. Na jja r suggests that this was 
a result of loss.
13. Taqlid al-Muqtana, Mis., B .M ., N o, add. 11,559, foI&. 46-7.
See also Hodgson, a r t. ,  "Druz", E J  p '} N a jja r, Madhhab, 142.
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cosmic principles (or ranks) known in isma *ilism as Hudud, which are a l-
*A q I, al~Nafs, a l-Kalim a, al-Sabiq (or al-Janah al-Ayman), a l-Ta li (or
al-Janah af-Aysar). ^
The major part of the writings is attributed to Hamza, Baha* a l-D in
and isma* if ibn Muhammad.
*
Antaki adds Darzi to the list and considers him to be one of the
founders of the Druz teaching. He gives his name as Muhammad Sbn isma* il
15and says his origin was *Ajami (Persian). De Sacy, however, points
out that Darzi had another name which appears in the Druze writings as
Anushtigin (or Nashtakin) which, to quote De Sacy, “ ascertains that 
™ 16Darzi was a Turk". Although the possibility is strong, i t  does not follow 
th a t a name usually defines the orig in. An interesting p o in t^ 'h o w e v e r ,  arises 
from this: why did Darzi have two names, and which of them was the true 
one? Muhammad Ibn lsma*il was the name by which he was known to the 
chroniclers and presumably also to the populace in Egypt. While Anushtigin 
was the name by which he was known to close friends such as Hamza and 
other Druz leaders.
Darzi was an ambitious man who wanted to declare himself as
14. Hodgson, a r t . ,  “Druz", E ,8,2, and “a l-Parazi and Hamza“ , J .A »Q ,S . 
82 (1962), 16. See also A . N a jja r, Madhhab, 1 3 7 $ .
15, Antaki, 220. See also *Azim i, anno, 408; ibn a l-*A d im , Zubda, !, 
248; lt t i* a z ,  anno, 408.
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ql-Qq* Im (the Expected Mqhdi). He may have assumed the name
Muhammad Ibn lsrr.a*il according to a personally preconceived plan in
order to rouse the emotions of the Shi*a Isma* ilis , knowing that the name
held special implication with the expected Qa* im "Muhammad Sbn Isma*il
Sbn Ja*far a l-Sad iq".
Sbn a l-Z a fir  adds another man named al-Hasan Sbn Haydara a l-  
•  •  •
Farghani (from Farghana in Persia) who was known also as al-Akhram (the 
One with the Perforated Nose) and considers him to be one of the Druz
17leaders. In the Druz writings there is no mention that al-Akhram acquired
any position in the leadership of the Sect. aM<irmani!s Risala, known as a l-
. -  . . 18 Risala al-Wa* iza is a reply to a letter sent to him by al-Akhram. So it  is
more like ly  that al-Akhram was one of Darzi's supporters and, perhaps, the
spokesman of his group. According to Sbn a l-S ab i*, al-Akhram was a person
19who public ly declared al-Hakim to be divine, '  and that applies more to 
Darzifs supporters.
Darzi and his supporters, although they may have preached similar
16. De Sacy, Expos6, I, 384. See also Hodgson, "a l-Darazi and Hamza", 
J .A .Q .S ,, 82 (1962), 5 .
17. Sbn al-Z-afir, f o l , 59 f f .  See also ibn al-^Sabi*, quoted by Sibt,
M ir*a t,* fo l. 207, and by SbnTaghri Birdi, Nujum,. IV, 183.
18. See al-Risala al-Wa* i^a, ed. by M „K . Husayn in B „F ,A .E t Uv, 14 (1952), 
11.
19. ibn al-Sabi* quoted by Sibt, Mir* a t, fo l. 207, and by ibn Taghri 
Bird?, Nujum, IV, 183. See also Sbn a l-Z a fir , fo l,  59.
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Ideas to those o f Hamza, could not be considered among the founders of 
the Din al-Tawhid. They were a group who separated from the movement 
even before if  was known. They disobeyed the leader Hamza by making 
public their extreme views of the teaching. For this they were expelled.
But since chroniclers were unaware of these developments inside the circles 
of the movement, they believed that Darzi, Hamza, Akhram and the rest 
of them belonged to one and the same party.
The Teaching
Immersed in secrecy, the doctrinal books of the Druz which 
they called al-Hikma (the Wisdom) were for a long time beyond the
■■in  .......... .. . .  *
reach of historians and theologians. Even today the vast majority of the
community of the Druz are not permitted access to them. O nly a small
21group known as a i-* Uqqal (Wisemen or Initiated) are allowed to read them 
and study the teaching. The rest of the community are considered Juhhai 
(not in itia ted). The * Uqqal hold their own special meetings during which 
they read and discuss the doctri ne. The Juhhai are invited once a week 
to attend a meeting and one of the < Uqqal reads some of the Rasa7 ii which
20. There is no clear mention in the writing that the term Hikma was
associated with the names of the Rasa* i l . The name, however, seems
to have originated in a later period, perhaps in the time of *Abd 
A llah al-Tanukhi (d .885/1480), who is known to have collected the 
Rasa* 11 and arranged them info six volumes. The name of al-Hakim 
and Par a I-Hikma may have been the inspiration. For information on 
al-TanOkhl, see "al-Tanukhi *Abd A lla h 11, E .1.
21 . See Hodgson, a r t . ,  "Druz11, and “al-Darazi and FJamza",
J .A .O .S . , 82 (1962), 20.
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does not contain much of the Ta* w i l . These meetings bear a great
22sim ilarity to the special and common meetings of Par al-Hikma and 
it  may well be that the Druz have adopted similar methods. Non-Druz 
are barred from these meetings and arc not even allowed to enter the 
prayer place Khalwa (solitude), where the meetings are held, even when it  
is empty, i f  is of lit t le  wonder that Muslim theologians and historians of 
the middle ages have failed to give any satisfactory account on this issue.
This secrecy is undoubtedly a reflection of the hostility which forced their 
leaders to undertake precautionary measures and consider them as part 
of the religion in order to protect the community from outside oppression.
In the course of time, however, many copies of al-Hikma have found 
their way info the libraries of Cairo, Paris, London, Oxford and many other 
places, and interested scholars have been able to reveal some of the 
mysteries of the Druz teaching.
Druzism, or as the members of the Sect prefer to call if ,  Din a l-  
Tawhid, is an extreme off-shoot of the Isma* il? Da* w a. Its method is 
aI-Ta*w il (the allegorical interpretation of the Holy Quran and the 
traditions of the Prophet). Its founders studied in the Isma* i l i  school of 
Dar al-Hikma and it  follows naturally that their methods of analogy are typ ica lly
22. Discussion of Dar al-Hikma has been made in Chapter III o f this 
thesis.
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Ismatf H i, The same terms and sometimes whole phrases are repeated in
both al-B ikm a and the lsma*ili religious books and with the exception
of a few points, al-j-jikma might be classified as one of the Isma* i i i  books.
23Many scholars have commented on the teaching of the Druz 
and i t  is not the purpose of this thesis to discuss its doctrines at length.
But if  seems necessary to comment on the points of difference between Din 
al-Tawhid and its mother Isma*ilism, inasmuch as its influence on the sp lit.
One strong point of Druz teaching asserts the physical mani­
festation of the divine form and that a t the end of the fourth century A .H  • 
such a manifestation was revealed in tine person of a l-H akim . To them he 
was absolutely and completely God in person and the term Tawhid meant 
the belief in the complete unity between the spirit of God and the body of
23. The Druz teaching has been discussed at length by many historians.
The best account is offered by M .G .S . Hodgson in his articles "Druz", 
E .l 2- , and "al-Darazi and bjamza in the O rig in  of the Druz 
Religion", J .A .O 82 (1962). The fullest and most detailed 
account is given by S. De Sacy in Exposfe de la Religion des 
Pruzes, (Paris, 1838), 2 vols. See also M . Sprengling, "The 
Berlin Druze Lexicon", A .  J .S.L LVI (1939); M .K . Husayn,
Ta* ifa f al-Druz Tarlkhuha wa *Aqa*iduha, (Cairo, 1962); A . j .
Arberry and others, Religions of the Middle East, (Cambridge, 1969),
II, 230 ff; J.R . Buchanan, ‘The Druzes; their origins and 
development to the Zenith of their power under Fakhr a l-D ln  SI",
G ,U .Q  .S J  XIX (1961-2), 1 ff; A .A ,  N a jja r, Madhhab a l-  
Druz wai al-Tawhidj, (Cairo, 1965); M .A . * Inan, al-Hakim  Bi 
Amr A lla h / (Cairo, 1932); A .M .  M ajid/ al-Hakim , 105 f f ;P .K .  H itt i,  
The Origins of the Druze People and Religion," New York, 1928.
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"  24al-Hakim . Although the lsma‘ ilis  revered their Imam as a divinely 
appointed being, such extreme views were not acceptable to the 
majority of the Isma< i l i  followers.
IX*
From this sprang a ll other points. The Druz be lie f that God 
manifested himself in physical forms only at times when a new revelation 
was necessary and then a new deliverer was commanded to reveal i f .  The 
new revelation was Din al-Tawhid and the new prophet was Hamza.
Thus, since every prophet superseded previous prophets and exalted his
Sharing over the previous ones, Hamza superseded Muhammad and Din al~
- 2 5Tawhid was exalted over Islam. The Isma* If is interpreted Islam by 
saying that i t  was the outward revelation (Zahir) of the inner revelation
■U '
(Ba Tin) of (' fman or Tawhid) and considered them of equal importance, both
26as a continuation and inseparable. They considered the teaching of their 
Imams to have supplemented and not superseded the Sharing of Prophet 
Muhammad.
If might be interesting to mention here the arguments of both 
doctrines on this point. The Ssma*ilis interpret the Aya which says: "Between
24. al-Balagh wa a l-N ibaya , fo l.  55; al-Naggj a l-K h a fi, 39; 
al-Tanzlh, fo l . 22; Miihaq V/ally al-Zaman, Ms., B .M ., Nla. 
add. 11,553; fo l.  23.
25. a l-Naqd a l-K ha ft, fo l.  38; al-Rida wa al-Taslim, fo l.  20; Bid* al-Jawhid, 
fol .41 f f  tnM s,BeM ., N o.add. 11,558, fo l . 41 f f .  See also Hodgson, 
a r t . ,  "Druz", E . l.^ ,a n d  "al-Darazi and Hamza", J .A .O .S . ,  82 (1962),
7 f f .
26. a l-K irm ani, al-Risala al-\Ya*?za, 24 f f .
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them was erected a wail which has a gate. Inside i t  (Batinuhu) there is 
mercy and joy (Rahma) and outside it  (Zahiruhu) there is suffering 
(*Adhab). ^  They said that the “gate" meant *A li Ibn Ab i lb • The 
"w a ll" meant the Shari*a . Inside the Sharing and through the gate was
4 iman (or Tawhid ) . They supported this by the tradition of the Prophet which
"  " 2 8  says, “ I am the C ity  o f Knowledge and *A li is its gate (Bab), He who
29
wanted to enter the C ity  should come through its g a te ,“ The Druz agree
with this interpretation and add that the Aya says, “ Inside the gate there
is Rahma11 and not the inside as a whole is Rahma. So Tawfoid is inside * Iman
and not the r Iman itse lf. They add that Islam is the door to 7 Iman and 9 Iman
is the door to Tawhid. Thus they divided Tawhid from 7 Iman and considered
30if  a higher stage of worship.
The Druz differ not only from Isma* ilism, but perhaps from a ll
other religious sects in that they do not allow conversion. They say that the
door of Tawhid was closed ?n about 434/1042 and base their argument on the
theory of reincarnation and that since souls are transferred from one physical
body to another, a ll have had an opportunity to join in Tawhid through the
31revelation of Hamza,   ,
27, Aya no. 13, Sura no.57.
28, For information on this term, see B. Lewis, art, "Bab“ , £ ,1 £
29, A .  N a jja r, Madhhab, 40.
30, A .  N a jja r, Ib id ,
31, For the closure of conversion, see Hodgson, a r t . ,  “Druz” , £,1,2
For further details on the Druz belief of transmigration of soub, see *
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This interpretation of the soul's reincarnation with reference to 
the closure of the Da< wa is not original in the teaching. The founders of 
the Sect do not mention at a ll that the door of Tawhid would be closed at 
any time. St seems like ly  that this happened after the death of the founder 
leaders and due to lack of leadership as well as to outside pressure. The
M  M
leaders who succeeded Baha? a I-P in  in about 434/1042 closed the door of
the Da* wa in order to protect themselves and their followers. To justify
this action, they interpreted the theory of reincarnation, which is deeply
32
roofed in the teaching.
Amongst modern Druz there Is a common belief known as Nufq 
(speaking). According to this, a child newly born may be able to speak
33and remember some oV a ll things about his previous life . This, of course,
is based on the theory o f reincarnation. Modern Druz writers are divided
info two groups on this issue. Some support this belief and others consider
-  H itt i,  The Origins, 44. See also Risalat Suyal wa Jawab, Ms. Bib, N a t.
N o .1144“ !449, published by Eichhorn under "Bon Der Religion Der 
Druzen", R0M .B .L ., XiB (1782), 108 f f  and by Regnault, "Cafechisme 
a I ‘Usage des Druses djahels” , BoS.G.V H , (Paris 1827), 22 f f .  This 
Risala has been written at a much later date than the time of Hamza.
i —  , ... •
The writer, who does not appear to have thoroughly understood the 
teaching of Hamza, gives a summary of what he believed to be the 
Tawhid in a form of answering questions. Some of his answers are con­
sistent with the teaching, but many others are far from its instruction.
32. See Risalat ai-Ghayba, Ms., [J .M ,, N o . add. 11,559, which clearly 
indicates that the Muwahhidun were facing great pressure which 
forced many of them to abandon the teaching.
33. For further details, see H itt i,  The Origins, 44,
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34if  a kind of "myth" resulting from a misunderstanding of the doctrine.
The teaching, however, dismisses such an idea and as A .  N a jja r 
pointed out, i f  considers if  contrary to the doctrine. But the arguments
*n the Rasa* i l,  particularly some by Baha* a l-D in , indicate that at his
-  . 3 5time there were some Druz who believed in Nufq and asked him about i f .
The po litica l implications which resulted from the differences
between the teaching of Hamza and that of the o ffic ia l circles of the
*
!smaf i i i  Da*wa were far more important than religious polemics. The whole 
question of imama and Khilafa was involved. The Druz said that since 
al-Hakim was God, then he could not be Imam or Caliph. "He is higher 
and more dignified than to be associated with names or titles such as imam, 
fo ljib  ai-z.aman, Amir al~Mu? minin, which a ll belong to his slave (Hamza)." 
Administering the State and leading the Umma through the right paths
was the job of a human being chosen and appointed by him and that was
-  37Hamza, who claimed to be the imam-Caliph directly appointed by the Lord,
•  - i r n *
34. A . N a jja r, Madhhab, 69; A .T a l i?, AsT, 100.
35. A .  N a jja r, Madhhab, 70.
36. A l-Ghaya wa al-Nas.ilia, fo l.  71, f f .
37. C f. Hodgson, "al-Darazi and Hamza", J .A  .Q .3 . , 82 (1962),
13, and a rt. "Druz", EJ
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Following this reasoning, they maintained that the imam was no longer 
necessarily appointed by his physical father, nor was it  necessary for 
either of them to be Fatimid by descent. This abolished the hereditary 
system of the Smama and in modern terms the institution of Imama, the 
centre of the isma* i l i  Da^wa, was nationalised by Hamza.
Hamza, however, seems to have realised that since he opened
M
the way for non-Fatimids to become Imam-Caliphs, many other
ambitious men would also try to achieve that position. If is noticeable
that he overemphasises the argument in his Rasa* il which says that only
38he, because he was specially chosen by God, was to be the Imam.
From this his d ifficu lties concerning politica l leadership commenced.
Not only did he have to figh t al-Hakim's son and o ffic ia l successor, but also
*
some of his own followers. Darzi, who opposed Hamza chiefly concerning
the question of Imama, claimed that he himself was the imam. For this he
39was expelled from the movement and declared to be IbHs (the D ev il).
A fter Hamza's disappearance many Druz Dagis claimed his position. The 
Druz writing contains a considerable number of Rasa* il which were 
written to reprimand those Da* is and warn the faithful from accepting 
their c la im s .^
38. This point appears to be the theme of argument in almost a ll
of the Rasa* i l . For example, see al-Ghaya wa al-Nagihq, fo l . 71; 
Al-Ricja wa a l-Ia s llm , fo l . 20 ff; Al-Subfca ql-KaM na, fo l , 38 f f .
39. A j-G hgya wa a l-N asiha, fo l.  71; Al-Subha al-Ka* ina. fo l.  38.
40. SeeTawbikh Lahiq; Tawbikh Sukayn; Tawbikh Sahl; Tawbikh Hasan Ibn
Muc lla ; TawbTkh al-Khayb Mahal la , a ll in Ms. B .M ., No .add. 11,562.
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The Elements behind the Origin of the Sect
Chroniclers of the middle ages have generally agreed that a l-  
Hakim himself was behind the movement. They say that he wanted to be 
declared divine and for that purpose he encouraged and supported the 
extremists of his D u*a t. This is supported by the Druz writings which 
state that Hamza was chosen and authorised by al-Hakim  to reveal the
teaching of Tawhid.
r ^  T r r i # -  ■
The lsma<ili writings, on the other hand, declare that the new
movement was the thinking of a group of extremists ( Ghuiat) whom a l-
Hakim neither authorised nor supported. They add that those who were
authorised anc! supported by the Imam were well known and remained the
offic ia l spokesmen of the pq<wa untii his death.
Modern historians accept the chroniclers' and the Druz information
as facts and generally agree that al-Hakim was behind the movement.
*
Such reports, however, should not be accepted without investigation. There 
are three versions given by chroniclers. Two by Antaki and Ibn a l“ 5abi' 
and yet another by Sibt Ibn a l-Jaw zf, a later chronicler. Most of the 
later accounts have followed one or another of these versions. The fact 
of their dissimilarity would appear to denote confusion amongst these 
writers. None of them was liv ing in Egypt at that time and a ll of them 
relied on hearsay, which is often calumnious and always reflects the attitude
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of the informers. In addition, these three chroniclers were obviously
hostile to al-Hakim and it  is probable that this hostility coloured their
opinions, ibn a l-S abp, as has been mentioned before, was writing in
Baghdad at a time when the relations between the <Abba$ids and the
Fatimids were particularly strained. Antaki wrote of the al-Hakim
•  ♦
who had suppressed the Christians in Egypt and had destroyed the Church of 
the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem and Sibj depicted him as he was after the 
Fatimid Empire had been abolished and In a society where accusing 
the Fatimid imams of heresy was considered a v irtue .
N ot only do the three versions differ from each other, but 
they are also contradictory in themselves. Thus Antaki states that 
al-Hakim  approved Darzi's teaching and commanded him to contact the 
officia ls and ask them to accept the new teaching, while he adds that
*» * yj, j
when a l-H akim  was informed about Darzi's preaching he was very angry.
He further states that Darzi was killed  by a Turkish soldier while he was 
in the company of al-Hakim and adds that the gates of Cairo were closed 
for three days and a number of Druz were k illed  This seems to indicate 
that both the k illin g  of Darzi and vho closure of tho c ity  gates wore ordered by 
a l-H akim . By this Antaki contradicts the assumption that al-Hakim 
supported and authorised Darzi's teaching. Neither Darzi's nor Hamza's
41. Antaki, 222.
245.
names appear among those of the only people allowed in ai-Hakim 's
*
-  -  42court. The list of these persons is given by A n tak i. Sn addition,
neither of them was given any tit le  or position in the administration of
the State or of the Da< wa which would indicate that al-Hakim's support
or encouragement was not given to the movement.
From Ibn al-Sabp comes the statement that al-Hakim desired • •
43to claim d iv in ity  and employed a man called al-Akhram to declare i f .
A contradiction of this appears in his own chronicles when he says that 
al-Hakim prohibited his subjects from prostrating themselves before him 
or from kissing the ground or his hand when they saw him. He affirms
that al-Hakim  supported and encouraged the new teaching, but contra- 
diets himself by saying that he allowed Ahl al-Dhimma, who had adopted 
Islam, to return to their previous religions and permitted them to rebuild
their destroyed churches, while this is completely contrary to the Druz
* u- 44 teaching.
Sibt presents al-Hakim as fearing the results of Darzi's teaching
in Egypt and as saying to him secretly, “ Go to Biiad al-Sham and preach
45there, because its people are quick to fo llo w ."  Yet in another part of
42. Antaki, 222-3.
#
43. Sbn al~Sabi* quoted by Sibt, Mir* at, fo l . 207, and by Ibn 
Taghri Sirdi, Nujum, IV, 183 f f .
44. See a l-S iji l al-M u*Uaq, Ms., B .M ., N o . add. 11,558; 
al-Rida wa al-Taslim, fo l . 16; Risalat al Yahud wa al-Nasara,
Ms., B .M .., N o. add. 11,558.
45. Sibto, M ir*a t, fo l.  207. Also quoted by Ibn Taghri Birdi, Nujum, IV, 184.
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his report he presents al-Hakim as Jabbar ‘ Anid (stubborn tyrant) who 
killed a great number of people without fear of consequences. !t is 
strange that, i f  this story of Sibt is correct, he was able to reveal the 
exact words of a secret conversation between Darzi and al-Hakim .
This story of Sibt, however, is more like ly  an attempt 
to explain the existence of the Druz community who were liv ing  in Wadi 
al-Taym in Bilad al-Sham in his time. By the term Darzi he does not 
necessarily mean Anushtigin a l-D a rz i. It is more like ly  that he meant 
the founder of the Druz Sect -  "Hamza". According to Antaki, Azim i,
M aqrizi, al-Dhahabi and the Druz writings, Anushtigin a l-D arzi was killed 
in Egypt. Hamza might have fled to Wadi al-Taym and he and his 
successors were responsible for the spread of the teaching there. But even 
this remains an assumption.
St is noticeable that some of the later chroniclers gave no 
credence to these accounts and seem to have concluded that they were 
probably coloured by the hostility of tho writers rather than repeated facts.
Ibn a l-Q a lan is i, who usually follows the reports of Ibn a l-SabP , does not
9
mention any relation between al-Hakim and the Druz leaders, nor is a l-
9
Hakim's desire for d iv in ity  referred to by him. M aqrizi, who reports
Antaki's story, does not suggest that Darzi or Hamza were at any time
46. al-Subha a l-K a ? ina, fo l. 38; al-Ri<ja wa al-Taslim, fo l. 20;
Antaki, 223; ‘ Azim i, anno, 408; al-Dhahabl, TQfTkh ai-islam , anno, 
408; Iffi^az , anno, 408.
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encouraged by a l-Hakim , Moreover, Maqrizi condemns Ibn Abi
*
Tayy, who seems to have been influenced by the account of Ibn a l-  
«
Sabi*, by saying, "This is extreme hostility which no one of the
47Egyptian chroniclers has mentioned11. ‘ Sbn Khaldun openly says,
48“These are allegations which no man of in te llect would contemplate.11 *
The Contradictions of the Druz Writings
The writings of the Druz affirm that Hamza was supported and
authorised by a l-Hakim . Some of the Rasa* il even bore inscriptions which 
«
claim that al-Hakim was aware of them and he approved the teaching 
«
they contained. But as A . N a jja r pointed out, there is no substantial
49 ~evidence to support such claims. y Careful research info a ll available
information reveals that if  is very unlikely that the Druz Ra$a*jl were
written during the life  time of a l-Hakim . There is no mention of confiscation
of either books or Rasa* ii during the Druz suppression which followed the
riots of 408/1017. This suggests that none were w ritten.
In 408/1017 Darzi public ly declared al-Hakim to be divine, which
caused the riots, thus forcing Hamza to go info hiding. From his concealment
*
he denounced D arzi. If would appear very unlikely that, during a period 
of persecution, Hamza would compose Rasa* il which would emphasise that he,
47. iff?* az, anno, 411 .
48. Sbn Khaldun, IV, 60.
49. A , N a jja r, Madhhab, 103.
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like Darzi, was an extremist. Studying the Risaia, known as a i-S i j l i
a l-M u ‘ allaq which Hamza wrote in 411/1021 after al-Hakim 's death,
points out that none of the other Rasa* its, titles or ideas are mentioned in
50if ,  although they are supposed to have been written before. Some
of the Rasa* il contain information which was obviously unknown at their
alleged date of composition. One striking example of this occurs in the
Risaia known as al-Balagh wa a l-N ihaya f i a I-Tawhid. If speaks of a l-
Zahir, al-Hakim's son, as successor to the Caliphate, whereas ‘ Abd a l-  
•  •
Rahim, al-Hakim's cousin, was the appointed successor until al-Hakim's
death. This Risaia is alleged to have been written in 410/1019 and
5]
presented to a l-Hakim . In a Risaia known as al-N aqd a l-K ha fi the
52writer mentions two lines of poetry and attributes them foa l-H ak im .
But as Dr. M .K , Husayn points out, those lines are the work of al-#V\u*ayyad
-   RQ _
f i a l-D in  a l-S h iraz iT who died in 47J/1Q77. Although the Risaia is 
alleged to have been written and presented to al-Hakim in 408/1017,The 
inscription oh the Rasa* il reads nWa Rafa‘ a Nuskhataha Bi Yadihi jla  a l-  
Hadra a l-ta hu  Tiyya (He /Hamza_J7 by his own hand presented it's copy to 
the divine presence /a l-H a k im / . )11 ’ O r, "Rufi‘ a Hddha a l-K itab  ild
50. See a l-S ijj i l a l-M u ‘ a llq q .
51 . See al-Balagh wa a l-N ihaya , fo l . 55.
52. a i-N a q j a l- i\h a fi, 37,
53. ;VwK. Musayn, Ta* ifa t a i-D ruz, 94.
54. al-Baiagh wa a l-N ihaya , fo l.  55.
al-Hadra a l-Lahutiyya11 (This book was presented to the divine presence).
The phrasing strongly indicates that Hamza did not write these inscriptions
•
and they are tho work of an unknown follower. The motive for this is quite 
clear. The Shi*a isma* ilis  obey unconditionally the instructions of their 
Imam. If they read that he had approved of the new teaching then there 
is a great likelihood that they would follow it .  In Hamza's own writings 
there is a passage in which he states that some of the Du*at refused to
accept his teaching unless al-Hakim's own signed mandate commanded them
56to do so. It is also necessary to mention that the o ffic ia l leaders of the
isma*i!i Da*wa declared that al-Hakim never supported or authorised 
■ •
Hamza or any other extremist to preach Siuch teaching. Special Rasa* il •   J 1 “
and even o ffic ia l decrees were circulated throughout the State for the same
57purpose. If also should not escape notice that only a few of the Druz, 
Rasa* i l , particularly those which emphasise the authorisation of Hamza,
m
bore the inscriptions and dates.
55. a l-N aqd a l-K h a fi, fo l.  39.
56. al-Rida wa al-Taslim, fo l.  20.
57. al-Risaia al-Wa* iza; al-Mabasim wa al-Bisharat and al-Risala al 
Duriyya were a ll written and circulated for this purpose. See also 
al-Musabbihi, Akhbar, fo l.  134 f f  and A ntaki, 236. Both 
chorniders say that immediately after his succession to the 
Caliphate, a l-Zahir issued a decree denouncing the claims of
the Ghulat.
250.
There is much evidence fo suggesf ill at al-Hakim  was noi' behind
the movement. It is also logical to suppose that, had he given his
support to this allegation of his d iv in ity , he would have chosen one or
both of them as o ffic ia l leaders of the Isma* i i i  Da* wa in order fo
emphasise their authority. Neither of them received such an appointment,
nor any visible signs of his favour; not even one of the lavish g if is he
was accustomed fo bestow on those who pleased him. He would not have
summoned al-Kirmcmi from Iraq and authorised him fo counsel the Ghulaf
and half their extremism
Both the infernal and external policies of aNHakim strengthen
♦
the supposition that he was anxious fo spread the Shi*i !sma*i l i  doctrine 
throughout the Muslim world and fo convince the Muslim Umma that he was 
the rightful imam-Caliph. If would aiso seem that i f  this were necessary 
and d iff ic u lt, i f  would be even more so fo convince them that he was an 
incarnation of the D ivine. I f  al-Hakim himself believed in the teaching 
of Hamza and Darzi i t  would, no doubt, have been reflected in his personal 
life  and his activities as a ruler, a ll of which indicate an opposite point of 
view.
Druz teachings state that al-Hakim had no father and no son;
5 9
that he neither ate nor drank as did normal human beings. On the contrary,
58. Da*i Idris, quoted by M .K . Husayn in his introduction fo al-Ristila 
al-Wa* i^a , p .5 .
59. q l-N ihaya f? al-Taw liid, fo l.  55; Mithaq W aliy al-Zaman, fo i . 23; 
a l-Naqd a l-K h a fi, fo l.  39; al-Rlsdla al-Mustaqlma, fols. 108-9.
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mm.
al-Hakim claims a l-*A z iz  as his father and himself in direct descent from
60the Prophet Muhammad. He certainly married, and the occasions of the
birth of his children were celebrated by money and gifts bestowed on many 
/1o f his offic ia ls* There is also no evidence fo show that he contemplated 
forcing Muslims fo pay the Jizya as paid byA h l al-Dhimma, although the
Druz teaching clearly stated that a ll Muslims would have fo do so when the
-  62 Tawhid was declared. On the contrary, his policy is known to have
introduced considerable measures of fax exemption. A ll reports of his
infernal po licy show that if  was based on the strict observance of the law
63 “of Islam. The assumption that al-Hakim  aspired to be acclaimed as a
*
d iv in ity  appears fo be contradicted by the many S ijils and Amans, written 
by himself. They suggest that he was pious and devoted fo the funda­
mental principles of Islam. Each S ijil commences with the phrase "From
64the Slave of God" and ends with "By the assistance of G od ." He 
repudiated any appellation o f himself which suggested undue eulogy and
60. al-Miusabbihi, quoted by M aqrizi, ltti*a z  , annos 386 and 398.
.  i . . .  .
61. Maqrizi, |t t i*5 z , anno, 394.
62. Bud* al-Tawhid, fo ls .4 1 -2 .
63. See The Internal Policies of al-Hakim, Chapter VI of this thesis.
•
64. See for example, A n iak i, 229 f f ,  where a number of S ijils are
mentioned; l f t i* a z , annos 391-404; I bn a l-*A d im , Bughya, IV, 24. 
See also al-Hakim's S ijil of appointment of Qad? al-Q udaf reported 
by al-C;aigashancR, Subh , X , 385 f f ,  and quoted by *lndn, 249,
and by T a li* , Asl, 67; a l“ Hakim*s S ijil fo Harun Ibn Muhammad, 
the chief Pa*1 in Yanen reported by Da* i Idris, Uyun al-Akhbar,
V I, 271-3, edited by H . Hamdani, a l-S u lay ljiyyun .. . ,  301, and 
by A .  Majid, al-Hakim , 239.
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prevented his subjects from prostrating themselves before him or from
kissing either the ground, his hands or the straps of his horse's
65harness when any of them encountered him in the streets. He con­
sidered such extreme obeisance contrary to the teaching of Islam 
and signs of Shurk (heresy) created by the Byzantines.^ His instructions 
fo Qadis and Da* is a like were fo obey Islam and never fo question
either by judgment or action the teaching of the Quran or the traditions
67of the Prophet and previous Fatimid imams.
He summarises his own belief in a personal letter which he 
wrote fo one of his high officia ls: "I fear no one; beg no one except 
my God fo whom I submit and from whom S receive a ll bounties. My
Prophet is my grandfather; My imam is my father and my religion is
68sincerity and justice". These and many other reports,together w ith the
titles struck on his coinage, and his enthusiasm with which he bu ilt
mosques, a ll indicate that he could be considered as an extreme Miuslim
and certainly not a believer of Hamzafs doctrine,
«
65. A n iak i, 205; Risalat a l-N isa* a l-Kabira, Ms., B .M ., N o . add^ 
11,'559, f o l . 34; Sibt, Mir* a t, fo l . 206 and quoted by Ibn Taghri 
Bird!, N u ju m, SV, 177-8; Bffi*az, anno, 403.
66. Itfi*a z , anno, 403.
II !■ I II
67. See al-Hakim's S ijil of appointment of Qa<j? a l-Q udaf and his S ijil
fo the chief Da*T in Yanen, note 64.
68. This is reported by a considerable number of chroniclers. See 
lf f i* d z , anno, 403.
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From a close study of the sources i f  is reasonable fo suppose 
that al-Hakim  had no wish fo be considered as divine and that he 
neither supported nor encouraged the declarations of Darzi or Hamza.
On this hypothesis, if  may raise the question of why they were not 
punished for causing the dangerous split in his Da* w a.
i f  is, therefore, imperative fo remember that such movements, 
as in the case of the Druz, were not unique in the history of the Shi*d 
lsma*i!i Da* wa which had, since its inception, witnessed many crises 
arising from conceptions of imam's d iv in ity . in the life  time of Ja*far al~
tom
Sadiq, Father of Ismail, from whom Isma* ilis took their name, one of the 
Da* is, known as Abu al-Khatfab, declared Ja*far\; to be be divine and 
himself to be his P rophe t.^
Immediately after the establishment of the Fatimid State, during 
the reign of a l-M ahdi, a group of his followers seceded from the Da*wa
on the same issu e .^  In a l-M u * iz ls lifetim e if  was recorded that some
-  -  - 7 1Da*js also preached the d iv in ity  of the Imam.
The source of such extremism flows directly from the teaching of
the Isma* Ilf Da*wa itse lf. The T a *w il(allegorical interpretation of the
69. See al-Shahrisfani, ai~M?lal wa a l-N ih a l, 136; D .S . Margolioth, 
a r t . ,  "Khaftabiyya", £.1.
70. M .K , Husayn, Ta* ifa t a i-D ruz, 87.
71 . S .M . Stern, "Hetrodox Ismailism at the time of al-M u* iz z n, B JS* O ,A*S ♦,
XV ITS (1955);, 10 ff; M .K . Husayn, Ta? ifa t a I-D ruz, 87. The 
question of the growth of extremism in the Fatimid Da* wa has been 
fu lly  discussed by W. Madelung in his "Das Imamaf in der Fruhen Ismailit- 
schen Lehro", Der Islam, (1960-62), 43-135.
Holy Books and the Traditions of the Prophet) which is the basis of 
the isma* i i i  philosophy and teaching, is a two-edged weapon. From 
one aspect if  is the cause of the progressiveness in its teaching 
which made if  the most liberal movement in isldm. On the other 
hand, if  created a fe rtile  soil for misinterpretations and the growth of 
extremism. Many Da* is who were once o ffic ia l leaders of the Da*wa 
have expressed extreme views similar fo those of Darzi and Hamza, Even 
at the present time there are some who believe in the d iv in ity  of the Imam 
and the explanation they give is based on their own interpretation of the 
T a *w il. One of the most illum inating examples is the book of al-K irm ani, 
known as al-Riyad , in which the writer discusses the Ta; w il of three 
celebrated Isma* i l i  Da* is of the fourth century A .H . A  study of this 
book reveals how far Tay w il could deviate from the o ffic ia l line of the 
Da* wa . This o ffic ia l line was always under the supervision of the Imam 
and never declared him fo be d ivine.
The general policy of the Imams in dealing with the growth of 
extremism inside the circles of the Da* wa as observed throughout their 
reigns was cto employ moderate Da* is in order fo half extremism by means 
of discussion and debates. The Imams would not expel or punish any of 
their Da* is for his own personal views as long as they remained private. 
When, however, he openly declared them and endeavoured fo confirm them
with the o ffic ia l approval of the Imam, then action would be taken 
72against him,
a I-Hakim seems fo have adopted his father's methods in dealing 
with the extremists. When their views were expressed in private he 
used persuasion, but when they were [subiicly declared and claimed 
to be with his approval, they were persecuted. If is reasonably safe 
to assume that interpretations and views of extremism were first discussed 
in the privacy of the Majalis a l-Aw liya* (the meetings of the Du*at) in 
Dar-*al-Hikma. Sn 396/1005 we learn that al-Hakim ordered the
  ..................... . ■ i i  ■ i »
73closure of these M aja lis . If was, of course, impossible fo close 
them indefin ite ly and they were re-opened, but under the direction of 
a moderate Da* i , M alik Sbn Sa* id , the famous Q adi and learned man, 
was chosen for the position and the new leadership's teaching was based
74entirely on the o ffic ia lly  accepted books of the Da* w a.
Malik's leadership failed fo half the wave of extremism which
caused al-Hakim  to become angry and again in 400/1009 he ordered the
72. A study o f the Fatimid Da* wa's history and doctrine would
prove this. There were a number of Da* is who expressed views 
similar fo those of Hamza or Darzl and were not expelled be­
cause they did not try fo confirm them as the o ffic ia l line of 
teaching. For examples, see the poetry of Ibn Hani* al-Andalusi 
in his Diwan , Beirut (1952), and the views of al-Nakhshabi, 
al-RazT, and al-Sujisfam , discussed by a l-K irm ani, a l-R iyad.
^3* Itti* QZ/ anno, 396. Anfaki, 209, speaks of the closure
but does not give a date.
74. §fti*a%, anno, 398, says that M alik was handed the doctrinal
books which used to be read during the meetings of the Du* a t .
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“  75closure of the Majalis which remained so for about a year. in 401 /
1Q10, they were re-opened under the leadership of M a lik , but after
an o ffic ia l ceremony in which he was public ly honoured and given 
-  — 75
the post o fQ adi al~Qudaf. This may have been to show his approval
of Malik's leadership and line of teaching. If also indicates that he
authorised him fo deal with legal problems which might arise from the
situation, M a lik , again, failed in his task and al-Hakim seems to
have realised that the fa ilure was perhaps because he was a Qacfi
rather than a Da*? and appointed a new leader for the Da*wa. This
time he chose Da* I Khafgi n. Khafgin was appointed as director of
«  —  «  77
the Da* wa with the t it le  of Da*i a l-D u*af (chief of the Missionaries), 
thus emphasising that he was the o ffic ia l head of a ll Da* is and none should 
disobey him, al-Hakim also gave Khafgin the titles al-Sadiq al-Amin
» .......................................................................................................................................................................................................H i '  —  mm* ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ............................ «
78 w(the Truthful, the Trustworthy), thus indicating that only Khafgin's
teaching was the true teaching of the isma* i i i  Da* wa , as far as its imam
was concerned,
„  From the Druz writings we learn that some of these books
were Da*a? im al-lslam and a l-Sqfisar, both by a l-Q ad i 
a l“ Nu*man. See Risalat a l-N isa7 a l-Kab ira , fo l.  33, 
where they consider these books as the outer revelation (a l-Z a h ir).
75. Itti*a z , anno, 400.. ..  . .— *
76. Ib id ., anno, 401.
77. See Chapter HI, note 66.
78. Ib id .
To aid Khafgin and help him fo overcome the growing 
religious polemics inside the circles of the Da*wa, al-Hakim  
summoned the mosf distinguished Da* i of the time, a l-K irm ani, who 
was operating in Iraq. He came fo Egypt and there he wrote a number 
of Rasa* i! in which he explained the fundamental principles of the 
Isma* i l i  Da* wa and particularly the position of Smama and its relations 
with d iv in ity . In one of his Rasa* il which is known as Risalat al~
Mabasim wa al-Bisharaf, Kirmani emphasises that al-Hakim , like  any
_ ' 1 •
previous Imam, was d iv inely appointed and guided, but not of himself
7 9  _ .  -
div ine.  ^ Perhaps the mosf interesting and important of his Rasa*il on
this issue is al-Risala al-Wa* iza (the message of advice), which he wrote
as a reply to questions put fo him by al-Akhram. If confirms that
Kirmani, together with other o ffic ia l leaders, was trying fo persuade
the extremists fo abandon extremism and re jo in  the true teaching of
Isma* ilism . If clearly states that the extremists have disobeyed the
commands of al-Hakim  and claims that he denounced their claims of his
d iv in ity . In it ,  Kirmani discusses the views of the Druz and considers
them fo be Ghuluw and Kufr (extremism and heresy) and asks al-Akhram
to declare fo his followers the falseness of his teaching, threatening him
79, See Risalat al-Mabasim wa al-Bisharaf, ed. by M .K . Husayn,
in la *  ifat al-DrOz, 55 „* . •
258.
80  —  «with severe consequences if  he did not obey. Kirmani's
writings were copied and distributed fo many Da*fs and he held 
many lectures in the M aja lis . His campaign fo half the wave of ex­
tremism seems fo have worked successfully and influenced many Da* is 
fo rejoin the o ffic ia l line of teaching. The extremists realised that 
since Kirmani's activities were o ffic ia lly  supported by Khafgin, their 
failure inside the circles of the Da*wa appeared imminent. Their 
only alternative was to seek outside support by declaring their views 
fo the public. But on this issue they, amongst themselves, were in 
disagreement. Hamza believed that the open declaration of al-Tawhid, 
which he called al-Kashf (disclosure), could not be revealed without 
the help and approval of a l-Hakim . In one of his Rasa? il he speaks of 
a meeting which he held to discuss this problem. He says, addressing 
al-Barda* i (one of the Du*at who split with Darzi), "I have fold
you and a ll those who were present that Q a ; im a I -Z  a man (Hamza
. . . . .  f
himself) cannot declare the Q iyama (the open declaration of the teaching)
to the people of heresy and impiety without the support of the power and
  -  8]
sword of Mawlana (a l-H akim ). 1 Darzi and a considerable number of 
■ •
the Ghulat preferred fo declare the Kashf (or the Q iyama) and then his
leadership began fo materialise. He commenced his campaign by sending
80. See al-Risala val-Wa* iza, op. c it .
If is mosf surprising that in both of his articles, "Druz” and "al-Darzi 
and Hamza", Hodgson does not appear to have made use of any of 
al-KirmanPs Risalas. This may account for the fact that he did not 
doubt the claims of Hamza and the chroniclers' assumptions, which 
both suggest that al-Hakim was behind the movement,
81 . al-Sublja al-Ka* ina, *'fo !. 38 n
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letters to the officia ls of the State asking them to accept the new 
82
teaching. Sf is safe to assume that these letters were similar fo
that which was sent to Kirmani by al-Akhram, al-K irmani was an
offic ia l and received the letter at about the same time as Darzi's
83
communications with the offic ia ls, which was 408/1017, According fo 
the information available, Darzi asked them fo believe in the d iv in ity
of al-Hakim and fo abandon a ll previous religions and join the new
, 84order.
On receiving these letters, the offic ia ls informed al-Hakim
of Darzi's activ ities and he decided to employ force. The gates of
Cairo were closed for three days, during which time the police raided the
places of the extremists and searched their houses. Forty of them,
including Darzi, were killed and many more arrested and imprisoned
85to await tria l for heresy. Hamza and a number of his supporters went 
info hiding for about two years while every known extremist suffered 
persecution. In 410/1019 Hamza attempted fo reinstate himself. He 
denounced Darzi and fried to convince al-Hakim and his offic ia ls that he
82. Anfaki, 222, gives the names of some offic ia ls fo whom Darzi 
is said fo have sent letters.
83. The date of the writing of al-Risala a!-Wa* iza is 408/1018, 
according fo its author.
84. al-Kirmani in al-Risala al-V/a* iza summarises the major points 
of the letter whjch was sent to him by al-Akhram, who most 
like ly  was Darzi's spokesman. See also Anfaki, 220-3.
85 . a 1-Subha a l-K a ' ina, fo l . 39; al-Ri<jq wa al-Taslim, fo l . 18;
al-Ghaya wa al-Nasiha, f o l , 75 f f .
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had never supported Darzi. He was, however, very cautious. He did 
not enter Cairo but made his headquarters in a mosque known as
Masjid Tibr outside the gates of the c i f y . ^  From there he made corn-
87 — — —munication with the prisoners and wrote a letter fo Q adi a l-Q udaf
fe lling him that he had no legal right fo fry the prisoners since he him-
88self was not a Muwahhid .
His activ ities aroused the authorities' suspicions and suddenly 
his headquarters were raided by the troops. A number of his men were 
k illed , while he managed to escape through a secret door which he had
prepared. He went into hiding and none except, perhaps, his closest
89supporters ever knew his whereabouts.
While chroniclers failed to reveal what happened after 
Darzi declared the teaching fo the public, and seem fo have ignored
a 1-Hakim‘s o ffic ia l actions against the Druz supporters, a Druz Risala
■ ^  ■ " ■
gives a clear picture of the persecution. If says, "After their souls 
knew the meaning of al-Tawhid and were purified from a ll disbeliefs, he 
almighty, (a I-Hakim) appeared fo them from a different angle and, 
contrary to his orders. He commanded their crucifixion in public roads 
and streets; by his orders they were cursed in meetings and public places.
86. Anfaki, 223.
•  9
87. al-Rida wa al-Taslim, fol .19 ff; al-Subha a l-K a ' ina, fol .36 f f .
*  .................’  . .  —  . . . . . i t  . . .  , r
88. al-Risala al-Munfadha ila  a l-Q ad i, fo l.  54 f f .
----------r-i—- i i ii i ----------------- ' ' *
89. al-Subfoa a l-K a ' ina, f o l . 3 6 f f .
M .K . Husayn, Ta? ifa t al-DrPz, 82.
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He allowed their wives to be raped and their money to be confiscated.
Many of the Muwahhidun were drowned and some were burnt. Jews 
and Christians remained unharmed, while the Muwahhidun were 
humiliated, terrified and fled to distant la n d s ."^
The Cause of the Movement
As in many other religious movements in Islam, religion was
a cloak for po litica l purposes and the instrument by which support could
be ra llie d . Hamza was an ambitious man with a great desire for leader 
*
ship which is obvious from h$s writings. He gives himself titles and claims 
divinely chosen leadership of the "fa ith fu l"; and imposes total and
o]
unconditional obedience fo his person from the followers of his teach ing /
His remarkable attempts to be acclaimed as Imam-Caliph by the officials
of the State, the chiefs of the Fatimid army and those tribal chiefs who
were under the sovereignty of the Fatimids is sufficient evidence of his
personal ambition. In several Druz Rasa*il, Hamza or his followers" *
communicated with these elements, and openly asked them to depose 
«■* w
a l-Zah ir, al-Hakim's son and successor, and declare Hamza as their new . r * 1 *
92 ~
Imam-Caliph. ~ According to some Druz writings, a l-Z ah ir was an
• - 1 •
90. al-Tahjin wa a l-Ta*n if, fo l. 57 f f .
91. Bud* al-Tawhid, 43-4; al-Rida wa«-l-Taslim,fo i . 1 opI-Naqd a l-  
l/haff,' foT.37/ Kashf al-Haqa* iq , fol .117 ff; ql-Tanzlh,
fo l. 22; . Mifhaq W aliy al-Zaman, £qI ; 23.
92. There are a number of Rasa* il addressed to tribal chiefs and important 
persons. See for example, Risalat q l-*A rqb , /vis., B .M ., N o . add.
11,561; Taqfid Ban? al-Jarrah, Ms, B JVU, N o , add . 22,484-.
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imposter who usurped the rights of the righ tfu lly  designated and divinely
93
appointed imam. The records in the Druz writings concerning the 
dispute between Hamza and Darzi point out that the personal ambition 
and desire for leadership caused this disagreement. Hamza says that he 
sent a letter to Darzi explaining that he (Darzi) could not be the 
Imam of the order, he says: "For that you need to have, beside your 
body, a soul; the soul is knowledge of truth of which you are empty, 
while I have revealed of that knowledge an amount which you and a ll
mankind have failed fo do. If you claim to be a Mu*min (true believer)
94
declare my I mama as you have done before." This seems fo have been
a reply to a communication from Darzi, the contents of which are
unfortunately lost. But it  is quite clear, however, that Darzi had made
similar claims of leadership, in another Risala Hamza explains why
■ *
Darzi denounced him by saying, "In order to achieve leadership and 
dignified name (Talaban li al-Riyasa wa al-Ssm a i-L a tif) ” and adds 
that Darzi claimed the position of his Imam Hamza because of "envy 
and admiration (Hasadan TLahu wa I* jaban Bj R uhih j)” . ^  Supporting 
Darzi or sympathising with him became considered as heresy. Hamza 
says, "You (al-Burda? i and al-Habbdlpwho sympathised with Darzi and
93. al-Sublja al-Ka* ina,fol «3D; ’Rida wa al-Taslim , fol .20.
94. al-Ghava wa al-Nasiha, 71-2. For more discussion on this point,
see De Sacy, Expos6, I, 102; 11, 169; Cajra de Vaux, a r t. ,  
"Hamza", E»1. Cr. Hodgson, "al-Darazi and Hornza", 8 f f .
95. ai-Ghaya wa al-Nasiha, fo l. 38.
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entitled him as Sayyid al-Hadin (master of the Guides), (apparently 
one of Hamza's claimed titles), you have committed disbelief and heresy
a
(a l-K u fr wa a l—Shirk)
The declaration of al-Hakim to be divine appears to be merely 
a means to lead fo the abolition of the hereditary system of the 
I mama. As long as al-Hakim was accepted as only Imam, he would be
«  t h i j
succeeded by his own son, thus there would be no chance for Hamza
*
to achieve the position he desired. But i f  al-Hakim was declared as 
God and the old teaching was abolished and now doctrine substituted 
then he would be able fo claim leadership. Hodgson says, "For his 
very exaltation of al-Hakim beyond the level of a mere Imam le ft
the more immediate practical organisation of the faith frankly in Hamza's
97 -
hands." Had the teaching of Hamza or Darzi been merely another
interpretation of the Holy Books and traditions, inspired purely by
philosophical and intellectual thoughts, then there should have been no
reason for the po litica l implication which both leaders concluded.
Druzism (or Din al-Tawh id) appears fo have been a radical movement
within the Isma* i l i Da* wa . Its ultimate objective was fo abolish the
hereditary system of Imama and Khilafra and open the door for non-Fafimids
96. al-Subha al-!<a?ina, fo l, 38.
97. Hodgson, "al-Darazi and hjamza", 13.
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to become Imams, Its religious polemics are mere rationalizations
98and apologies to justify the ends. The method which Hamza adopted
was pure isma* i l i  . As Isma* i l i  imams and Da* is interpreted Islam
to support their claims, Hamza interpreted Isma* ilism for the same
«
reason. Even when he propagated inside the circles of the Da*wa 
his organisation followed the same scheme as the Isma* il ls .  It is 
d ifficu lt to ascertain when He™20 came fo Egypt, but it  is possible to
assume that it  was sometime after the establishment of Dar ai-Hikma _  r _^ . ---
when he began fo operate as Da* i , From the information revealed in
his own writing if  would seem that he maintained secrecy in converting
Da* js to his cause. Those who accepted his teaching would swear
allegiance and acknowledge him as the leader of the Inner Revelation
(Tawhid) in contrast to Khafgin who was considered the leader of the
98. if  is quite clear that the doctrinal argumentation and allegorical 
interpretation in almost a ll of the Rasa* il is focused on this po in t. 
See for example the interpretation of Wilaya (obedience or 
loyalty), H a jj, and Zakaf in al-Naqd gl-Khaf? ; the inter­
pretation of the theory of al-Mahdl in Bud* al-Tawhid, fol ,43ff;  
the interpretation of al-Hakim's commands and personal behaviour 
in al-N is5* al-Kabira/ fol .34;Haqfcjat Mayazhar, fol ,79 ff; 
al-Risala al-Mustaqima,fol ,108ffand the interpretations of 
the teachings of Majal is al-Hikma in a l-Naqd a l-K ha fi,
Bud* al-Tqwhid,foi.44ff; a l- fa n z fy  fol .23 f f .
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-  « 99
Outer Revelation ( f Iman). Hamza would then appoint them to work
—  ■ ■ - *
as Da* is for the Inner Revelation fo undermine the influence of the 
Outer Revelation. The number of Du*at who responded to Hamza's 
teaching, especially in Syria, and who were appointed there by the 
o ffic ia l leader Khafgin, indicates the secrecy of Hamza's method and 
the success of his activ ities.
Hamza appears to have planned fo create a solid support inside 
the Da*wa which would lead to popular support of a il Isma* ilis  and 
would enable him to proclaim himself as the leader of the Fatimid Da* wa 
and State. I f  al-Hakim died, those who had accepted Hamza as Hadi
ft r 1
(Guide) and Imam would not dispute his right to po litica l leadership.
The teaching of the Fatimid Da*wa concerning the theory of 
al-Mahd?, together with some aspects of al-Hakim's internal policy, 
created a fe rtile  soil for the growth of the ambitions and teaching. 
Apparently there was an atmosphere of desperation among the Du* at 
which stemmed from the frustration of a long waif for the Mahd? and
100the failure of the Fatimid regimes fo create the promised ideal State.
The o ffic ia l leaders of the Da* wa preached that the reigns of the previous 
Imams were only a period of preparation for the appearance of the Mahd? 
who would conquer the enemies of God, abolish tyranny and construct
99. al-Balagh wa a l-N ihaya , fo l.  57; al-Rida wa al-Taslim , fol .20.
100. Hodgson, "al-Darazi and Hamza", 17.
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equality and justice, al-Kirmani in his Risala al-Mabasim wa a l-  
B ishara t puts 'forward a long argument frying fo affirm that al-Hakim 
himself was the expected M a h d i . ^  Al-Hakim 's moralizing decrees,r i . #
his reduction -  and in some cases exemption -  of faxes, his distribution
of money and property, his endeavour fo maintain a high standard of
justice in the court, and his hum ility towards his poorer subjects, his
concern for building mosques and observing the duties of Islam and his
attitude towards Ahl al-Dhimma, a il emphasised by the Da*wa
102have undoubtedly contributed fo the growth of the movement.
Hamza exploited the situation for his own ends. He preached 
that al-Hakim  was not only the Mahdi but the Lord Himself, and his 
manifestation in physical form as such was a sign to indicate the rise of 
al-Mahdi . He also interpreted al-Hdkim's policies and attitudes fo 
have been exercised for the same aim and concluded that al-M ahdj 
would be a human being, div inely chosen and appointed to materialise 
the "ideal state". That human being was Hamza himself.
101. al-Ktrm ani, Risalat al-Mabasim wa al-B?sharat,op. c if .
102. C f. Hodgson, "a l-Darzi and Hamza1", 12 f f .
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CHAPTER VII 
THE END OF AL-HAKIM
*  r
A l-H ak im ^ end was one of the most mysterious events in Muslim 
history. On the 27th of Shawal 41 i/13 th  February 1021, ho went on 
his usual journey to Mount Muqatfam and never came back. O ffic ia ls , 
who waited for a few days for his return, went info the mountains 
fo search for him. They found his clothes but failed to find any trace 
of his body.
The mystery surrounding his end fascinated the chroniclers and 
writers of Muslim history. More pages are devoted to conjecture about 
his disappearance ( Ghayba) than to the whole twenty-five years of his 
re ign. Many stories have been written and many assumptions have been 
made in order fo c la rify  that mystery, but a satisfactory explanation has 
never been established.
in the legends which have reached us there are two lines of 
thought. One suggests that al-Hakim disappeared by his own w ill;  the 
other says that he was murdered. The first is found in the Druz writings 
and in the works of some Christian chroniclers. The other is in the versions 
of contemporary chroniclers.
The Druz, who believed that al-Hakim was the manifestation of 
God on earth, say that his disappearance was a punishment for the sins of
268. 
-  1those who disobeyed his commands and refused to join in Din al-Tawhid.
Bar Hobraeus, a Christian chronicler, says that the Lord Jesus
had appeared to al-Hakim and reprimanded him for his ill-treatm ent of
Christians, so in order fo save his soul, al-Hakim adopted Christianity
and became a monk.^
Anfctki is the first Christian chronicler who furnished this
idea. He applied fo al-Hakim a mystic behaviour and said that he often
retired fo the mountain for solitude and fo ask God to appear and speak fo
him as he had done unto Moses. He even compares al-Hakim 's case with
that of Nebuchadnezzar, the King of Babylon, who was alleged fo have
been punished by God for his destruction of the Holy Temple of Jerusalem
ibn ai-Muqaffa* enlarges upon this idea and adds that towards the
end of his reign, al-Hakim became a great admirer of Christianity and
■
spent hours, and sometimes days, with the monks in their monasteries
eating their simple food and praising their religious beliefs and way of 
4life . A t the time of Bar Hebraeus this story was believed by many 
Christians. He says that many imagined that al-Hakim had gone fo 
the desert and become a monk, withdrawing completely from public life .
1. Seea l-S iji l al-Mu* a ilaq, Druz Ms. B .M . no. add. 11,558,
ed. by de Sacy, Chresfomafhie Arabe, Paris (1826), II, 67, by
* Snan, al-Hakim , 259; and by M ajid, al-Hakim , 242. Excerpts 
from this S ijil are translated info English by P*K.  H iff i,  The 
Origins of the Druze People and Religion, 61 .
2 . Bar Hebraeus, Chronographia, 189.
3. Anfakr, 218.
4 . Ibn cii-Muqaffa*, II, 133 f f .
He adds: " I, the feeble one, heard from Egyptian 'lawyers' 
when I was liv ing in Damascus, that at the time when al-Hakim was 
persecuting the Christians, Christ, our Lord, was revealed unto him as unto 
Paul, and from that moment he believed and departed secretly to the 
desert.
Such explanations, however, were mere interpretations of the 
mystery of a I-Hakim's death in order fo support the writer's own religious 
views. They have drifted from logic and rea lity and therefore i f  is un­
wise to give them any credence, al-Hakim , as contemporary chroniclers 
agree, was k ille d . The signs of several knife cuts and patches of blood 
stains were found on his clothes, they reported.^
In their reports concerning what happened before al-Hakim 's.dis-
t
appearance, the contemporary chroniclers, Anfaki, Ibn al-Sabp and a l-* •
«  7
Q uda*i, agree with each other except for some minor details. a l-Q uda*i's 
*  *
story, however, appears to be the mosf reliable since he was an o ffic ia l 
in the service of the Fatrmids at that time. He relates that on the fateful
5 . Bar Hebraeus, Chronographia, 189.
6. A n iak i, 234. See alsoQuda* i quoted by Ibn Taghri Birdi, Nujum,
IV, l90;^Sbn aj-Sabi* quoted by Sibt, M ir*a t, fo l.  209A, and by
Ibn Taghri B ird i, Nujum , IV, 188-9; Sahib Tarikh al-Qayrawan
quoted by Ibn al-Dawadari, VS, 299; Ibn Sa*id quoted by Maqrlzl, 
ltti*a z  , anno, 411.
7. See Aintaki, 234; Quda* i quoted by Ibn Taghri Birdi, Nujum, !V ,J 9 0  
Ibn al-SabH quoted by Sibt, Mir* a t, fo l . 207 f f . and by Ibn Taghri 
Birdi, Nujum, IV , 184 f f .
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-  8 night, al-Hakim went to mount Muqattam accompanied by two servants.
« *  •
9
While on his way he met nine Beduins from the tribe of Banu Qurra who
appealed fo him for financial help. He sent them to Bayt a l-M a l together
with one of his servants to receive a sum of money which he g ra n te d .^
Then he continued his journey until he reached a place called Qabr a l-
Fuqa* i where he commanded the other servant to return to the Palace.
On the follow ing morning, the offic ia ls of his Court, together with the
dignitaries, gathered near the slopes of the mountain for a whole day
awaiting his return. They remained there for two more days and then
decided fo go and search for him. A fter a long walk they found the ass
which al-Hakim had been rid ing. Its saddle and bridle were not removed
but its front legs had been cut o ff by a sword. They followed foot steps
which led them fo a small pond and there they found a I-Hakim's clothes,
#
11s till buttoned up, in the pond.
al-Musabbihi says that al-Hakim's k ille r was a man from Upper 
Egypt (a l-S a*id), He was captured in 415/1024 and confessed to having
JUV
8. Anfaki, 233, says accompanied by one servant on ly.
9. A n fa k i, 233, says seven Beduins. Jbn al-Sabi* quoted by Sibt,
Mir* a t, fo l.  209, and by ibn Taghri Birdi, Nujum, IV, 185, says
fen Beduins.
1-41 "
10. Anfaki, 233, says the sum was five thousand Dirhams. Ibn a I-
Sabi* says ten thousand Dirhams.
11. Quda*J quoted by ibn Taghri Birdi, Nujum, !V , 190 f f .  See
also Sahib Tarikh al-Qayrawan quoted by Ibn al-Dawadari, V I, 
299; A fly wa I a ir  Ma nq u I, fols. 112 f f . ;  Ibn Sa* id quoted by 
M aqrizi, lt f i*a z , anno, 411,
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committed the murder together with three other men who fled fo different
parts of the Muslim world. On the man's person, al-Musabbihi says,
"a I-Hakim's scarf and a piece of his head skin were found". He adds
that the man committed suicide during the interrogation by stabbing
12
himself with a knife which he carried on his person.
Even with the approval of an authority like M aqrizi, such a
story does not appear very convincing. If is very unlikely that a murderer
would keep on his person evidence of his crime for four whole years. St
is also unlikely that a prisoner, being interrogated for the murder of the
Imam, would be allowed to keep a knife on his person. The man, as a l-
Musabbihi's report suggests, was a trouble-maker. He attempted fo create
a rebellion against the Fafimids in Upper Egypt. It may be that his capture
and execution offered the Fatimid authorities an opportunity fo emphasise
that al-Hakim was dead. There are a considerable number of reports which
suggest that many people believed that he was still a live . Ibn al-Muqaffa*
says that since al-Haklm's disappearance up to the end of his son's reign
427/1035, people imagined that he was liv ing . Many pretended fo be him
and collected money from the inhabitants of the mountains. He speaks of
a magician named Sharuf, who resembled al-Hakim , and took advantage of
the tribe of BanuGurra amongst whom he lived for two years pretending
13fo be al-Hakim  hiding his identify for his own reasons.
12. al-Musabbihi quoted by Maqrizi, if f i*a z , anno, 415, and Khifaf, II, 289.
13. Ibn al~*Muqaffa*, II, 138.
Maqrizi speaks of a Kufami named Ahmad Ibn Tatawa
who arrived in Egypt in 415/1024 and claimed fo have come from Kufa
14m n 1
in Iraq where he had been in the company of a l-H akim . Ahmed
claimed, says Maqrizi, that al-Hakim sent him as a messenger to warn
*
people of their evils. He also mentions that a black servant named *Anbar,
who worked as a porter in al-Hakim's court, met a l-Z ah ir once and tried fo• .
convince him that his father was s till a live and would return very so o n ,^
Even up fo the time of al-Musfansir (427-488/1035-1095) there were
some who believed such claims. Maqrizi speaks of a man named
Sulayman whose resemblance fo al-Hakim encouraged him fo make an
attempt to fake over power. He organised a group of men fo preach the
return of al-Hakim and in the month of Rajab 434/February 1043, he
entered the royal palace declaring himself as the returning Imam. His
16attempt was foiled and he was captured and executed.
It is also possible that such an explanation by al-Musabbih i 
was made fo counter the rumours which accused Sit a l-M u lk  of plotting 
against her brother. Ibn al-SabP, who considered these rumours factual, 
as w ill be discussed later, relies on the information of a man named Abu a l-  
Fara| Ibn Zakariyya al-Qarqawi who was in Egypt at the time of al-Hakim's
lt t i* a z , anno, 415.
15. Ib id .
16. Ib id ., anno, 434.
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17disappearance.
St is more like ly  that the story of al-Musabbihi was a fabrication
made by the Fatimid authorities fo serve either, or both, purposes. The
chronicler himself was an o ffic ia l employed by them.
Ibn al-Sabi* states that al-Hakim's death was a result of a
conspiracy arranged by his sister Sit a l-M u lk  and a Kufami chief known
as Sayf al-Daw la, *A li Ibn Husayn Ibn Dawwas. He adds that al-Hakim
accused his sister of immoral behaviour and threatened her life . She made
communications with Ibn Dawwas, who also feared al-Hakim  and considered
him a danger fo his life , and promised him the chief command of the
army and the administration of the State affairs in return for his help fo get
rid of al-Hakim and proclaim his son as successor, ibn Dawwas agreed and
selected two of his mosf reliable black slaves, paid them a vast sum of
money and gifts, and planned with them how fo commit the murder. They
went to the mountain and waited secretly there until al-Haktm came. They
killed  him and carried his body fo their master who took if  to the palace of
18Sit a l-M u lk  where she buried i f ,
17. Ibn al-Sabi* quoted by Sibt, M ir*a t, f o l . 206A.
18. Ibn al-Sabi? quoted by Sibt, M ir*a t, fols. 206 f f . ,  and by Ibn Taghri
Birdi, Nujum, IV , 185 f f .  See also Ibn a i-Q a lan is i, 79; Ibn a l-  
Z a fir, f o l . 63 ff;  Ibn a l-A th ir, IX, 130 ff; Ibn a l-Jaw zl, V I, 297 ff> 
al-Dhahabi, Tarfkh al-islam , anno, 411, and * ibar, III, 106 ff;_
Ibn a l-*A m id , anno, 411; Ibn al-Dawadari, V I, 301; Ibn Kafhty 
X II, 10; Sbn/\bi Tayy quoted by Maqrizi, 8t f i* a z , anno 411; Ibn 
Shahln, Twarikh a l-M uluk wa a l-Salafin , fo l . 43; Abu a l-F ida*, II, 
151? Ibn Ayas, 1, 57; ai~Yafi*1, M ?r*a fa l-J inan, III ,  24 f f .  "
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This story of Ibn a l-Sab i*, although fu ll of exaggeration and 
assumptions, is not without foundation. Sts source was the rumours which 
Abu al-Faraj heard in Cairo and carried with him to Baghdad. These 
rumours were the by-product of some events which occurred before and 
after al-Hakim 's death. In 404/1013 al-Hakim proclaimed his cousin *Abd 
al-Rahim as successor fo the Caliphate and ordered his name fo be read in
19the Khufba and fo be struck on the coinage. This meant separating 
the lmama from the Khilafa , which was oonfrary fo the policy of the 
previous Fatimid Imams. It was the first time since they came to power that 
the Caliph appointed somebody other than his own son fo succeed him.
Such an important decision was opposed by some members of 
the royal fam ily, and by some high o ffic ia ls . They preferred al-Hakim 
fo follow  his ancestors' line and appoint his own son.
Maqrizi reports that the news of Abd al-Rahim's appointment 
was not welcomed favourably in Maghrib. Nasir al-Daw la, Abu Munad 
Badis, the chief of Sinhaja and Fatimid Wall there, was very displeased 
with i f  and said, "Had if not been that Imam's orders are not fo be interfered
-  * Uyun a l-M a*a rif, Ms. Bib, N a t.,  Paris, N o .1490 Arabe, anno
411; Tarlkh Migr wa fa da* iluha, Ms, Bib, N a t.,  Paris, N o .1816 
Arabe, anno, 411; aMshaq*?, al-Rawd al-Basim f? Akhbar Man 
Mada min a l-*A w a lim , Ms. Bib. N a t,,  Paris, N o , 1562 Arabe, 
anno, 411 .
19. Anfaki, 207-8; H ti*az, anno, 404, and Khitat, Si, 288.
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with, 1 would have written asking him not to withdraw this matter 
from his son's hands.
Hp« M*
M alik I bn Sa< id, the chief judge and director of the Da<wa
21was executed in 405/1014 for his opposition to the appointment.
Since aM-lakim's son was only ten years aid and unable to 
*
organise an opposition to bring pressure on his father, his aunt, Sit a l-
Mulk appears to have assumed the role, Maqrizi speaks of her activities
"  . 22 ~ as being a constant worry to a l-Hakim . A fter al-Hakim 's disappearance
• •
she became the real ruler in the Fatimid State. Chroniclers say that she
2 Qexcellently administered the State affairs on behalf of her nephew.
The first significant action she took was to execute Abd al-Rahim.
She made the W azir, Khatir a l-M u lk , ‘ Ammar Sbn Muhammad write a
letter to *Abd al-Rahim, who was then in Damascus, asking him to come im-
mediately to Egypt. The letter bore a I “ Hctkim's signature and was written on
24his behalf to appear as his command. When ‘ Abd al-Rahim arrived in
20. Stti<az, anno, 404.■ » /  f
21 . See 8tfi*a% , anno, 405; Ibn bjajar and Ibn Shah in in the
supplement to Kindi's book, Ta rlkh Qucjat Misr, 608.
^  * Itti^az , anno, 405.
23. See Anfaki, 235 ff; Ibn al-C ialanisi, 80; Itfi* a z , annos, 411, 412.
See also Ibn al-M uqaffa7, SI, 137; Sbn Taghrl Bird], Nujum, IV, 196 
Sbn Kathir, XU, 10 f f .
24, See Sbn al-Sabi7 quoted by Sibt, M ir7a t, fo l . 209A and by Sbn Taghri
Bird?, Nujum, IV, 188.
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25Egypt he was imprisoned and later executed. This was followed by
the execution of some high o ffic ia ls . Ibn Dawwas was put to death after
— 26 — being accused of al-Hakim's murder. The Wazir ‘ Ammar ibn Muhammad. ' ■ •
27was also k ille d . Such events have undoubtedly raised many questions
and made people suspect that Sit al~Mulk may have conspired against her
brother and after she succeeded in removing him, she turned against those
with whom she had plotted in order to bury her secret.
On the other hand, there are indications which contradict this
conjecture. The appointment of *Abd al-Rahim became uncertain
towards the end of al-Hakim 's reign. In 409/1018 al-Hakim  is reported• «
to have no longer trusted him and had him arrested for a w h i l e  .28 <?Abd 
al-Rahim realised the change in al-Hakim's attitude and made communica­
tion with Hassan Ibn a l-M u fa rrij, the chief of the Jarrahids of Palestine,
29 -seeking Hassan*s support in case of need. al-Musabbihi, Antaki and • • •
the Druz writings speak of another cousin of al-Hakim named Abu Hashim
25. Antaki, 236;Quda<i quoted by Ibn Taghri Birdi,- Nujum, IV , 194;
l t t i f az, anno, 427.
26. Ibn al-Sabi^ quoted by Sibt, M ir7 at, fo l . 210A, and by Sbn Taghri 
Birdi, Nujum^  IV , 192; Quda<T quoted by Ibn Taghri Birdi, Nujum, 
IV , 191; Antaki, 238; lt t i*a z , anno, 411.
27. A ntaki, 238; Itti*az  , anno, 412. See also Ibn al-Sabi7 quoted
by Sbn Taghri Birdi, Nujum, IV, 192.
ltti*a%, anno, 409. See also Ibn a l-Q a lan is i, 70.
29. Antaki, 226-7.
277.
(Abbas Ibn Shu«ayb who was known as Wall <Ahd Amir al~Mu* minm
(the Caliph's h e ir ) , ^
The fact that the succession of al-Hakim's son was not met with
any significant opposition indicates that neither <Abd al-Rahim nor Abu
Hashim were seriously expected to succeed al-Hakim to the Caliphate. So
in the year of 411/1020 there were no reasons strong enough to encourage
Sit a l-M u lk  to arrange her brother's death and had she been w illing  to k ill
him over the question of the succession, then she should have done ft much
earlier. If is more like ly  that she only took advantage of the situation and
proclaimed her nephew as Caliph and struck ruthlessly against those who
tried to create troubles. Antaki says that the reason behind the execution
of Khatir a l-M u ik  was that he attempted to influence the young Caliph into
31adopting a life  of leisure while he assumed power.
The story of Sbn a I-Sabi?, however, is possible but not fac tua l. His
o
explanation is based on circumstantial evidence and not on recorded facts.
The element of guess-work and imagination is quite apparent in its details.
For example, he reports the exact words which, he says, al-Hakim  and his
*
killers exchanged. He also relates, in detail, what was supposed to be the
30. al-AAusabbihi, Akhbar Misr, fo l,  140 ff; Risalat al-Tanzlh, 
fo l. 26; AntdkT, 220, 223. See also lff i*a z , 427,
31. Antaki, 238,
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very conversation between Sit a l-M u lk  and Ibn Dawwas when they met
to plan the murder. Then he adds that Sit a l-M u lk  k illed  everyone who 
32knew her secret.
Antaki believes that the murder was arranged by Ibn Dawwas
m
alone. He says that o ffic ia ls, who searched the house of the Kutami 
chief found there evidence of the crime. al-Hakim's own knife, which 
was on his person before his journey to the mountain, was found amongst 
Ibn Dawwas*s possessions, He interprets the cause of the murder to have 
been a constant fear on the part of the Kutami chief -  a fear that al-Hakim 
might order his execution as he had so many of the high offic ia ls of his
  M K4
court. al-Hakim 's killers, in Antaki's story, are the Beduins he met on 
his way to the mountain. Four of them came with the servant to receive 
the grant from Bayt a I-M ai while the rest remained there to k ill him.
Antaki adds that these Beduins were hired for this purpose by the chief,
•“* 34 
Ibn Dawwas.
This story, however, appears to be a mere repetition of what the 
Fatimid authorities declared after the execution of Ibn Dawwas. If is very
32. Ibnal-Sabi7 quoted by Sibf, M ir7at, f o l . 2lOA,and by Ibn Taghri
Birdi, Nufum, IV, 192.
33. Antaki, 238.
34. Antaki, 238.
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unlikely that Ibn Dawwas, if  in fact he was responsible, would retain 
any evidence that would prove his g u ilt. Although he was accused of 
murdering the Imam, his execution was, more like ly , a po litica l man- 
oeuver. He and Khatir a l-M u lk , ‘ Ammar Ibn Muhammad, were power­
ful chiefs of the Kutami faction. With the disappearance of al-Hakim 
and the succession of his child , they might have attempted to exploit 
the situation for their own benefit. Sbn Dawwas was acting as 
Mudabbir ai-Dawla (administrator of the State's affairs) before he was 
killed
in their conjectures concerning al-Hakim's death, chroniclers 
overlooked two great possibilities? personal vengeance and assassination 
for po litica l aims. In 410/1019 al-Hakim  is said to have commanded his 
black troops to punish the inhabitants of the C ity of Misr for their dis­
obedience of his orders. The troops entered the c ity  and, according
to chroniclers, committed many atrocities, including the burning of a
36part of the c ity  and the rape of many of its women. Such actions had 
undoubtedly created a great indignation amongst the people concerned and 
it  is possible that some of them sought personal vengeance by murdering 
the Imam-Caiiph whom they believed to have been responsible for causing 
the disaster.
^  * IttH az, anno, 411 .
36. See Antaki, 224 ff; !bn al-SabP quoted by Sibt, M ir7a t, fo l . 207A,
and by lbn  Taghri Birdi, Nujum, IV, 180 ff? Ibn a l-Z a fir , fo l. 63 f f .
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Assassination for Political Alms
There are strong indications which suggest that the extreme 
Da* is may have k illed  al-Hakim in order to gain po litica l success. The
1 1  11 j i  ^
most significant fact of the whole issue of al-Hakim's Ghayba was the
I  !_
discovery of his clothes still buttoned while his body had completely 
disappeared. This indicates that the k ille r had purposely le ft the clothes 
in such a manner as to emphasise that al-Hakim's body was nothing but a
m
spirit that vanished miraculously. Any other k ille r would have had no
reason for leaving the clothes thus.
Chroniclers state that the day after al-Hakim's disappearance,
37the sun was eclipsed, which suggested that the night of the 28th of 
Shawwal 411 A .M . may have been carefully chosen for the imam's death to 
make his Ghayba coincide with the eclipse of the sun. Events of this kind 
have great effectiveness in stirring the emotions of the masses.
In the Druz Risala, a l-S ijil a !-M u*a llaq , the writer clearly 
states that al-Hakim  would never be found nor would anybody be able to 
determine his whereabouts. He warns people against trying to search for 
him and promises them that he would w illing ly  reappear as soon as they 
abandoned their evils and purified their souls (the acknowledgement of
37. Quda* i quoted by Ibn Taghri Birdi, Nujum, IV, 196; Ibn Sa* id 
quoted by Maqrizi, ltti*ch:, anno, 411,
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38the new teaching and the leadership of Hamza). The most important
fact about this Risala is that it  was written by Mawla Amir al~Mu7minin
(most probably Hamza) and dated in the month of Dhu a I -Q  a* da 411 A •
39probably a few days after al-Hakim's death. This raises the question: 
how could the writer of the Risala be sure that the Imam would never 
be found while according to chroniclers1 reports Sit a i-M u ik  and high
officia ls waited for more than forty days before establishing such a con-
, . 40elusion.
If has already been mentioned that the Iqpders of the extremists 
had fallen under a severe pressure from the authorities during the last four 
years of al-Hakim 's reign f a pressure that curtailed their activities and
p
made the preaching of their cause a hazardous, if  not impossible, task, 
al-Hakim's disappearance, as i t  happened, would be the most convenient 
event for their struggle. It would l i f t  the pressure and emphasise their 
doctrine which is based on the belief of his d iv in ity  and thus give Hamza and 
his supporters a new in itia tive  and better chance.
38. See supra, note n o .l .
39. See ib id .
40. Antaki, 235. See alsoQuda* i,  quoted by Ibn Taghri Birdi, Nujum, 
IV , 190 ff? Itfi* az, anno, 411 .
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However, available informafion concerning al-Hakim 's end is
*
not conclusive; the stories which have been written are mere con­
jectures and assumptions based on the circumstances surrounding the 
event and unless a new and coherent material is discovered his death 
or "disappearance" w ill remain an enigma in the history of Islam.
On the 10th of Dhu a l-H ijja  411/4fh April 1021, al-Hakim
*  *
was o ff ic ia lly  declared dead after reigning for twenty-five years and 
one month. His age was th irty-six years and seven m o n t h s H i s  only 
son ‘ A li was proclaimed Imam-Caliph on the same day and received the 
t it le  a l-Z ah ir Li I7Zaz Din A llah by which he became known.
41. This is reported by almost al! chroniclers. See M aqrizi, jffi*a z  , 
anno, 411 and Khijat, 289.
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